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ABSTRACT 
 
A Classic Model in a Low Fertility Context: The Proximate Determinants of Fertility in 
South Korea and the United States. (May 2010) 
Christine Elizabeth Guarneri, B.A., The College of New Jersey; 
M.S., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Dudley L. Poston, Jr. 
 
John Bongaarts‘ proximate determinants model of fertility has accounted for over 
90 percent of variation in the total fertility rate (TFR) of primarily developing nations 
and historical populations. Recently, dramatically low fertility rates across the globe 
have raised questions regarding whether this model could be applied to exclusively 
below-replacement nations. This study follows Knodel, Chamratrithirong, and 
Debavalya's 1987 analysis of fertility decline in Thailand by conducting in-depth case 
studies of the proximate determinants in two low fertility countries over time: South 
Korea, where fertility is well below the level of replacement, and the United States, 
where fertility has hovered around replacement level for many years.  Then, the fertility-
inhibiting effect of the proximate determinants is assessed by comparing the quantitative 
index representing each determinant measured in the 1960s/1970s with its measurement 
in the 2000s.  For both years, I consider the fertility level that would prevail in the 
determinant‘s presence as well as the level that would exist in its absence.  Finally, I use 
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each of the indices to calculate the TFR and assess how the strength of the model varies 
over time in the two countries.    
Ultimately, results indicate that the proximate determinants model does not offer 
a clean picture of the fertility level in either South Korea or the United States; when 
trends uncovered by the case studies are compared to the results of the quantitative 
analysis, a number of inconsistencies are revealed.  This suggests that certain 
components in the model may need to be respecified for more effective application in 
low-fertility contexts.  However, that is not to say that it offers no insight into fertility at 
all or that it is no longer a useful tool.  On the contrary, it is shown that the proximate 
determinants model holds a lot of potential for analysis in low-fertility nations.  The 
implications of these results, as well as the need for improvements in international data 
collection efforts, are also discussed.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
For the latter part of the previous century, the worldwide ―population explosion‖ 
took center stage.  Popular media stories of the baby boom in the countries of  the 
developed world and uncontrolled and uncontrollable fertility  in many countries of the 
developing world became constant;  statistics of record-breaking population growth fed 
the public‘s fears.  Policy makers and global activists turned to possible solutions or 
controls, offering anything they could find to prevent the overburdening of the Earth.  
Despite these pessimistic overtures, known by some as neo-Malthusianism,  it is of 
particular interest that in 2004, Ben J. Wattenberg published Fewer: How the New 
Demography of Depopulation Will Shape Our Future, in which he identified 
depopulation, not overpopulation, as the new great challenge of the twenty-first century.  
―Birthrates and fertility rates ultimately yield total population levels,‖ he explained, ―and 
never have birth and fertility rates fallen so far, so fast, so low, for so long, in so many 
places, so surprisingly‖ (2004: 5; emphasis his).  As of 2009, 75 countries were 
estimated to have total fertility rates below 2.1, the number known as the ―rate of 
replacement,‖ or the number of babies per woman necessary for a developed, low-
mortality society to theoretically replace itself exactly (excluding the influence of 
migration) (Haub and Kent 2009).  Morgan and Taylor estimate that just 3 percent of the 
current world population lives in countries that have not begun fertility decline, noting  
____________ 
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that ―once a fertility transition has begun, it does not stop until birth rates of 2 or below 
have been achieved‖ (2006: 378).   
The consequences of this new demographic reality cannot be overstated: changes 
in fertility rates directly affect population levels, which have widespread economic, 
political, social, psychological and environmental implications that easily extend beyond 
national boundaries.  Additionally, the combination of below-replacement fertility and 
resultant population aging has generated numerous concerns that have not previously 
been addressed by nations in any detail.  For instance, fewer babies imply a smaller 
population of future workers to maintain the current economic infrastructure, to generate 
new ideas and technologies to remain competitive in the global marketplace, and to pay 
into social security programs.  The latter is of utmost concern, and is disproportionately 
called upon to highlight the potential severity of the impending labor shortages now 
forecasted for a number of developed countries.  Without enough babies to replace the 
population, the key question is who will support current workers when they reach old 
age?  With millions less people, can these societies continue to function?   
Underlying such questions is the reality that ―no country has transitioned back to 
replacement-level fertility (for any five-year period) once falling below it‖ (Morgan and 
Taylor 2006: 377).  Moreover, there is the nagging knowledge that pro-natalist policies 
have been consistently deemed ineffective.  The failure of countries to raise their fertility 
rates significantly is mentioned throughout the literature: Huguet comments on how a 
number of countries have tried to stimulate their fertility levels by instituting programs 
such as those that focus on making it easier for women to have children and/or to care 
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for an elderly family member, while at the same time maintaining a career.  Yet any 
resulting increases have been ―modest to date, and have not reversed fertility declines‖ 
(2003: 108).  Similarly, Lutz and Skirbekk describe family policies in Europe that are 
based on an ―equal-opportunity rationale and aim to help women combine childrearing 
with employment‖ (2005:705).  Despite varied forms and applications, they report that 
these policies have had little or no effect on period fertility in the countries with lowest 
fertility.  Grant declares that ―it will take a massive effort to bring fertility back to 
replacement level,‖ adding that ―industrial nations have had notoriously little success in 
influencing personal decisions about child-bearing, even where there is some consensus 
as to desirable family size‖ (2001: 398).   
But why is this?  One possibility is that the pro-natalist policies instituted thus far 
have not effectively targeted the true sources of low fertility in a given country.  Fertility 
rates are affected by a number of distinct and different factors, including sexual behavior 
and marriage patterns, contraceptive prevalence and use, frequency of induced abortion, 
and postpartum infecundability.  Thus, hypothetically speaking, a country might institute 
a policy to make day care widely available in an effort to increase the compatibility of 
having children with having a career.  However, it might actually be that a cultural 
stigma exists against marrying young, resulting in a shorter amount of time during which 
women can start families, and ultimately a lower number of births across their lifetimes.  
Such a country might well be more likely to obtain the desired fertility results from a 
policy addressing that cultural stigma.  Making this kind of determination is an area in 
which much more research remains to be done.  If it could be accurately identified why a 
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fertility rate is low or ultra-low, it is quite possible that more effective policies could be 
put forth.   
Concerns such as these call for a more thorough understanding of below-
replacement fertility.  Because this phenomenon was unprecedented and unexpected by 
most, it is likely that the standard fertility models applied in the past may no longer be as 
helpful in the examination of below-replacement fertility nations.  This is especially 
likely when both the pace of decline and variation in the fertility levels across these low 
fertility nations are taken into consideration (Morgan and Taylor 2006).  After all, as 
Morgan and Taylor explain, ―the implications of a TFR of 1.25 are vastly different than 
those of a TFR of 1.75, as are the potential policy responses to ameliorate the 
consequences‖ (2006: 376-377).   
With the above and related issues in mind, I became interested in investigating 
whether one of the most well-known fertility-based models of all—John Bongaarts‘ 
proximate determinants model of fertility—would hold up in analyses of strictly below-
replacement populations.  This model has been shown to account for over 90 percent of 
variation in the total fertility rate of a combination of primarily developing nations and 
historical populations.  If this model does not meet similar success when applied 
exclusively to below-replacement nations then, perhaps, a respecification of the model is 
in order.  Either way, the resulting knowledge could well lead to a better understanding 
of why fertility rates are so low, and of why efforts to raise them have been so relatively 
unsuccessful.  If so, it is possible that more effective policies could be recommended.  In 
any case, such an analysis could well provide nations with additional information they 
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could use to determine how to adapt to their new demographic reality, and which would 
hopefully contribute to making this process of adaptation less complicated.   
Therefore, the purpose of this dissertation is to examine the effectiveness of the 
proximate determinants model in a below-replacement fertility context.  This will be 
done in two separate types of analyses modeled after the style of Knodel, 
Chamratrithirong, and Debavalya‘s 1987 study of fertility decline in Thailand.  In the 
first, I will conduct case studies of two of the countries included in Bongaarts‘ original 
investigation—South Korea and the United States.  By doing so, I seek to identify how 
the proximate determinants have changed the course of fertility in these counties over 
time.  In each case study I will undertake an in-depth look at the four primary proximate 
determinants, one by one, at the sub-national level. I will consider, for example: 
 How have marriage trends changed over time in each of these countries?  
  Does most exposure to sexual intercourse occur within marriage?   
 How has the extent of nonmarital sexual relations and its implications for 
fertility changed over time?   
 What is the proportion of couples unable to bear children due to primary 
sterility? 
 Are there any reliable statistics on coital frequency? 
 What kinds of lactation data are available in these countries?   
 Has there been a noticeable/significant change in the mean duration of 
breastfeeding? 
 What is the level of contraceptive awareness in these countries? 
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 How reliable are the data on induced abortion? 
 If it is believed that current data underestimate induced abortions, by how 
much? 
 Are people more/less willing to have had an abortion due to prevailing 
religious beliefs in these countries? 
These questions are among the many I will address in an effort to better grasp the 
manifestation of each determinant in two very different nations over a thirty-year period.  
Then, in the second analysis, the fertility-inhibiting effect of the proximate determinants 
will be assessed by comparing the quantitative index representing each determinant 
measured in the 1960s/1970s with its measurement in the 2000s.  For both years, I will 
consider the fertility level that would prevail in the determinant‘s presence as well as the 
level that would exist in its absence.  Finally, I will use each of the indices to calculate 
the TFR and assess how the strength of the model varies over time in the two countries.   
 I expect that the results of these analyses will reveal that certain modifications to 
the proximate determinants model may well be in order.  For example, Bongaarts 
included ―proportion married‖ as one of the four original proximate determinates with 
the intention of representing women of reproductive age who were engaging in sexual 
intercourse regularly (Bongaarts 1978).  Decades ago, this was believed to be a fairly 
accurate proxy for exposure to sexual unions and accordingly an accurate determinant of 
the number of births a woman would have.  However, gender norms in many developed 
countries have changed substantially over the past 30 years and with them general 
acceptance toward sexual activity outside of marriage.  Today, 91% of females in the 
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United States are likely to have premarital sex before age 30 (Finer 2007).  
Subsequently, as the results of my analyses should reveal, the relationship between the 
proportion of women who are married and the TFR may no longer be as strong.  
Essentially, I will use knowledge of this type to theorize how the proximate determinants 
model might be modified to explain a higher proportion of variation in the TFR of 
strictly below-replacement fertility nations. 
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter II reviews previous literature 
pertaining to this topic.  In particular, it will provide an overview of the following: 
fertility levels throughout history and the emergence of low fertility as a significant 
demographic concern; the concept of replacement migration and the debate surrounding 
its potential use in below-replacement contexts; the institution of fertility policies and 
their effectiveness; the leading fertility paradigms and their potential application to 
explanations of low fertility; and previous studies utilizing the proximate determinants 
model.  Chapter III will introduce the hypotheses I seek to test, as well as the data and 
methods that will be employed in each of the two central analyses to test these 
hypotheses.  My dissertation will rely on a variety of data sources including the 
Population Reference Bureau World Population Data Sheets for 2006 , 2007, and 2008; 
the Population Reference Bureau 2008 Family Planning Worldwide Data Sheet; the 
National Survey of Family Growth, Cycles I, II, and VI; the 1974 Korean National 
Fertility Survey; the Korean 2003 National Fertility and Family Health Survey; the 
Korean 2005 National Survey on Marriage and Fertility Trends; and many others 
outlined in this chapter.  Chapters IV and V will consist of the two case studies in which 
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the proximate determinants model is applied to the countries of South Korea and the 
United States, respectively.  Chapter VI analyzes the fertility-inhibiting effect of the 
proximate determinants in these two countries by comparing the quantitative index 
representing each determinant measured in the 1960s/1970s with its measurement in the 
2000s.  Finally, Chapter VI will provide a summary of the results of this investigation, 
examine their significance, theorize modifications for the proximate determinants model 
in below-replacement fertility nations, and explore some of the implications for future 
research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 9 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
An analysis of the Bongaarts‘ proximate determinants model in a strictly below-
replacement context should include a discussion of fertility levels throughout history, an 
overview of the concept of replacement migration, attention to the relationship between 
fertility policy and the level of fertility in a nation, a review of the central fertility 
paradigms, and introduction to the proximate determinants model of fertility itself.  This 
chapter includes each of these elements. 
 
Fertility Levels Throughout History: An Overview 
Over the course of human history, the notion of population growth has been 
virtually inseparable from the idea of the perpetuation of the species.  However, there 
has been a distinct shift from focusing on growth as the means to avoid extinction to 
focusing on survival even when levels of growth have been higher than desired.  It has 
been estimated that in 8000 B.C., around 5 million people populated the Earth; this is the  
point in time at which the earliest farming communities are believed to have formed.  By 
1 A.D., the global population had grown to approximately 300 million, and then reached 
an estimated 800 million by 1750.  Such growth translates to an average doubling time 
of greater than 1,000 years (Durand 1967).  This is attributed to high birth rates 
counteracted by similarly high death rates, resulting in a percentage growth rate only 
slightly above zero.  During this period of very slow growth, the effects of famines, 
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epidemics, and wars were significant and potentially threatening to the overall survival 
of the species.  For example, the infamous bubonic plague of the 14
th
 century accounted 
for the deaths of about one in three persons across Europe and China (Gelbard, Haub and 
Kent 1999).  Ultimately, sufficient levels of growth were critical to ensure that human 
societies could persist even in the face of such substantial losses.  As Charles Hirschman 
explains, ―without high fertility, most [traditional] societies would have experienced 
population decline and eventual disappearance‖ (2003: 425).   
It was not until the twentieth century that this focus on the need for population 
growth experienced the shift from concerns for survival to concerns for self-preservation 
in light of a perceived ―population explosion.‖ Improvements in public sanitation, 
hygiene, and nutrition, along with advances in medicine, brought about increases in life 
expectancy and decreases in mortality.  Consequently, between 1750 and 1900, the 
population of the world saw a doubling time of around 150 years; this dropped to just 65 
years between 1900 and 1965 (Gelbard, Haub, and Kent 1999).  Whereas the population 
of the world did not reach its first billion people until 1800, a second billion was added 
to the population by 1930, a third by 1960, a fourth by 1975, and a fifth by 1987.  The 
six billion milestone was reached just over ten years later in 1999, with 7 million 
projected to be reached some time before 2015 (McFalls 2007).  Such a ―phenomenal 
increase‖ is attributed in large part to the sharp decrease in mortality rates in the less 
developed countries that had not yet also experienced fertility decline (Kent and Haub 
2005: 4).     
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It was in the early 1960s, when knowledge of dramatic population growth 
initially attracted popular attention, that the term ―population explosion‖ became a 
common household phrase.  The general public began to fear for the economy, 
environment, subsistence of government programs, and the overall quality of life.  
Popular media exacerbated the issue with its coverage on the baby boom cohort at home, 
and the high fertility of women in developing countries.  In 1968, the renowned 
American demographer and sociologist Ansley Coale observed that: 
Today, after some twenty years of fertility well above the pre-World-War-II 
levels, it has become fashionable to explain almost every national failure or 
shortcoming by rapid population growth—the ugliness and hopelessness of slum 
life, wasteful and irritating traffic jams, unemployment and delinquency among 
the disturbingly large fraction of adolescents who drop out of school, the 
pollution of air and water, and the disappearance of the natural beauty of our 
country behind a curtain of billboards and under a blanket of Kleenex and beer 
cans (467). 
 
Yet despite this preoccupation described by Coale, a very different kind of population 
trend was beginning to take shape behind the scenes.  As early as the 1930s, certain 
developed nations, such as the wealthier countries in Europe, had reported fertility rates 
below the replacement level (Coale 1968).  At this initial stage, such declines in fertility 
were often regarded as short-term fluctuations.  Concern over the potential for a 
declining population was superseded by population momentum which maintained 
positive natural increase in these low-fertility nations.  The Baby Boom experience 
seemed to provide reassurance that birth rates could, and would, rebound.  Many 
demographers referred back to Demographic Transition Theory (see section below), 
which held that a sharp decline in mortality was followed by an equally sharp decline in 
fertility, which would ultimately stabilize at the replacement level (Population Reference 
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Bureau Staff 2004).  Declining fertility was not, so it appeared, a worthy distraction from 
the seemingly uncontrollable rates of growth beginning to take place in developing 
countries as their mortality rates—but not their fertility rates—experienced dramatic 
declines. 
Though widely accepted as a reasonable perspective, some individuals voiced 
dissent.  Among them was the prominent American demographer Donald Bogue, who in 
his President‘s Address at the 1964 Population Association of America Annual Meeting 
offered his sincere belief that a ―truly tremendous demographic ‗breakthrough‘‖ had 
taken place (Bogue 1964: 450).  He stated that: 
Two or three years ago demographers tended to hold the gloomy view that only a 
small miracle could save many nations from disaster because of rapid population 
growth.  The picture now is completely different.  If we make generous use of the 
world ―if,‖ we now find a basis for a cautious optimism (1964: 450). 
 
In other words, it was his opinion that rapid population growth and overpopulation were 
not slated to continue on as the most pressing concerns among demographers—in fact, it 
would likely be just the opposite.  Bogue followed this pronouncement with research 
that revealed a decline in fertility between 1968 and 1975 in many developing nations 
that was much greater than had been anticipated.  With his colleague Amy O. Tsui, he 
concluded that world population growth was well on its way to slowing rapidly, with 
zero population growth likely by 2035 to 2050 (Bogue and Tsui 1979).  These 
conclusions were met by many with considerable skepticism (Demeny 1979), and even 
described as ―over-optimistic‖ (van der Tak 2005: 27).  Yet the passing of time has 
proved his words true. 
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 Globally, the average number of children per woman declined from 5.0 in 1950 
to 2.6 in 2009 (Haub and Kent 2005, 2009).  However, a closer look at the regional 
discrepancies within this trend provides insight into how these fifty-nine years were 
fundamental in shaping the current high fertility/low fertility dichotomy that has 
characterized the demography of the world at the start of the twenty-first century.  
Among developed nations, these years coincided with the final stages of the 
demographic transition: low mortality resulting from significant gains in health and 
medicine brought about major improvements in life expectancy and infant mortality, and 
was now being joined by falling levels of fertility.  Whereas many of the developed 
nations had experienced a baby boom following World War II, various trends including 
delayed marriage, increased rates of divorce, a larger number of women enrolling in 
college, and higher female labor force participation quickly overwhelmed the boost in 
births.  Accordingly, fertility rates began to decline again by the 1970s.  By 1980, many 
European countries reported fertility rates below replacement, and by 2000 the same 
could be said for most of the developed world (Population Reference Bureau Staff 
2004).  In 2009, the average TFR for the more developed nations was 1.6 (Population 
Division 2009).  While the declining fertility itself was not regarded as a surprise, 
Demographic Transition Theory did not account for such sustained low fertility.    
Subsequently, this continued change has been termed by some to be the ―second 
demographic transition,‖ though there is disagreement among demographers as to both 
the ultimate outcome of this second transition, as well as the degree to which a transition 
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of this kind will become widespread (Population Reference Bureau Staff 2004).  That is, 
will developing countries tend to follow this path? 
 Among developing nations, the early twentieth century found their fertility and 
mortality rates in the pre-demographic transition state.  In other words, high fertility 
occurred along with high mortality.  However, this trend was not constant across the less 
developed world.  Instead, significant variation existed then and continues to exist in the 
rate at which these countries have progressed through the stages of the demographic 
transition, with some exhibiting completely new patterns of change (Population 
Reference Bureau Staff 2004).  Coale has explained that ―differences in traditional 
beliefs and customs appear to play a part in determining whether or not the rate of 
childbearing falls, in addition to such differences as education and per capita income‖ 
(Coale 1989: 22).  In most developing nations, fertility has undergone a notable decline, 
primarily due to the dissemination of contraceptive knowledge and technology on the 
part of the more developed countries.  In the 1950s, the average TFR in the developing 
parts of the world was approximately 6.2, although the rates were as high as 6.7 in 
Africa and as low as 5.9 in Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean (Population 
Reference Bureau Staff 2004).  In 2009, the less developed countries had an average 
TFR of 2.77—over 50 percent lower than their 1950s rate.  Even within this reduced rate 
exists considerable regional discrepancies: South America and Asia report TFRs at about 
2.30 and 2.31 respectively, while the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa still see rates in 
the area of 5.1 (U.S. Census Bureau 2009).  Despite the country-to-country differences, 
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their overall change in fertility has been more drastic and to a greater extent than was 
expected by demographers (Wattenberg 2002).   
It is necessary to address in more detail the concept of ―replacement-level 
fertility.‖  In recent years, this term has become virtually synonymous with a TFR of 2.1 
births per woman.  Yet in reality, 2.1 is the number of births necessary to replace the 
population within a context of very low mortality—typically characteristic of developed 
nations.  As a result, the ―true‖ level of replacement varies globally with the prevailing 
level of mortality.  Espenshade and his colleagues stated in 2003 that the global variation 
in replacement-level fertility is quite substantial, ―ranging from a low of 2.05 for 
Réunion to a high of 3.43 in Sierra Leone‖ (Espenshade, Guzman, and Westoff 2003: 
575).  Years earlier, Coale and Demeny had developed an estimate of the TFR necessary 
to replace the population at a given life expectancy.  For example, at a life expectancy of 
25 years, it was estimated that a TFR of 5.21 would replace the population.  It was not 
until life expectancy at birth reached 75 years that the level of replacement approximate 
the current popular value of 2.1 (Coale and Demeny 1983).  In other words, it is critical to 
keep in mind that there is no ―universal constant‖ for replacement-level fertility, but that 
the values are ―highly country-specific‖ (Espenshade, Guzman, and Westoff 2003: 575).   
This is particularly significant when considering that whereas many of the 
developing countries have experienced significant fertility decline, the vast majority 
continue to have fertility rates at least slightly above 2.1.  While this would seem to 
suggest that they are approximately replacing their populations, or even experiencing 
continued growth, this statement can only be made very generally since in some 
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instances it may be the case that high rates of mortality necessitate a higher number of 
births.  However, as these countries also typically possess a younger age structure, in 
many it does appear that their continued growth is secure for some years to come 
(Population Reference Bureau Staff 2004).  Accordingly, the majority of growth 
experienced in the world today takes place in the poorer, less developed nations:  
The less developed countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the 
Caribbean are projected to increase by just under 50 percent in the 41 years 
between [2009] and 2050, and the poorest of these are projected to double in 
population size over that period (Haub and Kent 2009: 3).   
 
When these rates of growth are considered in relation to those experienced by developed 
nations such as Germany and Italy which are faced with depopulation, the magnitude of 
such a contrast becomes readily apparent.  Nonetheless, the Population Reference 
Bureau emphasizes that if developing nations hold to their current low-fertility path, that 
the momentum ―will eventually subside and population size will stabilize‖ (Population 
Reference Bureau Staff 2004: 10).    
By 2009, 75 of the world‘s countries count themselves among those with below-
replacement fertility (Haub and Kent 2009), including some identified by the United 
Nations as being of lower relative levels of development (e.g. Armenia, the Bahamas, 
Barbados, Cuba, Macedonia, Mauritius, Moldova, Netherlands Antilles, Palau, Saint 
Lucia, Singapore, Trinidad and Tobago) (United Nations Statistics Division 2009).  
Together, below-replacement fertility nations constitute about 36 percent of the countries 
in the world, or about 50 percent of the global population (Morgan and Taylor 2006).  It 
has been estimated that within the next two decades, nearly all countries will reach low 
fertility (Morgan 2003).  By this point, demographers and population scholars likely 
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have caught up with this ―new demography of depopulation‖ and will have begun to 
focus their attentions on the extent of the fertility decline and its repercussions   
(Wattenberg 2004).  Of these, population aging is frequently cited as the most immediate 
effect of fertility decline.  As fewer babies are born and younger cohorts grow smaller, 
the proportion of younger people in the population shrinks while the proportion of older 
people grows.  For this reason, very low fertility is regularly accompanied by population 
aging that usually occurs quite rapidly. 
Generally speaking, discussions of fertility decline and the resultant population 
aging tend to concentrate on the economic, political, and environmental consequences. 
In the next several paragraphs, I will discuss some of these consequences. 
Economic.  Even in the early years of the twentieth century, scholars like D.V. 
Glass were hypothesizing the consequences of population decline.  In his 1937 Eugenics 
Review article, he presented a practical analysis of several possible outcomes relating to 
lower rates of fertility.  Economic effects were among the foremost discussed.  For 
example, he observed that societies undergoing continual fertility decline may well 
require such constant economic restructuring that it will become a serious challenge to 
keep up.  He also acknowledged that the flexibility to adapt to new demands and new 
production—typically met by younger segments of the population—will be impaired by 
population aging.  But in the context of a declining rate of fertility that ultimately 
stabilizes, he conceded that there is ―no reason to fear that the total demand for goods 
and services will necessarily be reduced with a smaller population, even though the 
demands for specific products may be smaller‖ (2005: 564); he added that ―it may mean 
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that fewer toys will be wanted; but on the other hand it may result in a greater demand 
for armchairs and slippers‖ (2005: 566).  He did allow for the likelihood of layoffs in 
individual sectors, but maintained that it is not necessarily a prescription for widespread 
increases in unemployment.   
 Almost seventy years later, writers like Wattenberg and Longman were making a 
similar case.  Wattenberg argued that the combination of aging and declining 
populations could cause ―economic turmoil of the first magnitude in the developed 
modern world‖ (2004: 134).  The way in which this would happen would be manifold, 
but the most direct cause would be through what Longman has termed the ―vanishing 
labor supply‖ (2004: 15).  Lower birthrates mean smaller future cohorts, fewer workers, 
less producers of goods, and eventually less of the goods and services desired by the 
population.  Furthermore, with less workers paying into programs like Social Security 
and a higher proportion of the population drawing out of those same programs, the 
government will be left with a considerably greater burden in terms of amassing the 
necessary funding to keep these programs viable (Wattenberg 2004).  This issue alludes 
to the potential support ratio (PSR), or the ratio of the size of the population aged 15-64 
to the size of the population aged 65 and over (United Nations 2001).  As fertility 
declines and the population ages, the PSR will decrease substantially: there will be fewer 
workers ―supporting‖ every one individual aged 65 and over.   
   In a broader sense, less individuals simply means less people generating new 
ideas, coming up with breaking-edge technologies, and providing a means for the nation 
to remain competitive in the global marketplace.  McDonald emphasizes this point:  
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In each generation of new technology, conventionally it is young workers who 
assimilate the technology working in complement with older workers who have 
capital, wisdom, and ideas for the application of technology. As science 
advances, the speed of technological change increases.  Countries that ignore this 
reality are placing themselves at risk in a competitive global economic 
environment… (2006: 486). 
 
The importance of this statement becomes all the more apparent when we consider that a 
flourishing capitalist economy and population growth go hand in hand.  One needs only to 
look at those parts of the world where population has ―become stagnant‖ (including Japan, 
much of Europe, and the Great Plains of the United States) to find evidence of capitalism 
weakening perceptibly (Longman 2004: 4).  If this trend holds true within the context of 
global depopulation, it could necessitate economic restructuring on a massive scale. 
Kohler and Ortega emphasize another potential economic outcome based on the 
smaller cohort sizes that will be making their way up through the educational and 
economic systems.  They point out that these small cohorts may very well encounter 
―substantially more favorable conditions‖ in terms of education, employment, and 
housing markets than their older predecessors in larger cohorts.  In turn, experiencing 
such favorable conditions might lead to ―an earlier onset and higher level of fertility‖ 
(2003: 409).  This is quite reminiscent of Elwood Carlson‘s points in The Lucky Few 
(2008), a work which paid special attention to the cohort of individuals born between 
1929 and 1945.  His central argument is that this group of individuals experienced 
greater degrees of success and self-fulfillment relating to education, employment, and 
general economic climate as compared to the prior and successive cohorts due to a 
unique combination of their small size and historical circumstances.  Ultimately, some 
members of the Lucky Few cohort helped contribute to the Baby Boom—perhaps 
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evidence that such unique and ideal circumstances can have a direct positive impact on 
fertility.   
An approach like that of Kohler and Ortega calls attention to the possibility of 
positive outcomes from lower fertility and ultimate population decline.  Bouvier states 
that when population levels fall, ―in most instances this is a good thing for the society… 
With fewer people, nations can do so much more for their people—be it improved 
education, better housing, better roads—the list goes on‖ (2001: 379-380).  This 
assumes, of course, that most members of a population are more of an economic drain 
than they are an asset; otherwise, less people would actually mean exponentially less 
money with which to do the sorts of thing outlined by Bouvier.  Theoretically, less 
people should also mean more job opportunities for the unemployed and 
underemployed.  Grant describes unemployment as Europe‘s ―greatest economic 
problem‖ (2001: 394).  This suggests that once the available labor force is exhausted, the 
anticipated shortage caused by declining fertility may not be quite so severe. 
Political.  The relationship between population decline and military strength was 
another of the areas explored by David Glass.  Despite concerns that declining fertility 
would lead to a lowered military position relative to other world powers, he emphasized 
rationally that most other world powers were experiencing a similar trend in their own 
populations, and suggested that immigration could be called upon to increase military 
manpower if necessary (Glass 2005).      
Far more recently, this relationship has been analyzed by Wattenberg, though 
with a much graver prospect.  He identifies the primary and secondary geopolitical jobs 
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of America to be, respectively, defending itself and ―vigorously [promoting] social, 
economic, and individual liberty in America and around the world‖ (2004: 158).  Both of 
these jobs, he emphasizes, are compromised by the current demographic trends of 
fertility decline, population aging, and depopulation.  The latter issue, as it applies to the 
virtual entirety of the developed world, is especially serious because it puts both the 
United States and its allies at a numerical disadvantage.  He explains that in the past, 
numbers were tantamount to ―major military advantage,‖ and he questions what this will 
mean for the U.S. in the future (2004: 159).  However, Morgan insists that ―fans of U.S. 
military might are breathless over its speed and technology, not its size‖ (Morgan 2003: 
600).  This implies that, provided U.S. military technology continues to thrive, it could 
make do without the advantage of size.      
Environmental.  The environment is another arena that, like employment, would 
seem to benefit from population decline.  Fewer people  resulting from below 
replacement fertility would mean less of a strain on the environment and thus less 
expenditures in that area.  Wattenberg succinctly explains that as the population 
continues to grow, we will persist in seeing people-based pollution—though less than 
expected, according to recent fertility rates.  After that, as depopulation commences, the 
amount of pollution will also begin to decrease (Wattenberg 2004).  Grant goes into 
greater detail, noting the kinds of pressures put on the environment by recent world 
growth, such as critical increases in the amount of natural carbon, nitrogen and 
phosphate loads in the biosphere; water pollution; atmospheric acidification; climate 
change; and other fundamental changes to the world ecology.  With smaller populations, 
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nations ―could enjoy the benefits of prosperity without the environmental costs that have 
come to characterize it,‖ and could better plan for sustainability (2001: 393).  The human 
species would have a smaller relative ―footprint‖ on the environment, and each 
generation would have the possibility of leaving circumstances better for their own 
children than those they initially encountered, rather than the other way around.   
In light of so many effects, Morgan has astutely observed, ―Less polemical low-
fertility concerns focus on a shortage of warriors, workers, and consumers... [But] in a 
global economy, workers and consumers don‘t need to be homegrown or national 
coresidents‖ (2003: 600).  Indeed the concerns surrounding low fertility raise questions 
regarding the utility of migrants in supplementing the anticipated cut in these ―warriors, 
workers, and consumers.‖  That is, can bringing in immigrants repair a nation‘s age 
structure, supplement its PSR, and secure its future?  Or does resorting to ―replacement 
migration‖ cause more problems than it solves?  The next section of this dissertation 
explores this possibility and the discussion surrounding it.   
 
Replacement Migration 
This matter of replacement migration is currently immersed in great debate.  
Providing fodder for the two sides was a report released by the United Nations 
Population Division in March of 2000 entitled Replacement Migration: Is It a Solution 
to Declining and Ageing Populations?  This report was meant simply to provide 
projections to address a number of ―what if?‖ scenarios for eight countries and two 
regions, and in no way was it meant to recommend the use of ―replacement migration‖ 
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(a term the UN coined) as a solution to these issues.  In this way, policy makers could 
gauge the severity of the situation for their own nation, and determine how plausible 
their migration-related options might actually be. 
 The UN Population Division defines replacement migration as ―the international 
migration that would be needed to offset declines in the size of population and declines 
in population of working age, as well as to offset the overall aging of a population‖ 
(United Nations 2000: 7).  The ―twin problems of population decline and aging‖ are very 
important when considering replacement migration, because the number of migrants 
determined to be ―necessary‖ to reach a certain numeric goal depends on each country‘s 
unique age structure and situation with respect to fertility.  In their report, the UN 
Population Division presented projections in terms of 6 scenarios for the countries of 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States; as well as 
for the regions of Europe and the European Union.  The six scenarios ―with regard to the 
migration streams needed to achieve particular population objectives or outcomes‖ are as 
follows: 
Scenario 1: the population is projected in the medium variant of World Population 
Prospects: 1998 Revision. 
Scenario 2: the medium variant of the 1998 Revision is used, amended by 
assuming zero migration after 1995. 
Scenario 3: the migration required to maintain the size of the total population at the 
highest level it would reach in the absence of migration after 1995 is computed. 
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Scenario 4: the migration necessary to maintain the size of the working-age 
population (15 to 64 years) at the highest level it would reach in the absence of 
migration after 1995 is computed.   
Scenario 5: the migration required to prevent the ratio of the size of the population 
aged 15-64 to the size of the population aged 65 or over (the potential support 
ratio described above) from declining below the value of 3.0 is computed. 
Scenario 6: the migration required to maintain the PSR at the highest level it would 
reach in the absence of migration after 1995 is computed (United Nations 2000: 15). 
Immigrants, in this study, are assumed to be permanent migrants who ultimately remain 
in and age with the population of the host country, are subject to the same fertility rates 
as the national population (Huguet 2003).  This is consistent with research that finds 
immigrant women from countries with high fertility to converge ―reasonably quickly‖ to 
native-born fertility rates (Kwok 2007).   
Based on the unique intersection of characteristics for each country, the UN 
Population Division made a variety of estimates.  For instance, on the one end of the 
spectrum, France, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union 
would need smaller or comparable numbers of immigrants to maintain their 1995 
population levels (Scenario 3) than they have actually been accepting in recent years.  
On the other end, countries such as Japan, Korea, and Italy would need to admit levels of 
immigrants larger that  any they have ever seen in order to prevent decline (Bermingham 
2001:360).  If the goal is to stabilize the working age population (Scenario 4), only the 
United States would be exempt from the required rapid and extensive rise in 
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immigration.  Even more dramatic would be the numbers of immigrants projected to be 
necessary to prevent the PSRs from dropping below 3.0 (Scenario 5) or from dipping 
below their highest post-1995 levels (Scenario 6)—numbers ―far too high to be given 
any serious consideration‖ (Bermingham 2001: 360). 
While recapping the results of the UN report is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation and has been adequately covered elsewhere (e.g. Hollander 2000; 
Bermingham 2001; Bouvier 2001; Grant 2001), the passionate debate that ensued after 
the release of this report is very pertinent in the way that it reflects the severity of the 
greater social issues of population aging and decline. 
Replacement migration as a further problem.  That the report put out by the UN 
inspired great debate among demographers and policy makers alike should come as no 
surprise.  Some found the report to be a blatant promotion of immigration as the solution 
to population aging and decline.  Others described the projections as an endorsement of 
fears that the PSR would drop to unsupportable levels, and thought they were ―evidently 
meant to suggest their [own] absurdity and thereby make the point that immigration is 
not a solution to what is happening in those countries‖ (Grant 2001: 392; emphasis 
mine).  In general, two main arguments were developed as evidence against the 
projections: first, that the levels of immigration required to meet many of the goals 
outlined in the six scenarios were completely improbable if not impossible; and second, 
that the social and cultural implications of such immigration, even if it were possible, 
would be extreme and dire.  Grant, for instance, makes the first argument by focusing on 
Italy‘s particular case: to maintain its 1995 PSR, Italy would need to admit about 120 
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million immigrants between the years of 1995 and 2050, which would leave it with a 
population in the area of 194 million in 2050.  Grant notes that this is ―more than three 
times the size of the 1995 Italian population,‖ 79 percent of which would be post-1995 
immigrants or their descendants.  She then asks whether ―anybody seriously [thinks] that 
Italy can grow to be almost as populous as the United States,‖ and whether it would be 
―bearable‖ or ―tolerable‖ on a number of different levels (2001: 395).  The most 
significant of these levels is that of access to resources, such as housing, employment 
education, health care, and social protection—all of which would need to be virtually 
revamped to account for so many new residents and their descendents. 
 Concerns about whether particular levels of immigration are feasible or practical  
stem from this anticipated impact that those immigrants will have on a given country, 
whether in terms of the environment, resources, or culture.  Consequently, it is the 
second of the two main arguments that has received the most focus in the literature.  As 
Coleman carefully explains: 
The processes described and projected here, resulting from low fertility 
combined with high immigration, are significant because they are changing the 
composition of national populations and thereby the culture, physical appearance, 
social experiences, and self-perceived identity of the inhabitants of…nations 
(2006: 402). 
 
These potential changes are a particular concern in nations that still emphasize the purity 
of ethnic heritage.  After all, if a country with sub-replacement fertility resorts to 
replacement immigration to maintain a particular goal with regards to growth, it is 
mathematically inevitable that the country will come to consist predominantly of a 
population of immigrant origin (Coleman 2006: 403).  Japan is the most obvious 
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example of a country preoccupied with avoiding such an outcome, especially since it 
appears to have problems with its current very low levels of immigration.  French (2003) 
describes Japan as ―the most tenaciously insular of all the world‘s top industrial 
countries, [where] deeply conservative notions about ethnic purity make it hard for even 
the experts…to envision large-scale immigration.‖  Even ―good‖ immigrants—i.e., other 
Asians who speak perfect Japanese, adopt Japanese names, and live a tidy and quiet 
existence—face prejudice and discrimination (French 2003).  Yet these notions of ethnic 
and cultural homogeneity are up against not only fears of rapid aging and population 
decline, but also the demand by some employers for immigrant labor (Coleman 2006: 
423).  Nonetheless, Tsukaba University population expert Hiroshi Komai does not think 
even this is enough to push Japanese policy makers to consider incorporating more 
immigrants.  He describes the number of immigrants necessary to prevent population 
decline as ―unimaginable for Japan‖ in terms of the social limitations of the workplace, 
culture and educational system.  He adds that ―societies have always risen and faded, 
and Japan will likely disappear and something else will take its place, but that‘s not such 
a problem.  Greece and Rome disappeared too‖ (French 2003).           
 Japan is not unique in its struggle with the prospect of increased non-native 
populations.  Focusing on Europe, Coleman discusses how larger numbers of foreigners 
mean that immigrants are more often surrounded by others with the same values, 
language, and ideas about laws, which decreases the likelihood that they will feel 
obligated to adapt to the host country.  Consequently, he feels that: 
The social, cultural, and political impact of the projected changes could be 
substantial, indeed transforming, as urban daily life outside the home is 
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conducted increasingly in the company of strangers, with an older indigenous 
population becoming increasingly suburban and rural…   The greater cultural, 
racial, and religious distances between native populations and newer and 
numerically growing non-Western immigrant populations in Europe may lead to 
less favorable outcomes for both immigrants and natives…‖ (2006: 424-425). 
 
That immigrants will be reluctant to assimilate thus seems a central concern throughout 
many of the countries and regions covered in the UN report.  As explained by Masahiro 
Iba, a Japanese public housing department official, ―Integration is easy to call for, but it 
is very difficult to achieve.  You just can‘t tell people that they must adjust to others‖ 
(French 2003).  Faced with potential ―societal suicide‖ (Bouvier 2001: 381), it seems 
there are only three options: to change popular opinion on the subject, to force the issue 
by telling a nation it must integrate, or to come up with some other plan.    
 A final interesting consideration relating to using replacement immigration to 
avoid particular forms of population decline involves the sending countries.  As 
Hollander notes, the UN report is clear that some of their projections seem ―out of 
reach‖ simply because of the ―extraordinarily large number of migrants that would be 
required‖ (2000: 148).  Thus, it seems quite possible that sending the millions of 
immigrants necessary to obtain particular population goals in sub-replacement countries 
would create substantial problems for the countries they are leaving behind, regardless of 
the outcome for where the migrants end up.  If a given host country could make 
conditions appealing enough to attract the amount of immigration outlined in the UN 
report, could the sending countries spare that many emigrants?  Leon Bouvier presents 
an excellent idea, suggesting that the UN Population Division prepare a similar report on 
typical sending countries.  Because the majority of these countries are still seeing fairly 
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rapid growth, such a report could consider the amount of emigration necessary to see an 
end to population growth (Bouvier 2001: 380).  Then, it would be possible to compare 
the numbers with those projected in the first report to see if there is a match or mismatch 
between sending countries and their likely destinations, making it apparent whether 
replacement migration would create problems not only in receiving countries, but in the 
sending countries as well, or whether certain pairs would see some sort of mutual 
benefit.   
Replacement migration as a solution.  The hypothetical outcomes projected in 
the UN report were not exclusively interpreted through a lens of gloom and doom; many 
outwardly rejected the notion that this report was mere propaganda for international 
migration.  Instead, it was frequently interpreted in the manner of Bouvier, who 
summarized it by stating, ―To put it in plain language: If a country doesn‘t want its 
population to fall below a certain number, what are its options?‖ (2001: 379).  Indeed, 
many scholars felt that replacement migration could well hold promise for certain 
countries.  After all, when dealing with a single issue that affects many, there is rarely a 
blanket solution.  Thus, some believe it possible that adjustments to immigration policies 
might counteract, or at least temporarily abate, the issues of population aging and decline 
for specific countries.   
 Whether or not replacement migration can be interpreted as a potential solution 
for a country depends, obviously, on its current situation and the most appropriate 
population goal for that situation.  Returning to the first main argument against 
replacement migration as a solution, not all the levels of immigration required to 
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implement any of the six scenarios are completely improbable.  As mentioned 
previously, the numbers of migrants needed to offset population decline in countries like 
France and the U.S. are less than or fairly close to recent experiences (Bermingham 
2001: 360).   Likewise, in developing a set of projections very similar to those produced 
by the UN but for additional Asian countries, Huguet reveals that ―the level of net 
migration required to prevent the working-age population from declining in Singapore, 
Taiwan and Thailand would be less than current levels of temporary migration‖ and 
―should be well within the capacity of policy measures‖ (2003: 116).  Because these 
countries are already accustomed to the levels of migration outlined by the UN report, 
the second main argument against replacement migration as a solution—that of the 
impact of foreign populations—should not be an issue as it is something they must by 
default already be addressing.  Therefore, if maintaining the level of the population was 
to be a goal in any of these countries, then it could well be possible that replacement 
migration could help the situation.  Of course, simply keeping the population at a certain 
level does not guarantee that there are enough individuals working, or enough workers to 
generate the necessary financial support for the dependent population.  Yet at that point, 
it is argued that countries can resort to other techniques to increase those rates, such as 
by getting higher proportions of the current working-age population to actually work.  
This could be done in any number of ways, such as by encouraging more women to 
work (often by making child-rearing more compatible with having a career) or by raising 
the retirement age.  Thanks to improvements in health at older ages, the ―old 
demographic convention of a retirement age fixed at 60 or 65‖ may be perceived as a tad 
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obsolete (Coleman 1992).  Needless to say, such solutions do not take into account the 
extensive structural inequality in the labor force, and how this inequality would affect 
policies aimed at increasing labor force participation. 
 Russia, with its fertility rate well below 2.1, would stand to benefit from 
replacement migration in a fairly uncommon manner.  Factors such as industrialization; 
war-induced changes in the age structure and family patterns; significantly decreased 
levels of well-being; and increased exposure to Western attitudes regarding family, 
reproductive and sex behavior have all led to a precipitous decline in the TFR.  
However, due to Russia‘s ―systemic, primarily economic crisis,‖ there has also been a 
considerable growth in the rate of mortality (Rybakovsky 2005: 59).  This unique 
combination of low fertility and high mortality places it under a ―double pressure‖ that is 
not shared by the Western European nations or by the United States, resulting in 
―population reproduction mode characterized by European fertility and Afro-Asian 
mortality‖ (Rybakovsky 2005: 61).   A further complication lies in the fact that this rapid 
population decline is taking place on an already sparsely-populated expanse of land that 
is home to one-fifth of the world‘s total natural resources.  Russia is one of the richest 
countries in the world, with a decreasing ability to defend itself as such—especially 
when its neighbors, such as China, boast such dense populations.  While it seems 
improbable that China will march in and conquer the eastern sections of Russia, 
Rybakovsky mentions the concern that those parts of Russia might befall the same fate 
as ―Alaska, Texas, Kosovo and a number of other regions of the world‖ (2005: 67)—
territories, he implies, which ended up transferring hands due to an inability of a given 
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nation (presumably Russia, Mexico, and Yugoslavia respectively) to defend themselves, 
maintain their borders, and essentially hold their own.  Consequently, replacement 
migration could well offer many benefits to Russia.  It is interesting to note that this 
nation even has an ―ideal‖ stockpile of migrants, if it can figure out a way to entice them 
back: the millions of ethnic Russians settled in nearby former Soviet republics.  
However, to incorporate these migrants would necessitate tweaking the immigration 
policy, which is often easier said than done.  Nonetheless, Rybakovsky offers this 
picture of Russia‘s future: 
More likely than not, an annual migration inflow… is vital for stabilizing 
Russia‘s population numbers and maintaining labor potential at a level sufficient 
for sustainable economic development.  Addressing these two interconnected 
tasks implies both acceptance of migrants, prospective citizens of Russia, 
primarily from the former Soviet republics, and invitation, for reasonable periods 
of time, of labor migrants possessing definite social parameters from countries 
other than former Soviet republics (2005: 68). 
 
This prospective path for Russia offers a distinct illustration of the multidimensionality 
of incorporating immigrants as a means to mitigate particular demographic complexities. 
Replacement migration and population decline.  Together, below-replacement 
fertility and the ensuing population aging and decline that are already evident in many 
countries present a ―problem‖ as severe as anything that has never been addressed 
thoroughly before.  This situation that portends doom to some is more likely just a 
development that will become more and more common as additional countries have to 
deal with it, and it should be addressed as such.  After all, because this development 
stems from demographic processes, there are only so many options for trying to 
―engineer demographic change,‖ an effort Grant points out may indeed prove to be 
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impossible (2001: 398).  If a country elects to adopt replacement migration, then it will 
need to admit a constant and high level of immigrants, or focus on making the workforce 
they have more productive.  Bermingham offers support for this last possibility by 
commenting that ―perhaps working-age citizens will have to forgo the luxuries of early 
retirement, short work-weeks, long vacations, non-working spouses, and so forth,‖ 
adding that ―one way or another, great changes are unavoidable‖ (2001: 361).  The UN 
report provided countries with a picture of what an entirely immigration-based response 
to population aging and decline would look like.  It is up to individual nations to use that 
knowledge to come up with the best plan for their own situation: perhaps immigration 
will work to some degree, or perhaps it will be more of a palliative that merely delays 
problems.     
The possibility of replacement migration aside, low fertility should  not be viewed 
as a crisis of epic proportions, or as the path to extinction.  As Warren C. Robinson points 
out, ―government programs and private institutions, as well as personal behavior and 
relationships, will require adjustment, but they will be well within tolerable limits and no 
more profound or traumatic than other such changes [that]…societies have faced in years 
past‖ (2004: 60).  In other words, societies will certainly have a challenge on their hands, 
but history has shown repeatedly the striking capability human beings have to adapt. 
 
Fertility Policies: Potential Coping Mechanisms 
 Another approach that nations may choose to use to address below-replacement 
fertility is that of pro-natalist policy.  This is not a recent notion: examples of fertility 
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policies abound throughout history.  However, a unique challenge arises in determining 
the effectiveness of such policies: their effectiveness is based on a comparison with what 
would have occurred had the policy not been enacted, but it is really impossible to know 
what would have otherwise taken place (Demeny 2003).  Despite this limitation, a close 
look reveals that pro-natalist and anti-natalist policies alike have been met with varying 
degrees of perceived success.   
Policies of fertility limitation.  The most well-known policy of fertility control in 
history is, arguably, the One Child Policy of the People‘s Republic of China.  Part of the 
reason is likely due to the extensive coverage of both the policy and its many 
consequences by critical international scholars and reporters.  However, it is less well-
known that the policy was conceived by defense scientists based on Marxian philosophy 
in a determined (and dramatic) effort to thrust China toward modernity.  It has been 
argued, particularly by Susan Greenhalgh, that this manner of scientific policymaking 
was at such odds with social reality that vast suffering has resulted across the nation 
(Greenhalgh 2008).  This policy was instituted in 1979, and was introduced to the people 
of China through a comprehensive propaganda campaign complete with a system of 
sanctions.  Initially, these sanctions consisted primarily of incentives for families to limit 
themselves to one child; the incentives typically consisted of money and preferential 
treatment in education, health, housing, and employment (Currier 2008).  Yet by the mid 
1980s, these sanctions also included penalties: ―severe fines, ration restrictions, and the 
denial of registration for higher order births (with implications for health, education, 
housing) were all used‖ (Currier 2008: 369).   
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This policy has had varying degrees of effectiveness.  In terms of overall fertility 
change, the TFR in China dropped from 2.8 in 1979 to 1.8 in 1995 (Currier 2008).  Yet 
similar results have been fleeting in the rural areas, home to the majority of the Chinese 
population.  Over time, the policy has evolved into a de facto two-child policy for many 
areas and a 1.5 child policy in other areas, stemming from the fact that most families 
require more than one child—and especially sons—to maintain their agrarian livelihood 
(see, in this regard, Scharping [2003] for extensive discussions of the very different 
policies in the various provinces of the country).  With the institution of the one child 
policy, many areas witnessed substantial increases in female infanticide, sex-selective 
abortion, and the underreporting of births.  Consequently, exceptions have been made for 
rural couples whose first child is either a girl or disabled, or who suffer considerable 
hardship in their line of work without an additional child, permitting them to have 
another child (Currier 2008; Scharping 2003).   
A specific type of ethical issue is raised by policies of this type that concerns the 
means employed (manipulation and coercion) to control population growth (Battin 
2004).  As a response to ethics-based criticism of China‘s strategy of fertility reduction, 
many other nations have made a concerted effort to shift their focus to instituting 
development-based policies, whether in their own countries or in others believed to be in 
need of assistance.  Emphasizing the connection between developed economies and 
lower fertility, these policies have had the added bonus of appearing to be ethical 
because development, it was believed, would be accompanied by: 
(1)  Improved economic infrastructure; 
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(2) More education for girls; 
(3) Improved economic status for women; 
(4) Advanced healthcare; and 
(5) A general disconnect between bearing children and having security in old age 
(Battin 2004). 
In other words, ―development-based population policies…were aimed not at directly 
controlling population or restricting individuals‘ fertility, but at changing people‘s 
background circumstances for the better‖ (Battin 2004: 2095).  Lower fertility was just a 
lucky byproduct.  Unfortunately, it turned out there were also some less-than-lucky 
byproducts, ranging from the disruption of existing cultures, to swelling the numbers of 
the urban poor, to the introduction of ―alien cultural and economic values‖ (Battin 2004: 
2096).  While these kinds of policies would seem to lead to the hoped-for decrease in 
levels of fertility, this outcome does not necessarily always leave societies better off.   
 At last, to address the negative consequences of development-based policies, 
many countries have exhibited a preference for policies of reproductive health.  That is, 
by providing women with access to a full range of reproductive healthcare ranging from 
contraception to pre-, peri-, and post-natal care, they place agency in the hands of 
individuals.  The specifics and extents of these programs vary from country to country 
(Battin 2004), but they have become so common that—as Demeny explains—in the 
latter part of the 20
th
 century, ―population policy in the developing world became 
essentially synonymous with family planning programs‖ (2003: 757).  An example of a 
comprehensive approach is that of  Bangladesh, where healthcare workers go so far as to 
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deliver contraceptives to the homes of women who for whatever reason are unable get to 
public clinics.  Unlike the previous types of policies discussed, objections to 
reproductive-health policies seem to be exclusively moral (e.g. is it moral to prevent the 
contraception of children which are believed by some to be gifts from God?) and not 
ethical (Battin 2004). 
Pro-natalist policies.  Renowned demographer Paul Demeny once drew the 
following similarity between pro-natalist and fertility reduction policies: 
Analytically, the potential population policy issue raised by low fertility is 
identical to the problem inherent in rapid population growth: it is caused by the 
disjunction between the sum total of individual reproductive decisions and the 
collective interest in a long-run demographic equilibrium.  But this time 
individual aspirations generate a deficit rather than an excess in population 
growth (2003: 759).   
 
Theoretically, it follows that by addressing the disjuncture—influencing individual 
aspirations in the direction of the collective interest—that the resultant deficit would be 
ameliorated.  This is, not unsurprisingly, more easily said than done, and pro-natalist 
policies have been met with little and debatable success.   
 Demeny has identified five conditions under which fertility will decline: 
(1) When parents must take on the bulk of financial responsibility for raising 
children; 
(2) When women have the opportunity to participate in the labor force, 
particularly in occupations that are not compatible with bearing and raising 
children; 
(3) When primary and secondary education are effectively mandated by law; 
(4) When child labor is illegal; and 
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(5) When children are not the only reliable source of old-age security (2003: 
757). 
Pro-natalist policies aim to induce individuals to have a greater number of children.  To 
accomplish this goal, it follows that one of the above five methods must be addressed.  It 
goes without saying that the majority of nations would not seek to decrease the quality of 
life for their citizens; hence, it can be concluded that policies releasing children from the 
responsibility of primary and secondary education, allowing them to work at young ages, 
or ensuring them as the only means of old-age security for their parents are extremely 
unlikely.  Instead, policies take one of two forms: direct and indirect.   
 Direct policies are those attempts to influence fertility that offer incentives to 
those who have children and/or disincentives to those who do not (Hugo 2000).  
Commonly, the incentives take the form of monetary value for each child in some form 
or another: cash payments at the birth of the child or on a monthly basis up to a certain 
age; income tax breaks for individuals with children; home loans that are written off 
progressively with the birth of children; paid or unpaid maternity leave; subsidies for 
childcare or educational-related costs (e.g. school equipment and transportation); 
reduced rent;  among other incentives (Hugo 2000).  Disincentives, on the other hand, 
often take the form of additional taxes for childless individuals.  It is important to note 
that, generally, these types of policies are believed to affect the timing of births instead 
of actually increasing the total number of births per woman.  That is, when cash is 
offered, individuals who were likely to have a birth later anyway will make an effort to 
have that child sooner so to qualify for the cash incentives, but will not go on to have 
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more children than they had originally planned.  A primary reason for this behavior is 
that the incentives are oftentimes insignificant when compared to the massive 
investments that children require—estimated in the U.S. at over one million dollars per 
child (Bongaarts 2008).  Accordingly, programs such as these instituted in the former 
Czechoslovakia and Australia were met with limited or no increase in total fertility 
(Hugo 2000).   
Direct policies may also be enacted by restricting access to contraception or 
abortion.  In the cases of Romania, Bulgaria, the former Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, 
this type of restriction did indeed lead to an increase in fertility (Hugo 2000).  However, 
Romania offers an excellent example of how fertility returns to its lower level once the 
restriction is no longer in place.  Even prior to his election as President, Nicolae 
Ceauşescu communicated his concern that post-World War II Romania was 
experiencing a dangerous decline in fertility that had begun in the fifties.  Under his 
political influence, and ultimately his presidency, Ceauşescu undertook measures 
including outlawing induced abortion, encouraging each family to bear three children, 
closely monitoring pregnancies, discouraging divorce and any use of contraceptives, and 
taxing individuals over the age of twenty-five who were childless (Keil and Andreescu 
1999; Teitelbaum 1972).  Some of these mandates, especially the restriction on abortion, 
resulted in a number of unsafe medical conditions for women.  With regards to the total 
fertility level, however, Ceauşescu did see the rise he hoped for: within a year after the 
abortion ban was enacted, fertility demonstrated a remarkable increase that persisted 
above the replacement level for two decades (Bradatan and Firebaugh 2007).  However, 
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what is most interesting about this case is what happened right after the law was 
abolished: fertility rates fell to below replacement levels.  Bradatan and Firebaugh 
(2007) argue that the strict pro-natalist policies were just a disturbance to the downward 
trend in fertility, and that Romania ultimately reached the same end of very low fertility, 
albeit later than it would have without the restrictive policies in place.  As a result, any 
decline in fertility experienced since 1990 (following the fall of Ceauşescu‘s 
administration) is simply the continuation of the prior trend, without the artificial 
inflation in TFR caused by Ceauşescu‘s policies.   
 Indirect policies are those aimed at changing the environment in which 
individuals decide on the number of children they desire (Hugo 2000).  Oftentimes, 
indirect policies come to be synonymous with ―family-friendly policies‖ because they  
seek to ―facilitate the participation of mothers in the paid workforce outside of the home 
and promote gender equality in the workplace, home and society generally.‖  
Governments will essentially institute policies that attempt to remove the ―social 
barriers‖ believed to be preventing couples from bearing their desired number of 
children (Hugo 2000: 190-191).  These types of policies are widely advocated.  Morgan 
insists that ―…institutional adjustments can make small families feasible in the twenty-
first century‖ (2003: 594).  Lutz and his colleagues emphasize that public policy and 
institutional responses can assist women in realizing their intended fertility by 
addressing the complications surrounding the combination of child rearing with work 
and/or participation in other activities, which results in making parenthood practical at 
younger ages (Lutz et al. 2003).  McDonald maintains that ―institutional settings more 
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conducive to having children are both desirable and achievable… Benefits accrue both 
to the individuals concerned and to the society as a whole if fertility ideals can come 
closer to being fulfilled‖ (2006: 485).  One reason for such support is that these policies 
are not explicitly pro-natalist; that is, they seek to improve gender relations across 
society, with increased fertility an often-desired byproduct of these improvements.  
Subsequently, even if they ―fail‖ to increase fertility, they are still likely to have some 
positive effect on the population.  Another reason for the support is demographic 
research suggesting that tempo effects (i.e. the postponement of childbearing) in addition 
to an assortment of obstacles—economic, social, and biological—are decreasing levels 
of fertility by approximately 0.8 to 0.9 births per woman (Bongaarts 2008).  If such 
obstacles or inducements to delay childbearing could be removed, the potential increase 
to the TFR of 0.8 to 0.9 could easily put a large number of countries back at (or even 
above) the replacement level.  In fact, organizations such as Eurostat have begun to base 
their projections of future fertility on whether or not such policies have been 
implemented (Andersson 2008). 
Scandinavian countries are often cited as evidence that indirect policies can be 
relatively effective (Andersson 2008).  These are countries believed to have moved the 
furthest away from traditional Western gender roles, such as that of the male-
breadwinner model.  Instead, they have a ―long tradition of extensive social policies 
directed at the family‖ within Nordic welfare states, motivated by ―gender equality 
ideologies and concern for the general well being of children and their families‖ (Rønsen 
2004: 278).  Many have policies that include extended maternity and paternity leave, 
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publicly subsidized childcare, and cash benefits to parents who do not opt to utilize the 
subsidized childcare.  In Sweden, there are even special benefits offered to mothers who 
choose to closely space their births (Rønsen 2004).  While such policies do not always 
manage to increase fertility, it is important to point out that fertility in these countries is 
relatively high (albeit still below 2.1), with slower, less pronounced decline over time 
(Hugo 2000).  As of 2009, Norway reported a total fertility rate of 2.0 births per woman, 
followed closely behind by both Sweden and Finland at 1.9 (Haub and Kent 2009). 
     Though (excepting cases like Romania) these policies lack the coercion or 
manipulation that brought criticism among some of the fertility reduction efforts 
described above, pro-natalist policies produce their own type of ethical dilemma: what 
measures should a society take, and for what reasons, in order to increase birthrates 
(Battin 2004)?  For example, can a line be drawn beneath ad campaigns encouraging 
births to avert population decline and those to produce additional soldiers?  Or are there 
situations in which the interests of society in general be given weight over people‘s 
personal choices about reproduction?  These are complicated questions with 
undoubtedly culture-specific answers (if answers do, in fact, exist).   
 For the most part, many governments in below-replacement fertility countries are 
not moving to ―counteract‖ their low or declining fertility.  This is so for many reasons.  
First, when low fertility began to occur in several European countries  in the 1970s and 
1980s, it was typically regarded as a temporary issue stemming from delays in marriage 
and childbearing.  Demographers were confident that the declines would be followed 
shortly by an upturn in overall levels, and that total fertility would recover and stabilize.  
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Much of the fertility data of the day suggest that such a recovery has not taken place 
(McDonald 2006).  However, recent evidence has surfaced suggesting that this may still 
be possible: according to a 2009 study by Myrskylä, Kohler, and Billari, in countries at 
very advanced levels of the human development index (HDI), additional increases in 
development could well reverse the declining trend in fertility.  Essentially, this means 
that there is a well-established negative relationship between development and fertility—
but only up to a point.  After that point (which, according to Myrskylä and associates, is 
within the window of 0.85 to 0.90) fertility and development have a distinct positive 
relationship.    
The study by Myrskylä and colleagues focused on the 24 countries that had 
attained an HDI level of at least 0.9 by the year 2005 and for which longitudinal data 
were available for the period from 1975 to 2005.  Eighteen of the twenty-four countries, 
or almost three-quarters of them, exhibited this j-shaped relationship, though it is 
essential to take note that none of the increases in fertility were substantial enough to 
return the TFR to the level of replacement.  Nevertheless, if this relationship holds true, 
the implications for the trend of low and very low fertility could be far-reaching.  
Countries with HDI levels high enough to experience the reversal in their fertility trend 
are countries with the resources to then address their newly heightened total fertility 
rates.  That is, whereas little might be done to address a TFR of 1.3, Myrskylä, Kohler, 
and Billari maintain that at 1.89—the average TFR in countries at the highest levels of 
development—population replacement might be sustained with ―relatively modest levels 
of in-migration‖ (2009: 741).  At low levels of fertility, even small increases may 
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likewise increase the options that governments have.  At this point, it remains to be seen 
how this finding will be received by the demographic community.  One probable 
outcome from this research is the provision of additional evidence for governments to 
delay intervention attempts in the hopes that their country, too, may experience a marked 
reversal in fertility decline.  Whether or not this will be the case, none of the countries in 
the study of Myrskylä, Kohler, and Billari returned to the rate of replacement, and this 
fact must remain under consideration.         
 A second reason that governments may not be taking measures to address low 
fertility is based on what is apparently a ―conventional wisdom among demographers 
and economists that pronatalist policies are both expensive and ineffective‖ (McDonald 
487).  With the limited means available to engineer positive fertility change, high costs 
of attempting to do so may well be a deterrent in light of the low likelihood of success.  
In other words, programs involving incentives such as child care subsidies or loan 
repayment are likely too expensive for many nations to be worthwhile.   
Third, pronatalism can be ―politically sensitive‖ in countries whose past includes 
fascism and eugenics.  Such histories can be shameful and may well persuade 
governments to adhere strictly to the belief that fertility decisions lie in the realm of 
private lives, and out of the realm of government influence (McDonald 487).   
Finally, in many countries with below replacement fertility, there is a still a 
positive rate of natural increase.  In other words, owing to a nation‘s current age 
distribution, the population could still be increasing—this is a phenomenon known in 
demography as population momentum.  In such cases, the general public may not be 
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overly receptive to pro-natalist policies because they are indeed experiencing population 
growth, even though it is only temporary (Demeny 2003).  This is further complicated 
by the fact that many nations do not necessarily find the promise of a smaller population 
undesirable, especially in cases where high population densities are an issue.  
Additionally, if there is some degree of concern, it may be offset by the belief that 
increased levels of immigration would be sufficient to counteract or even prevent 
negative outcomes of depopulation.  But as explored above, this is more often than not a 
mistaken and even unreasonable belief. 
 The existence of so many obstacles to policy implementation and effectiveness asks 
the question, why can‘t policies effectively increase fertility?  Why is very low fertility a 
virtual ―trap‖ (Lutz and Skirbekk 2005) from which countries may struggle futilely but 
never escape?  For answers to these questions, it is prudent to turn to well-established 
demographic theories in order to assess how they might interpret below-replacement 
fertility, and whether they offer any possible explanation for reversing the trend. 
 
Fertility Paradigms 
Over the decades of the twentieth century, numerous paradigms have been 
proposed to better understand fertility levels in a population.  Within the context of 
unusual or unexpected change, it is useful to be able to refer to these paradigms in order 
to investigate how each would explain a given situation.  In the paragraphs below, I 
review six central demographic models—most of which explicitly deal with fertility; I 
focus on whether they openly account for the below-replacement fertility trend, or how 
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they might be interpreted to address below-replacement fertility.  The last of the models 
I cover is Bongaarts‘ proximate determinants model of fertility, which is presented in 
considerably more depth within its own section because it provides the central 
theoretical foundation for this dissertation.   
Demographic Transition Theory and Intergenerational Wealth Flows Theory.  
Demographic Transition Theory (DTT) is credited to Frank Notestein, who relied also 
on an earlier piece by Warren Thompson (1929). Notestein formally introduced it in his 
1945 paper to provide an explanation for the dramatic shift in fertility rates experienced 
in European and American history (Caldwell 1976).  The concept of the demographic 
transition refers, at its most basic conceptualization, to the population shift from high 
fertility and high mortality to high fertility and low mortality, and ultimately to low 
mortality and low fertility (Rowland 2003).  According to DDT, movement through 
these three stages is related to the societal transition to urban industrialization or 
modernization (Caldwell 1976; Rowland 2003).   
 The initial, pre-industrial stage is generally characterized by societies that are 
largely agricultural.  High fertility rates compensate for the equally high mortality rates 
resulting from low standards of hygiene and public health tied primarily to a lack of 
knowledge on the nutrition as well as the causes of and treatments for disease (Guest and 
Almgren 2001).  In this context, it is clear that numerous children will ensure that some 
survive to adulthood and contribute to the family livelihood.  This establishes extended 
family and kinship groups as the norm, which is in turn reinforced by a host of beliefs 
and practices.  As John C. Caldwell has explained, ―agriculture inevitably produced its 
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own morality‖ which ―placed great emphasis on the centrality of the family‖ (Caldwell 
2004: 298).  Similarly, Hirschman has stated that although high fertility was necessary 
for the survival of the community, ―the desire for high levels of childbearing was woven 
into the cultural fabric and the social institutions of traditional societies,‖ rather than 
being a relationship of which most people were consciously aware (2003: 425).  At this 
stage, the population experiences slow, stable growth.     
The second stage is characterized by general improvements in standards of living 
consisting of increases to the food supply and more efficient food distribution, better 
nutrition, improved sanitation and personal hygiene, and gains in medical knowledge 
leading to greater control over infectious and environmental diseases.  In turn, this 
results in a sharp decrease in mortality, especially with regard to infant and maternal 
mortality (Guest and Almgren 2001).  During this initial period of decreased mortality, 
traditional notions of the family tend to persist and fertility rates remain high.  As 
fertility rates greatly exceed mortality rates, societies experience a population explosion.  
In his original argument, Notestein observed that mortality is more likely than fertility to 
respond quickly to these changes, and therefore in this transitional period, birth rates 
substantially exceed death rates (Casterline 2003).   
Finally, the third stage typically occurs in more mature industrial societies.  In 
many cases, this means that the traditional focus on agriculture gives way to a greater 
emphasis on jobs in manufacturing and the urban service industry.  Ultimately, fertility 
experiences a rapid decline to rates often as low as the mortality rates, and population 
growth becomes stable and essentially negligible (Guest and Almgren 2001).  In some 
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cases, fertility rates may become so low that some societies will begin to witness 
depopulation.  As Hirschman explains, ―the transition from high to low fertility was not 
only an unprecedented demographic revolution but also a cultural revolution with 
profound implications for the definition of the family and the adult roles of women and 
men‖ 2003: 426).  As such, women‘s roles are likely to undergo considerable change as 
they increasingly become participants in the labor force.  Simultaneously, traditional 
notions of the family begin to erode, and smaller families become the norm.  This is 
aided by the fact that the likelihood of children surviving beyond age 5 or 10 has 
increased, along with their demand for consumption (e.g. education and other resources) 
which gives them few economic benefits (Guest and Almgren 2001).  Additionally, there 
may be greater stress on individualism and the achievement of personal aspirations, or a 
desire on the part of the younger generations to improve upon the living standards of 
their parents (Cleland 2003).   
While the theory recognizes the eventual stabilization of fertility and mortality 
rates, it does not explicitly address below-replacement fertility.  However, the balance of 
these last factors—higher levels of education and labor force participation among 
women, the economic costs of children, and culture of individualism—could reasonably 
be tied to below-replacement fertility.  The extent to which each exists in conjunction 
with the others could well contribute to rates of fertility so low that populations would 
cease to replace themselves in the absence of migration.  In fact, some modern 
interpretations of DTT specify the transition as having four stages, where the period of 
―incipient decline‖ and very low fertility and mortality constitute the fourth stage 
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(Poston and Bouvier 2010).  At this point, according to Poston and Bouvier, 
―populations only grow when there are fluctuations in fertility, such as in the baby boom 
in the U.S. after World War II.‖  They go on to explain that their use of the term 
incipient signifies that ―it is not really possible to determine how low fertility will go‖ 
(2010: 79).  They interpret this to suggest that a fifth stage of DTT—the stage of 
population decline—may soon be in order. 
Other demographers also recognize the significance of population decline. They 
do so by distinguishing it as its own transition altogether, dubbing it the ―second 
demographic transition‖ (Van De Kaa 2003).  Dirk J. Van De Kaa explains this as 
follows: 
…if fertility had indeed declined to replacement level, there would then have 
been little interest in post-transitional fertility trends… But things did not turn 
out that way.  Advanced industrial societies face a new imbalance between the 
components of natural population growth.  Fertility has declined well below 
replacement level.  Life expectancies at advanced ages have risen substantially.  
The combination of the two leads to a rapidly ageing population.  Negative rates 
of natural population growth are already observed in numerous countries.  
National projections show that this phenomenon will spread.  There are no 
indications this state of affairs is temporary: hence the conclusion that a second 
demographic transition is in progress (2003: 872). 
 
Making this distinction addresses the limitation of the original demographic transition 
theory‘s ability to account for below-replacement fertility in any depth.  Yet the 
identification of this trend as a separate transition does not provide any theoretical 
explanation for its occurrence, or expectation for its future trajectory. If a Second 
Demographic Transition Theory is in the works, it is still to come.   
Other issues with DTT should also be addressed.  For instance, the theory has 
been largely criticized for its emphasis on modernization as the driving force behind the 
 50 
transition because of its ethnocentric implications.  While DTT is based on the Western 
experience, fertility transition is a universal phenomenon—that is, every country in the 
world may be assigned a place on the demographic transition continuum.    However, 
because the stages are based on Western history, the tendency has been to associate the 
first stages with irrationality, which subsequently portrays pre-transitional societies as 
ignorant or even brutish (Caldwell 1976).  Thus, when currently developing nations are 
―placed‖ into those stages on the continuum, these characteristics are often—even 
unintentionally—applied to them.  In response, the emphasis of DTT has shifted over 
time from a focus on urbanization and industrialization as the causes behind transitions 
to the rational motivations of individuals.  In his call for a reinstatement of DTT, 
Caldwell concludes that: 
In general, in societies of every type and stage of development, fertility behavior 
is rational, and fertility is high or low as a result of economic benefits to 
individuals, couples, or families in its being so.  Whether high or low fertility is 
economically rational is determined by social conditions: primarily by the 
direction of the intergenerational wealth flow (1976: 355).   
 
Caldwell‘s above reference to the direction of the intergenerational wealth flow 
alludes to his own theory by the same name, which centers on fertility as a rational 
choice.  When wealth flows from child to parent, the desire would be typically to have 
unlimited numbers of children because children are net assets.  When wealth flows from 
parent to child, the tendency is toward childlessness.  The transition from the state of 
―unlimited‖ children to the tendency toward childless hinges upon the emotional and 
economic ―nucleation‖ of the family (Caldwell 1976: 355).  This occurs when parents 
shift their focus from their ancestors and extended families to their children, and even 
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their children‘s children (Caldwell 1976: 322).  As Robinson succinctly states, ―the very 
low fertility currently prevalent arises out of a deliberate choice by couples within the 
context of the modern urban-industrial society, but it is strongly affected by prevailing 
social and cultural views that high fertility threatens the future of the globe‖ (2004: 61; 
emphasis mine).  Ultimately, the emphasis is on rationality for all fertility-based 
decisions, irrespective of a society‘s level of development.  Thus, to say that parents in  
less developed countries are ―irrational‖ because they continue to have large families is 
to misunderstand these societies.  They are making the most rational decision within 
their particular context.       
Epidemiological Transition Theory.  Along with Demographic Transition 
Theory, Epidemiological Transition Theory is arguably one of the most commonly-
known theories among demographers.  This is due to the fact that the transitions for 
which both of these theories are named may be viewed as two of the most important 
broad developments in world population history.  As with DTT, Epidemiological 
Transition Theory can grant insight into changes in fertility over a wide spectrum of 
cultures and societies.  
Epidemiological Transition Theory (ETT) was introduced in the 1970s by Abdel 
R. Omran to provide an explanation for shifts in mortality and morbidity.  Epidemiology 
refers to ―the study of the distribution and determinants of mortality (death) and 
morbidity (illness) in human populations‖ (LaVeist 2005: 54).  Thus, the theory 
describes the shift in the distribution and determinants from deaths caused by infectious 
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and parasitic diseases to deaths caused by degenerative diseases such as heart disease 
and cancer.  This occurs over the following three stages:  
(1) The Age of Pestilence and Famine: the primary causes of mortality are influenza, 
pneumonia, smallpox, tuberculosis, and other related diseases.  Mortality rates 
are high—especially among infants and children—and life expectancy at birth is 
low, often just 20 to 40 years (Ailshire 2009). 
(2) The Age of Receding Pandemics: mortality declines rapidly due to improved 
sanitation as well as increases in standards of living and public health.  Mortality 
is still high—people are dying from other causes—but life expectancy increases 
from the previous ages to between 30 and 50 years (Poston and Bouvier 2010). 
(3) The Age of Degenerative and Manmade Diseases: mortality declines take place 
due to medical advances in the prevention and treatment of infectious diseases, 
so that diseases such as heart disease, cancer and stroke are now most prevalent.  
A rapid rise in life expectancy along with low mortality rates establish, for the 
first time, fertility as the primary factor in population growth (Poston and 
Bouvier 2010). 
 First and foremost a theory focusing on mortality trends, ETT does not ostensibly 
address changes in fertility, let alone specifically below-replacement fertility.  However, 
fertility levels may be considered as almost a residual effect of changes in mortality.  
That is, during the Age of Pestilence and Famine, high fertility rates were needed to 
counteract the high mortality of infants and children; otherwise, societies would have 
died out at this point.  Similarly, high fertility rates would need to be maintained during 
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the Age of Receding Pandemics because the mortality rates remained high, though not 
quite as high as during the first stage.  In this manner, it seems likely that fertility would 
drop to very low levels in the Age of Degenerative and Manmade Diseases, when infant 
mortality is significantly lower and the majority of children are well-assured to survive 
into adulthood.  Increased life expectancy allows for a rational evaluation of family roles 
and desires regarding childbearing with the knowledge that both children and adults will 
live to very old ages.  In other words, because everyone is living longer, there is not the 
same pressing need for high fertility.  Additionally, with all those extra years to live, 
there is more time for working toward the accomplishment of personal achievements and 
dreams.  This may result in a greater emphasis on individualism.  As a child consumes 
more than he/she can contribute for many years, people may choose to have fewer (or 
no) children so that they will have more resources per each member of the family.   
The Economic Model of Fertility.  Richard Easterlin‘s Economic Model of 
Fertility takes a closer look at this notion of childbearing as an economic consideration.  
Formally introduced in 1975, it relates fertility levels to the supply and demand of 
children in a society.  That is, ―children are viewed as a special kind of good, and 
fertility is the response to the consumer‘s demand for children relative to other goods‖ 
(Easterlin 1975: 54).  Specifically, Easterlin identifies the following three determinants 
of fertility: 
(1) The demand for children is represented as the number of surviving children 
parents would desire if fertility regulation were costless.  This demand may be 
determined by factors such as income, the price of children relative to other 
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goods, and the subjective preference an individual or couple has for children 
compared to other goods.     
(2) The potential output of children is equated to the number of surviving children 
parents would have if they did not deliberately limit fertility.   Such a number is 
related to (and varies with) factors such as the frequency of intercourse, sexual 
desire, involuntary abstinence (e.g. based on impotence), involuntary fecundity 
or infecundity, involuntary fetal mortality, the level of natural fertility, and the 
survival prospects of a baby to adulthood.   
(3) The costs of fertility regulation include both attitude (the subjective or psychic 
costs) and access (the objective costs—the time and money required to learn 
about and use specific techniques) (Easterlin 1975). 
Under the above conditions, this model holds that the fertility level fluctuates because 
both supply and demand are affected by societal changes.  Applied to the trend of below-
replacement fertility, it could suggest a number of things.  For example, the demand for 
children may decrease substantially because the cost of raising a child is so high, 
especially relative to income.  Children require a longer and larger investment to house, 
clothe, feed, and educate them into adulthood.  On the other hand, fertility may decrease 
because of less sexual activity among couples: couples who might otherwise have 
children may be more focused on their educations or careers.  Subsequently, the 
potential output of children may be very low, resulting in fewer births.  Whichever 
explanation may be most likely in a given context, Easterlin‘s framework provides a 
unique perspective on below-replacement fertility by focusing on today‘s commodity-
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oriented individualistic mindset.  In either hypothetical scenario, fertility would be likely 
to continue to drop to very low levels, and to stay quite low, until the complications 
affecting the demand for and potential output of children were ameliorated.  Depending 
on the specifics, this could involve family-friendly programs designed to make having a 
child more compatible with having a career.  Essentially, what such a program would do 
would be to lower the relative cost of having children.   
The Human Ecological Theory of Fertility .  The Human Ecological Theory of 
Fertility offers a macro-level explanation of fertility by focusing on the level of 
sustenance organization in a society.  It argues that the complexity of a society‘s 
sustenance organization is negatively related with fertility: that is, the more complex a 
society becomes with respect to its sustenance organization, the lower its fertility.  
According to Poston and Frisbie, this occurs based on the fact that when sustenance 
organizations become complex but fertility remains high, a large proportion of the 
sustenance produced is thus consumed directly by the population, which limits ―the 
population‘s flexibility for adapting to environmental, technological, and other kinds of 
changes and fluctuations‖ (2005: 606).  They go on to explain that, as a result, low 
fertility is more appropriate for the needs and requirements of such a sustenance 
organization since it leaves a higher proportion of the resources uncommitted.  In other 
words, with fewer children, there is more sustenance available for investment back into 
the system, becoming available as mobile or fluid resources.  This results in making 
investment resources ―available for increasing complexity, given requisite changes in the 
environment and technology‖ (Poston and Frisbie 2005: 607).   
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 This theory supplies, perhaps, the most direct application to below-replacement 
fertility.  The majority of below-replacement nations are considered ―developed‖ (72 
percent of the 76 countries reporting below-replacement rates in 2009 [United Nations 
Statistics Division 2009]).  It is thus possible to say that many of these nations have 
complex sustenance organizations, as is typically the case in societies with very 
specialized market-based economies.  High fertility rates are undesirable or impractical 
among such nations because better-paying jobs require a greater investment of resources 
in the form of education or experience.  Children would absorb the hours that could 
otherwise go into these pursuits, and so fertility drops as individuals invest their 
resources in themselves, and concurrently into the sustenance organization.  This is 
necessary if a given nation intends to be competitive in the global marketplace among 
the other developed nations.  When fertility rates remain high, then a given economy has 
nowhere to go; it does not have the resources to grow or improve.  Subsequently, a focus 
on global competitiveness might have the force to drive rates lower and lower to levels 
such as those present today.    
 
Bongaarts’ Proximate Determinants Model of Fertility 
The Bongaarts‘ proximate determinants model of fertility is the focus of a vast 
number of demographic studies.  This famous technique for analyzing fertility trends 
essentially revolutionized the way demographers look at a population‘s total fertility 
rate, influencing both data collection and analysis in the field of fertility studies.  
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Consequently, any serious application of the model necessitates a thorough 
understanding of both its structure and interpretation. 
 The proximate determinants model was first introduced in 1956 in a different 
form by Kingsley Davis and Judith Blake, who developed 11 ―intermediate fertility 
variables.‖  These were the 11 factors they had singled out ―through which and only 
through which social, economic, and cultural conditions can affect fertility‖ (1956: 179).  
There were many significant features of this framework, the greatest of which was most 
likely the way in which it emphasized the direct effect of these fertility variables.  
Another important feature was the way the framework emphasized the presence of all 11 
variables in every society, even when a particular variable perhaps seemed to have no 
effect.  In such a case, as in a society where none of the women were using birth control, 
it was the absence of the practice of birth control that was considered to be a form of 
influence.  Each of the 11 variables was thus working in either positive or negative ways 
in every population, the aggregated result of which was the population‘s fertility level. 
While well-received and even regarded as pioneering, the framework proposed 
by Davis and Blake was difficult to quantify.  Accordingly, Bongaarts revised the model 
in 1978 to produce 8 proximate determinants grouped into three broad categories as 
follows (Bongaarts 1978: 106): 
(1) Exposure factors 
a. Proportion married 
(2) Deliberate marital fertility control factors 
a. Contraception 
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b. Induced abortion 
(3) Natural marital fertility factors 
a. Lactational infecundability 
b. Frequency of intercourse 
c. Sterility 
d. Spontaneous intrauterine mortality 
e. Duration of the fertile period 
Much like the Davis and Blake framework, these proximate determinants of fertility are 
behavioral and biological variables that directly influence fertility, and are distinct from 
other types of variables because all others—such as family planning, socioeconomic, and 
attitudinal variables—must operate through the proximate determinants to influence 
fertility.  Furthermore, as was the case with the intermediate variables of Davis and 
Blake, each of the proximate determinants can operate to increase or decrease fertility, 
and do not need to operate in the same direction.  Where they are significantly different 
from their predecessors is in their ability to be easily quantified and clearly interpreted.  
These quantitative interpretations apply only to the first four of the proximate 
determinants, because though Bongaarts initially identified eight, he acknowledged that 
the first four actually account for the majority of the variation in a population‘s total 
fertility rate.  In his famous 1982 study using data from 41 developed, developing, and 
historical populations, these four proximate determinants were shown to account for 96 
percent of the variance in the TFR.  Consequently, Bongaarts determined that ―the 
remaining intermediate variables—natural fecundability (or frequency of intercourse), 
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spontaneous intrauterine mortality, and permanent sterility—are generally much less 
important although they may substantially affect fertility in some populations‖ (1982: 
186).   
 The quantitative indices developed for the first four proximate determinants each 
range from 0 to 1, where 0 represents complete fertility inhibition and 1 represents no 
fertility-inhibiting effect of a given intermediate variable.  In other words, the higher the 
value for a particular proximate determinant, the higher the corresponding fertility.  
Consequently, the four indices may be represented as follows: 
Cm: The marriage pattern index has a value of 1 when all women of reproductive 
ages are in a marital or consensual union and 0 when none of them are in 
such unions.  
Cc: The index of contraception equals 1 if no contraception is used in the 
population and equals 0 if all fecund women are using completely effective 
modern methods of contraception.  
Ci: The postpartum infecundability index equals 1 when no women are 
experiencing postpartum infecundability (absence of lactation) and 0 when all 
women are (the duration of infecundability is infinite). 
Ca: The index of abortion equals 1 when there is no induced abortion practiced in 
the population and 0 if every pregnancy that occurs is aborted. 
Bongaarts also identified four different types of fertility levels from which the impact of 
these four intermediate variables can be derived.  That is, by isolating certain 
combinations of proximate determinants, the four following fertility levels result: 
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(1) The Total Fertility Rate (TFR) refers to the rate at of legitimate births that result 
when the inhibiting effects of all intermediate variables are present. 
(2) The Total Marital Fertility Rate (TM) results when the fertility-inhibiting effect 
of celibacy is removed. 
(3) The Total Natural Marital Fertility Rate (TN) results when all practice of 
contraception and induced abortion is eliminated in addition to the effect of 
celibacy. 
(4) The Total Fecundity Rate (TF) is the fertility level that occurs when the 
combined effect of the remaining intermediate variables is removed, namely 
fecundability, spontaneous intrauterine mortality, and permanent sterility.  
Bongaarts estimated this value to be about 15.3 for all women. 
These fertility levels are related to the indices in the following ways: 
  Cm = TFR/TM 
  Cc x Ca = TM/TN 
  Ci = TN/TF 
TFR = Cm x Cc x Ca x Ci x TF     (1) 
The latter relationship, Equation 1, is the most noteworthy because it summarizes the 
relationship between the TFR and the four principle proximate determinants.  
Importantly, Bongaarts notes that Equation 1 is not to be used as a new way to estimate 
the TFR, but to give ―an approximate breakdown of the contributions made by different 
intermediate variables to levels and trends in fertility‖ (1982: 184).  Equation 1 serves as 
a focal point for this dissertation.  
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 Since its inception, the proximate determinant framework has been adapted for a 
wide variety of purposes.  Stover articulately identifies the five most common: 
(1) Decomposing the contribution of each of the proximate determinants to the 
realization of the current level of the total fertility rate 
(2) Analyzing the contribution of changes in the proximate determinants to changes 
in the total fertility rate over time 
(3) Comparing the differences in fertility between two or more countries or regions 
on the basis of differences in the proximate determinants 
(4) Estimating total abortion rates as a residual after the effects of all other proximate 
determinants have been removed 
(5) Projecting future levels of contraceptive use that would be required to achieve 
fertility goals given expected changes in the other proximate determinants or 
future levels of fertility given expected or desired changes in contraceptive use 
(1998: 255). 
Quite often, the model is used to investigate unusual fertility-related 
circumstances.  For instance, Bongaarts, Frank, and Lesthaeghe (1984) tested the 
framework in the early eighties in Sub-Saharan Africa.  In light of a puzzling lack of 
contraception or induced abortion, they were interested in determining why there was 
considerable variation in national, subnational, and individual level fertility in this area.  
They discovered that lactational amenorrhea resulting from breastfeeding; postpartum 
sexual abstinence; and pathological, involuntary infertility—a proximate determinant 
introduced in their study for the first time—were the principal proximate determinants in 
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Sub-Saharan Africa.  Furthermore, they reflected on the behaviors that impact these 
determinants, and how they may or may not be influenced.  In this situation, an 
understanding of the true underlying causes of fertility variation produced valuable 
knowledge for governments concerned with rapid population growth and poor economic 
conditions.   
Bongaarts undertook a similar investigation in 1987 when, in examining the 
relationship between contraceptive use and fertility in a number of developing countries, 
he found four countries—Yemen, Kenya, Syria, and Jordan—to have fertility rates far in 
excess of what one would expect.  These results were extremely interesting in light of 
the fact that contraceptive prevalence usually predicts fertility better than any other 
indicator of reproductive behavior.  Subsequently, Bongaarts applied the proximate 
determinants model to identify an explanation for the high fertility.  In doing so, he 
discovered that in each of these four countries, both breastfeeding and the marriage 
pattern exerted smaller fertility-inhibiting effects than in other societies with the same 
level of contraceptive prevalence, and that these differences accounted for a large part of 
the excess fertility (Bongaarts 1987).  As a result, he concluded that in some situations, 
―it is quite possible for fertility to remain constant or even rise temporarily as 
contraceptive use increases, because other proximate determinants can exert offsetting 
upward pressure on fertility… If contraceptive prevalence continues to rise, however, 
fertility inevitably declines‖ (1987: 138).  This investigation shed new light on the 
relationship between contraceptive prevalence and fertility.   
 The proximate determinants model has also been commonly applied to examine 
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change in one society or population over time.  This was the case in Onuoha‘s study of 
the relative contributions of the proximate determinants to fertility change in Senegal.  
Senegal was one of the few Western African countries to launch a formal population 
policy in the mid-1970s to reduce its level of fertility.  The policy was unsuccessful, 
however, and the fertility level of the country remained very high (Onuoha 1992).  
Onuoha suspected a misunderstanding of the principal variables actually determining 
fertility in Senegal might be partially to blame, and sought to identify the relative 
contributions of the major proximate determinants of fertility in an effort to remedy the 
situation.  His application of the model revealed that post-partum infecundability 
accounted for the largest proportion of births averted at both the earlier and latter survey 
dates—a finding consistent with a number of other studies in the sub-Saharan African 
region.  Yet he determined this practice had little potential for additional influence on 
fertility in the future, since its impact was already high.  Instead, he pointed to the index 
of contraception which had exerted only a minor influence on fertility change, and thus 
possessed considerable potential for incorporation into fertility reduction policies in the 
future (Onuoha 1992). 
 Islam, Islam, and Chakroborty (2003) also employed the proximate determinants 
model to explain change in a country over time.  Their focus was on Bangladesh, which 
was notable for undergoing a substantial decline in fertility: the TFR dropped from a 
high of 6.3 in 1975 to 3.4 during the early 1990s, despite any concurrent increases in 
socioeconomic or health status in the population.  With such an unusual disassociation 
from the more common indicators of fertility decline, Islam and colleagues set out to 
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determine the causes of the change in and ultimate stabilization of Bangladeshi fertility.  
They examined data from the Bangladesh Demographic and Health Surveys using a 
proximate determinants framework and identified a number of important relationships.  
First, while postpartum fecundability had long been the ―most important and strongest 
fertility reducing factor‖ for the country, this had changed in recent years for two 
reasons: (1) an increasing usage and fertility-inhibiting of contraception, and (2) a 
declining trend in the lactational amenorrheic period leading to a decrease in its fertility 
reducing effect (2003: 368).  Second, while the fertility reducing effect of contraceptives 
was most pronounced for the middle and older age groups, the effect of marriage 
continued to be strongest for the 15-19 and 20-24 age groups.  Islam and colleagues 
interpreted this to mean that the fertility-promoting effect of early marriage was also 
weakening.  Interestingly, the combination of a weaker postpartum infecundability and 
stronger marriage fertility inhibiting effect resulted in little change in the combined effect 
of the two determinants over the period of analysis; that is, the rise in births attributed to 
the former was effectively cancelled out by the decrease due to the latter.  Finally, the 
stabilization or ―plateauing‖ of fertility that occurred in the late 1990s was attributable to a 
tempo effect, and was actually just a ―short-term fluctuation‖ within a greater trend of 
fertility decline (2003: 368).  The knowledge generated by this research had significant 
implications for Bangladeshi public policy, since continued efforts to decrease fertility 
could be clearly aimed at continuing the spread of effective contraceptive use. 
 Knodel, Chamratrithirong, and Debavalya (1987) presented another notable 
example of applying the proximate determinants to examine change in a population over 
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time.  They investigated the unusually rapid and pervasive decline in fertility that took 
place over several decades in Thailand, despite its predominantly rural and agrarian 
status.  The entirety of their analysis is guided by what they referred to as the ―now-
familiar distinction between proximate and other fertility determinants‖ (1987: 9).  
Essentially, they start with the proximate determinants, and as they progress through 
their analysis they begin to incorporate other fertility influences as they work through 
the proximate determinants.  This is meant to address the situation that ―since many of 
the proximate determinants are influenced by volitional actions and choice, attitudes 
directly concerning fertility as well as attitudes about the proximate determinants 
themselves are an important feature of any explanation of reproductive change‖ (1987: 
9).  However, what is particularly remarkable about their study is its comprehensive 
examination of how knowledge of the fertility transition is enhanced and strengthened 
by integrating both quantitative and qualitative methods.  While specifics about the 
statistical transition from many births to only two or three is easily measured with 
quantitative data and methods, less easy to identify statistically is why such a transition 
took place in a country that is less developed.  That is, qualitative data and methods 
allowed for a deeper examination of the reasons the reduction took place and made it 
possible to derive a more complete picture of the issue than either analysis could provide 
separately—even within the proximate determinants framework, which is usually 
applied in a primarily quantitative way.  The qualitative aspect of their study consisted of 
in-depth focus groups with Thai men and women of all ages.  The questions covered all 
aspects of their fertility behavior, leading Knodel and his colleagues to make interesting 
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and innovative discoveries about the various mechanisms behind the transition: a series 
of interrelated and fundamental changes in socioeconomic conditions, a favorable 
cultural setting for reproductive change, substantial latent demand for fertility control 
prior to the actual decline, and a national family planning program that increased 
awareness and accessibility to acceptable and effective means of contraception.  In other 
words, whereas the quantitative analysis revealed that contraceptive use was the main 
proximate determinant accounting for Thailand‘s fertility decline, the qualitative 
analysis added extensive depth and insight to this conclusion by suggesting some of the 
interrelated elements working behind the scenes. 
 Another study utilized the change-over-time application of the proximate 
determinants model within a specifically below-replacement context.  Sibanda, 
Woubalem, Hogan, and Lindstrom (2003) examined how the proximate determinants 
could account for a very unique situation in Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia.  
Whereas over the years 1990 to 2000, the TFR in the rest of the country was declining 
slightly from 6.4 to 5.9, the capital experienced a remarkable decline from 3.1 to 1.9 
without the presence of any strong or effective national family planning program.  Using 
Bongaarts‘ model, the researchers determined that it was actually a decrease in the age-
specific proportions of women married that were responsible for the change, as well as 
an increase in contraceptive use.  The social implications of these results were then 
considered and evaluated.   
 In addition to standard applications of the Bongaarts model, several scholars 
have considered or attempted modifications to the proximate determinants framework 
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(Hobcraft and  Little 1984; Moreno 1991; Reinis 1992).  Stover‘s (1998) research is a 
particularly good example; he considers various ways in which, twenty years after its 
inception, the proximate determinants model might be modernized.  He considers each 
element of Equation (1) in turn (see above), offering possible improvements.  Some of 
his most noteworthy comments include identifying, as I did previously, the discrepancy 
between the index of marriage and the behavior it is actually meant to represent in 
modern times, namely, sexual activity.  His recommendation is to use a more direct 
measure of the proportion of women who are sexually active and representing it in its 
own index, Cx.  With regards to the index of postpartum infecundability he expanded it 
to combine the effects of postpartum abstinence and lactational amenorrhea.  He refers 
to this effect as postpartum insusceptibility and describes it as a ―more complete measure 
of the fertility-inhibiting effects of the postpartum period‖ (Stover 1998: 257).  Instead 
of the standard measure of 15.3 for total fecundity (TF) in Equation (1), Stover defines 
the reproductive period as extended from 15 to 49—excluding infecundity, which he 
now incorporates into its own index.  The result is a value of 21 for what he calls 
―potential fertility,‖ or ―the total fertility rate for a population of women who are 
sexually active and fecund for the entire period from age 15 to 49 and who do not 
practice breastfeeding, experience post-partum abstinence, nor practice contraception‖ 
(Stover 1998: 262).  In the end, he provides both a new model as well as the 
circumstances best suited for its use.  In this dissertation, I will consider some of 
Stover‘s recommendations within the context of below-replacement fertility countries in 
my attempt to determine whether his modifications improve the capability of accounting 
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for variation in the total fertility rate.   
The proximate determinants of below replacement fertility.  Bongaarts himself 
has identified a number of determinants of low fertility by focusing on the relationship 
between fertility preferences and behavior.  He has argued that while desired family size 
certainly declines during the fertility transition, actual levels of fertility often fail to meet 
these desires (Bongaarts 2001).  He explains why individuals do not realize these 
aspirations by examining the manner in which the following behaviors alter fertility 
levels relative to intended family size (IFS):  
(1) Unwanted fertility emphasizes that deviations from intended family size can 
include not only falling short of the number of children one desires, but 
exceeding that number.  Bongaarts explains that the prevalence of unwanted 
childbearing rises substantially with the onset of the fertility transition because 
the decline in desired family size ―leads to an increase in the proportion of 
women who are at risk of having more births than they wish‖ (2001: 266). 
(2) A replacement effect accounts for parents who have additional children after 
the death of a child for the purpose of reaching a desired number of surviving 
children.  When this occurs, the number of births a couple has is increased, 
though the desired family size remains unchanged.  Because of the relative 
rarity of this occurrence, replacement of this type has only a slight impact on 
fertility levels in what Bongaarts terms ―late-transitional societies‖ (2001: 
269).  Quantified, if every woman replaced a dead infant (it has been 
estimated that only half actually do), fertility would only increase by about 
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0.02 births per woman (Bongaarts 2001). 
(3) Sex preferences can cause individuals to have additional children after 
reaching their desired family size in order to obtain a similarly desired gender 
ratio.  For example, if a couple hopes to have just two children, a boy and a 
girl, but go on to have two sons, they may have an additional child in an 
attempt to produce a daughter.  It can be difficult to determine the effect of 
gender preference on fertility levels because it necessitates a wealth of 
information, including the structure preferences for gender and family size 
and the manner whereby parents address a conflict between sex composition 
and size (Bongaarts 2001).   
(4) The tempo effect represents the effect of postponing births on period 
measures of fertility.  Essentially, the act of delaying births depresses 
measures like the TFR.  That is, as the mean age at childbearing increases, 
the TFR may appear to decrease significantly though completed fertility is 
not affected.   Other measures, such as the tempo-adjusted total fertility rate 
(ATFR) represent synthetic period fertility without the distortion cause by 
changes in the timing of childbearing.  The difference between the ATFR and 
TFR corresponds to the distortion, or ―tempo effect‖ (Bongaarts 2008: 41).   
(5) Involuntary infertility can consist of an inability to find a suitable partner, the 
disruption of a union prior to the conception of children (due to death or 
divorce), and physiological or disease-induced sterility.  Bongaarts states that 
the prevalence of involuntary fertility tends to be higher ―in populations with 
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late ages at first union, high proportions never entering unions, high rates of 
divorce or widowhood, large desired family sizes, and high levels of 
prevalence of sexually transmitted diseases‖ (2001: 275).  However, it can be 
difficult to measure to the extent that it cannot always be separated from the 
limitation of childbearing that is voluntary. 
(6) Competition acknowledges that other preferences—such as those relating to 
money, career, and ―freedom from childcare responsibilities‖—may result in 
some women achieving lower fertility than they had anticipated. 
These factors are particularly significant in the way that they provide both a framework 
for interpreting variations in fertility levels across social and cultural contexts and a 
means for comparisons between groups (Morgan and Taylor 2006).  Specifically, within 
the below-replacement context, they may well provide a starting point for respecifying 
some of the traditional proximate determinants of fertility.     
I have been unable to find anywhere in the literature a recent analysis of the 
proximate determinants model in either South Korea or the United States, and no analysis 
designed with the intent of testing and modifying the model for below-replacement 
fertility application.  As such, this dissertation endeavors to address this gap in the 
literature by applying Bongaarts‘ original proximate determinants to two low fertility 
nations in order to assess the individual strength of each determinant within this context.    
In the next chapter of this dissertation, a number of hypotheses are formulated.  
Additionally, the data are discussed in some detail, as well as the methods that will be 
employed in the two central analyses to test the hypotheses.   
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CHAPTER III 
HYPOTHESES, DATA, AND METHODS 
 
In this chapter, I synthesize the basic findings and information presented in the 
literature review in the previous chapter.  This information is then incorporated into a 
number of hypotheses.  I also address some of the more technical aspects of the 
dissertation, both describing in detail the data that will be used and discussing the 
methods that are utilized in the two main analyses to test the hypotheses.   
 
Hypotheses 
 Based on the review of the literature, it is apparent that the proximate 
determinants model of fertility is an effective means for decomposing the total fertility 
rate.  It is also apparent that the below-replacement fertility phenomenon currently 
taking place lacks a solid theoretical foundation by which to explain and understand it.  
Consequently, I hypothesize that the proximate determinants model of fertility will not 
explain over 90 percent of the variation in the total fertility rates of two below-
replacement nations, as it did when applied to a combination of primarily developing 
nations and historical populations in Bongaarts‘ original study.   
In my dissertation, I will be undertaking two main analyses.  Whereas the case 
studies constituting the first entail many quantitative considerations, it is the second 
analysis in which I will  use the proximate determinants to examine the fertility behavior 
of women in South Korea and the United States in the 1970s and 2000s.  Each 
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determinant will be considered individually with respect to how it has changed over 
time; then, I will employ the four quantitative indices of the proximate determinants as 
independent variables in an analysis of the fertility behavior at both points in time.   
For the above analyses, I present the following specific hypotheses: 
1. The effect of the marriage determinant among Korea women and U.S. 
women will be weaker in the 2000s than it was in the 1970s.  
2. The effect of the contraception determinant among Korea women and U.S. 
women will be weaker in the 2000s than it was in the 1970s.  
3. The effect of the postpartum infecundability determinant among Korea 
women and U.S. women will not be significantly different in the 2000s than 
it was in the 1970s.  
4. The effect of the induced abortion determinant among Korea women and 
U.S. women will not be significantly different in the 2000s than it was in the 
1970s.  
5. Change in the index of marriage will contribute significantly to change in the 
fertility rate of South Korean women between the 1970s and the 2000s. 
6. Change in the index of contraception will contribute significantly to change 
in the fertility rate of South Korea women between the 1970s and the 2000s. 
7. Change in the index of abortion will not contribute significantly to change in 
the fertility rate of South Korea women between the 1970s and the 2000s. 
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8. Change in the index of postpartum infecundability will not contribute 
significantly to change in the fertility rate of South Korea women between 
the 1970s and the 2000s. 
9. Change in the index of marriage will contribute significantly to change in the 
fertility rate of women in the United States between the 1970s and the 2000s. 
10. Change in the index of contraception will contribute significantly to change 
in the fertility rate of U. S. women between the 1970s and the 2000s. 
11. Change in the index of abortion will contribute significantly to change in the 
fertility rate of women in the United States between the 1970s and the 2000s. 
12. Change in the index of postpartum infecundability will not contribute 
significantly to change in the fertility rate of women in the United States 
between the 1970s and the 2000s. 
 
Description of the Data 
The broader focus of this dissertation is on all countries whose fertility falls 
below the rate of replacement, or a total fertility rate of 2.1 births per woman.  The 
Population Reference Bureau‘s World Population Data Sheets identified 74 such 
countries who, for 2006, 2007 and 2008, have an average total fertility rates over those 
three years below 2.1.  By averaging the TFRs over a three-year period, it is far less 
likely that any of the countries identified are actually outliers—included simply because 
they experienced a temporary drop in fertility during any one of the three years.  Each of 
these countries is identified alphabetically in Table 1 along with its average three-year 
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TFR and fertility classification according to the distinctions assigned by Francesco C. 
Billari (2004).  Billari‘s categorizations are generally well-accepted in the low-fertility 
literature and are as follows: ―low‖ fertility countries are those with TFRs below the 
replacement level of 2.1 but greater than 1.49; ―very low‖ fertility countries are those 
with TFRs below 1.5 but greater than 1.29; and ―lowest low‖ fertility countries are those 
with TFRs below 1.3 (Billari 2004).  Among the 74 countries in Table 1, the mean TFR 
is 1.567—―low‖ fertility, but not quite ―very low.‖  Regarding the Billari classifications, 
37 countries are considered to have low fertility, 27 have very low fertility, and just 10 
fall into the ―lowest low‖ category.  This breakdown is illustrated in Figure 1 below. 
 Another interesting distinction among the below-replacement fertility nations is 
their unofficial United Nations development designation.  According to the United 
Nations Statistics Division: 
There is no established convention for the designation of ―developed‖ and 
―developing" countries or areas in the United Nations system. In common 
practice, Japan in Asia, Canada and the United States in northern America, 
Australia and New Zealand in Oceania, and Europe are considered "developed" 
regions or areas. In international trade statistics, the Southern African Customs 
Union is also treated as a developed region and Israel as a developed country; 
countries emerging from the former Yugoslavia are treated as developing 
countries; and countries of eastern Europe and of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (code 172) in Europe are not included under either developed 
or developing regions (2008). 
 
However, the UN has consistently identified ―least developed countries‖ or LDCs, land-
locked developing countries or LLDCs, and small island developing states or SIDS.  
LDCs are classified based on the highest level of disadvantage in their process of 
development, resulting in greater challenges and a more significant struggle to emerge  
from poverty.  These nations are characterized by their low income, weak human assets, 
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Table 1. Below Replacement Fertility Nations by Average Total Fertility Rate and 
Billari Classification: 2006 to 2008 
Country 
2006-2008 
Average 
TFR 
Billari 
Classification 
Albania 1.77 Low 
Andorra 1.27 lowest low 
Armenia 1.70 Low 
Australia 1.83 Low 
Austria 1.40 very low 
Bahamas 2.03 Low 
Barbados 1.80 Low 
Belarus 1.27 lowest low 
Belgium 1.67 Low 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 1.20 lowest low 
Bulgaria 1.37 very low 
Canada 1.53 Low 
Channel Islands 1.40 very low 
Chile 2.00 Low 
China 1.60 Low 
Costa Rica 1.90 Low 
Croatia 1.40 very low 
Cuba 1.47 very low 
Cyprus 1.50 Low 
Czech Republic 1.33 very low 
Denmark 1.83 Low 
Estonia 1.60 Low 
Finland 1.80 Low 
France 1.97 Low 
Georgia 1.43 very low 
Germany 1.30 very low 
Greece 1.33 very low 
Hong Kong (China SAR) 1.00 lowest low 
Hungary 1.30 very low 
Iran 2.03 Low 
Ireland 1.97 Low 
Italy 1.33 very low 
Japan 1.30 very low 
Latvia 1.40 very low 
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Table 1 cont.  
Country 
2006-2008 
Average 
TFR 
Billari 
Classification 
Liechtenstein 1.40 very low 
Lithuania 1.33 very low 
Luxembourg 1.67 Low 
Macao (China SAR) 0.93 lowest low 
Macedonia 1.43 very low 
Malta 1.40 very low 
Martinique 1.97 Low 
Mauritius 1.73 Low 
Moldova 1.30 very low 
Mongolia 2.07 Low 
Montenegro 1.63 Low 
Netherlands   1.70 Low 
Netherlands Antilles 1.93 Low 
New Zealand 2.07 Low 
North Korea 2.00 Low 
Norway 1.87 Low 
Palau 2.03 Low 
Poland 1.30 very low 
Portugal 1.37 very low 
Puerto Rico 1.73 Low 
Romania 1.30 very low 
Russia 1.33 very low 
Saint Lucia 1.30 very low 
Saint Vincent & the Grenadines 2.07 Low 
San Marino 1.20 lowest low 
Serbia 1.67 Low 
Singapore 1.30 very low 
Slovakia 1.27 lowest low 
Slovenia 1.30 very low 
South Korea 1.17 lowest low 
Spain 1.37 very low 
Sweden 1.87 Low 
Switzerland 1.43 very low 
Taiwan 1.10 lowest low 
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Table 1 cont.  
Country 
2006-2008 
Average 
TFR 
Billari 
Classification 
Thailand 1.67 Low 
Trinidad and Tobago 1.60 Low 
Tunisia 2.00 Low 
Ukraine 1.27 lowest low 
United Kingdom 1.83 Low 
United States 2.07 Low 
Sources: Billari 2004; Haub 2006; Haub 2007; Haub and Kent 2008 
 
 
and economic vulnerability (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
2002a).  LLDCs are characterized by poor physical infrastructures, weak institutional 
and productive capacities, small domestic market that are remote from world markets, 
and high vulnerability to external shocks.  Accordingly, they are considered among the 
most disadvantaged and severely challenged countries (United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development 2002b).  Finally, SIDS are distinguished based on their small 
size, remoteness from large markets, and high economic vulnerability to economic and 
natural shocks considered beyond domestic control, all of which results in a greater risk 
of marginalization from the global economy.  However, it must be noted that whereas 
criteria exist by which to classify LDCs and LLDCs, the designation of SIDS is entirely 
unofficial based on a lack of such established criteria by which to identify these nations 
(United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2002c).  The list made available 
on the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development website is provided solely 
for analytical purposes.   
 Essentially, countries that fall into these categories are not those typically 
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Figure 1. Below-Replacement Fertility Nations According to Billari Classification 
of Fertility 
 
 
thought of to also possess levels of fertility below replacement, which are commonly 
developed nations that have completed their demographic transition.  Nations that have 
yet to transition into a state with a developed market economy oftentimes have not 
experienced the sharp drop in fertility following improvements in life expectancy that 
frequently results in below-replacement fertility rates.  Yet among the 74 countries with 
average TFRs below 2.1, ten are classified as either an LLDC or SIDS (see Table 2).  
These ten countries consist of four landlocked developing countries and six small island 
developing states.  Their average 2006 to 2008 total fertility rates range from 1.30 in 
Moldova and Saint Lucia to 2.07 in Mongolia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.  
Because of their unique status as developing, below-replacement fertility nations, each 
would undoubtedly provide an interesting case study into their specific causes of fertility 
decline.   
Though as previously stated, the broader focus of this dissertation is on these 74 
50%
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36%
Low Very Low Lowest Low
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Table 2. Below Replacement Fertility Nations with Unofficial United Nations 
Designations 
Country 
2006-2008 
Average TFR Unofficial UN Designation 
Armenia 1.70 Landlocked Developing Country 
Bahamas 2.03 Small Island Developing State 
Barbados 1.80 Small Island Developing State 
Macedonia 1.43 Landlocked Developing Country 
Moldova 1.30 Landlocked Developing Country 
Mongolia 2.07 Landlocked Developing Country 
Palau 2.03 Small Island Developing State 
Saint Lucia 1.30 Small Island Developing State 
Saint Vincent & the Grenadines 2.07 Small Island Developing State 
Trinidad and Tobago 1.60 Small Island Developing State 
Sources: Haub 2006; Haub 2007; Haub and Kent 2008; United Nations Conference on Trade  
and Development 2002d; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2006 
 
 
countries, only two are selected for closer examination.  This occurs in two separate 
analyses.  In the first, case studies are conducted for two of the countries included by 
John Bongaarts in his 1982 investigation on the proximate determinants of fertility: 
South Korea and the United States.  These two cases were selected from all of the 
countries included in Bongaarts‘ original study primarily owing to the completeness and 
availability of the necessary comparative data.  Additionally, I sought to select two 
relatively different countries; that is, I aimed to avoid selecting countries with relatively 
similar experiences in their fertility transition so that the case studies might ultimately 
produce a more diverse array of fertility-related information.  Accordingly, South Korea 
witnessed a decline from nearly 6 births in 1960 and 4 births per woman in 1970 to an 
average TFR for the period of 2006 to 2008 of just 1.17, while the U.S. underwent a 
much slighter decline from 2.34 in 1967 to an average of 2.07 for 2006 through 2008 
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(Bongaarts and Potter 1983; Haub 2006; Haub 2007; Haub and Kent 2008).  While both 
are unmistakably low fertility nations, they fall at virtually opposite ends of the below-
fertility spectrum.     
My two main analyses mimic the style of Knodel, Chamratrithirong, and 
Debavalya‘s 1987 study of fertility decline Thailand.  Whereas their study was 
remarkable for its incorporation of both quantitative and qualitative analyses, I draw 
solely on their quantitative investigation.  To do so necessitated comprehensive fertility 
data for each country at two separate points in time.  These data were drawn from 
numerous sources, including the Population Reference Bureau (PRB) World  Population 
Data Sheets for 2006, 2007, and 2008; the PRB 2008 Family Planning Worldwide Data 
Sheet; the United Nations Population Division World Marriage Data 2006; the United 
Nations 2007 Demographic Yearbook; and the United Nations World Contraceptive Use 
2007.   
The PRB Word Population Data Sheets are ―used around the world and [are] 
widely considered to be the most accurate source of information on population‖ (Haub 
and Kent 2008: 16).  The broad goal of the PRB is to inform people of the world about 
issues relating to population, health, and the environment, as well as to empower people 
to use that knowledge ―to advance the well-being of current and future generations‖ 
(Haub and Kent 2008: 16).  The PRB data sheets consist of numerous statistics including 
the mid-year population, net migration rate, maternal mortality rate, percent of 
population ages 15-49 with HIV/AIDS, and the percent of population with access to 
improved water sources, to give a selection.  For the purposes of this dissertation, I draw 
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from the PRB data sheets only the total fertility rate data.  Information for the World 
Population Data Sheets are collected from a variety of sources ranging from official 
country statistical yearbooks, bulletins, and websites; the United Nations Demographic 
Yearbook, 2005 of the UN Statistics Division; World Population Prospects: The 2006 
Revision of the UN Population Division; Recent Demographic Developments in Europe, 
2005 of the Council of Europe and the International Data Base and library resources of 
the International Programs Center at the U.S. Census Bureau (Haub and Kent 2008: 15). 
The PRB 2008 Family Planning Worldwide Data Sheet operates under the same 
broad goals as the population data sheets, namely, to ―inform, empower, and advance,‖ 
but focuses on providing fertility- and contraceptive-related data.  These measures 
include the percent of women giving birth by age 18, the percent of women using 
modern vs. traditional methods of birth control, the source of supply of modern methods 
of birth control, as well as the percentage of women using contraception according to 
their wealth quintile.  For the purposes of this dissertation, I made use of the percent of 
married women using various types of birth control methods.  Information for this data 
sheet is gathered from similarly varied sources, including the Demographic and Health 
Surveys, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Reproductive Health 
Surveys, the UNICEF Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys, the Pan-Arab Project for 
Family Health, the Family Health Surveys, the Gulf Fertility Surveys, the Fertility and 
Family Surveys, various national surveys, and other sources as well.  As with the World 
Population Data Sheets, the 2008 Family Planning Worldwide Data Sheet is highly 
regarded.   
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Additional contraception data were obtained from the World Contraceptive Use 
2007 datasheet produced by the United Nations.  It is purported to provide ―the latest 
data available on key dimensions of reproductive health, including two of the indicators 
for the Millennium Development Goals, namely, contraceptive prevalence relative to the 
use of any method (indicator 5.3) and unmet need for family planning (indicator 5.6) 
(United Nations Population Division 2008).  The data for this publication were gathered 
from a variety of country-level surveys and nationally representative samples of women 
in the reproductive ages.  In total, these data account for 99.7 percent of women of 
reproductive age in a marriage or consensual union worldwide.  Whereas data on 
contraceptive prevalence referring to 1985 or later are available for 170 of the over 190 
countries in the world, only 109 countries have data as recent as the year 2000, 
representing 85.8 percent of women of reproductive age in a marriage or consensual 
union (United Nations Population Division 2008); of these, only 41 are below-
replacement fertility nations with contraceptive prevalence data for the majority of 
contraception types.     
The World Marriage Data 2006 datasheet is produced by the United Nations 
Population Division.  It consists of numerous indicators that were ―selected in such a 
way as to present a concise picture of marital behavior from both period and cohort 
perspectives‖ (United Nations Population Division 2007a).  The data are compiled from 
a wide variety of sources that include civil registrations, population censuses and 
nationally representative sample surveys.  The UN Population Division emphasizes that 
in the process of collecting these data, ―the basic criterion for inclusion of data [was] its 
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reliability,‖ with no attempts made to estimate missing data (2007a).   
 The Demographic Yearbook 2007 is another product of the United Nations.  This 
publication is produced annually and is based on a set of questionnaires dispatched by 
the UN Statistics Division to national statistical offices across the world.  It is a very 
well-known source for what are considered to be ―official statistics on a wide range of 
topics‖ including population size and composition, births, deaths, marriages, divorces, 
economic activity, educational attainment, household characteristics, housing, ethnicity 
and language, and more (United Nations Population Division 2009).   
Descriptions of country-specific datasets utilized are as follows: 
United States 
For the United States case study, this dissertation relies primarily on data from 
the National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG) Cycles 1, 2 and 6.  Conducted by the 
National Center for Health Statistics, the NSFG is ―an ongoing series of sample surveys 
designed to provide current information about childbearing, contraception, and related 
aspects of maternal and child health for the United States‖ (Lepkowski, Mosher, and 
Davis 2006: 4).  At its core, the NSFG employs a multistage probability sample to select 
respondents for face-to-face personal interview.  Cycle 1 was undertaken in 1973 with a 
sample consisting of 9,797 women aged 15-44 living in the coterminous U.S. who were 
currently married, previously married, or never married but with offspring living in  
households during  that year.  The response rate for this round of data collection was 
approximately 80 percent (ICPSR 2008).  The NSFG Cycle 1 data provided extensive 
information on pregnancies, including ―family planning practices and consultations, 
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prenatal and postnatal care, medical conditions, number of pregnancies and live births, 
problems experienced in conceiving, complicated pregnancies, sterilization, and medical 
checkup history‖ as well as desired number of children, birth expectations, and family 
size preferences among considerable demographic information.  Cycle 2 collected 
largely the same types of information from 8,611 women in 1976 (Mosher 1980).  Cycle 
6 was conducted in 2002 and early 2003, and is the latest and largest version of the 
survey available to date.  The data were collected from interviews administered to a 
nationally representative sample of 12,571 women and men ages 15-44, and was the first 
to include men in the interview process.  As such, it is an effective tool for estimating the 
number of individuals with particular characteristics in the U.S. household population.  
On this note, it is important to emphasize that the survey sample for the NSFG is not a 
―scale model‖ of the population; instead, particular groups were selected at different 
rates in order to overrepresent some of the smaller groups in the sample.  Consequently, 
to be able to make accurate inferences from the data, ―sampling weights‖ must be 
utilized.  ―‘Sampling weights‘ adjust for these different sample rates, response rates, and 
coverage rates so that unbiased national estimates can be made from the sample‖ 
(Lepkowski, Mosher, and Davis 2006: 2).  Put differently, the sampling weight for a 
given respondent indicates the number of persons in the population represented by that 
individual.  In order to account for the sampling weights, Stata‘s svy (survey) suite of 
commands is employed as necessary so that all estimates presented in this dissertation 
are based on the weighted data. 
 Additional data for the United States was drawn from the National Vital 
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Statistics System (NVSS), which includes information for births, deaths, marriages, and 
divorces collected by the National Center for Health Statistics.  In particular, this 
dissertation relies on data concerning marriages and births drawn from the natality file, 
which provides information on a wide variety of maternal and infant demographic and 
health characteristics for babies born in the United States (Ventura 2009).   
South Korea 
The case study analysis of South Korea uses a more eclectic collection of data 
sources.  For the 1970s, the primary source is the Korean National Fertility Survey 
conducted in 1974 and part of the World Fertility Survey (WFS) initiative.  This was a 
survey from a national sample of 5,430 ever-married women under the age of 50 and is 
considered ―one of the few in the WFS developing country program to have collected a 
reasonably complete history of contraceptive use‖ (Office of Population Research n.d.).  
Furthermore, the data provide comprehensive information on topics such as co-residence 
and contact with husband's and respondent's parents; mother's family size; number of 
sons born to mother-in-law and whether husband is the eldest son; expectations about 
sons' and daughters' education and perceived financial burden; expectations about 
various types of support from children; hours worked by respondent in last/current job; 
respondent's attitude to employment; husband's fertility preferences; respondent's 
fertility preferences at time of first marriage and desired timing of first birth; household 
ownership of consumer durables; size of dwelling; area of paddy/dry land owned/rented, 
and more (Office of Population Research n.d.). 
 While there is no current version of the Korean Fertility Survey, there are many 
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other data sources that may serve as its equivalent and which I use here in my 
dissertation.  The principal sources of data are the 2003 National Fertility and Family 
Health Survey and the 2005 National Survey on Marriage and Fertility Trends, both 
conducted by the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs (KIHASA); and an array 
of data collection efforts on the part of the Korean National Statistical Office (KNSO), 
such as population and household censuses, vital statistics, and more.   
 The 2003 National Fertility and Family Health Survey is the 19
th
 round of a 
series of fertility surveys conducted periodically since 1964.  It took place between May 
12
th
 and August 31
st
 in 2003, and consisted of individual interviews of  8,890 women 
aged 15 to 49.  The purpose of the research included identifying changes in fertility and 
child-rearing behaviors over time, as well as analyzing ways by which to improve the 
quality of life for families (Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs 2006).  The 
personal interviews covered topics such as marriage, pregnancy and birth histories, 
contraception, maternal and child health, family values and relationships, the quality of 
family life, and numerous demographic characteristics (Korea Institute for Health and 
Social Affairs 2006; Chung, Kim, and Nam 2007). 
 The 2005 National Survey on Marriage and Fertility Trends covered much of the 
same topics as the 2003 survey.  It was based on interviews with 8,890 women chosen in a 
national sample of households.  However, it was instituted as a reaction to the low-fertility 
phenomenon taking place across the world.  KIHASA aimed to gather information on the 
trends in order to identify their social and economic impact, and to draw conclusions about 
the future.  These included endeavoring to discover the cause of South Korea‘s low fertility 
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so that an effective policy might be put into place to restore higher rates of birth.  Specific 
topics covered in the interviews included values, assessments of self-fulfillment, educational 
attainment, employment, income and job security, child care, housing, the compatibility of 
family and career, and declining fertility rates.    
The Korean National Statistical Office also covers very broad fertility-based 
topics in its survey research, but only as one part of more extensive undertakings.  
According to the KNSO website, the purpose of the organization is the overall planning 
and coordination of national statistics, the establishment of statistical standards, the 
production and distribution of various economic and social statistics, the processing and 
management of statistical information, and the provision of various statistical data 
(Korean National Statistical Office 2009).  Data for the South Korean case study are 
drawn from many KNSO products, including the annual Census Report on Population 
and Housing, Women’s Statistics Yearbook, Changes in Key Characteristics of 
Marriages and Divorces Since 1970, Social Statistics Survey, Annual Report on the Vital 
Statistics and others.    
Because the primary data and the majority of KIHASA and NSO reports are only 
available in Korean, my research utilizes a collection of analyses and articles based on 
the results of the above-mentioned surveys to compile the necessary data for the 
comparative portion of the case study.   
 
Methods 
The purpose of my dissertation is to examine the effectiveness of the proximate 
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determinants model in analyses of two below-replacement fertility countries.  As 
discussed above, this is done in two separate analyses.  The first analysis consists of the 
two case studies in the style of the quantitative portion of Knodel, Chamratrithirong, and 
Debavalya‘s 1987 analysis of fertility decline in Thailand.  Within the United States and 
South Korea, I take an in-depth look at Bongaarts‘ four primary proximate determinants, 
one by one, at the national level.  Instead of simply calculating the quantitative index for 
each determinant, I consider the determinant contextually.  For example, I explore:  
 How have marriage trends changed over time in both of these countries?  
  Does most exposure to sexual intercourse occur within marriage?   
 How has the extent of nonmarital sexual relations and its implications for 
fertility changed over time?   
 What is the proportion of couples unable to bear children due to primary 
sterility? 
 Are there any reliable statistics on coital frequency? 
 What kinds of lactation data are available in these countries?   
 Has there been a noticeable/significant change in the mean duration of 
breastfeeding? 
 What is the level of contraceptive awareness in these countries? 
 How reliable are the data on induced abortion? 
 If it is believed that current data underestimate induced abortions, by how 
much? 
 Are people more or less willing to have had an abortion due to prevailing 
 89 
religious beliefs in these countries? 
These questions are among the many delved into in an effort to better grasp the 
manifestation of each determinant in two very different nations over thirty years.   
After each determinant has been thusly explored, the second analysis assesses the 
fertility-inhibiting effect of the four determinants by calculating the respective 
quantitative index representing the determinant for both the 1970s and the 2000s, and 
comparing the two measurements.  For both years, I consider the fertility level that 
would prevail in the determinant‘s presence as well as the level that would exist in its 
absence as was done in the study by Knodel, Chamratrithirong, and Debavalya.  Finally, 
I use each of the indices to calculate the TFR and assess how the strength of the model 
varies over time in both countries.  That is, given the values of the four indices and the 
value of the TFR in both the 1970s and the 2000s, is the model consistent in its 
predictive ability?  Does its predictive ability vary in an expected way?  In other words, 
does the new model explain less variance in a country‘s fertility when it is higher, and 
more when it is below replacement, or vice versa?   
In this second analysis, my ―independent variables‖ per se consist of the four 
indices calculated according to the equations provided by Bongaarts and Potter in their 
1983 model, as follows: 
Index of Marriage 
  Cm = Σ m(a) g(a)/Σ g(a)     (2) 
where 
m(a) = age-specific proportions currently married (or in consensual union) 
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among females; and 
g(a) = age-specific marital fertility rates. 
Index of Contraception 
  Cc = 1 – 1.08 * u * e      (3) 
where 
u = proportion currently using contraception among married women of 
reproductive age (male methods, abstinence other than postpartum, and 
sterilizing operations are included); and 
e = average use-effectiveness of contraception, the weighted average of the 
method specific use-effectiveness levels e(m) with the weights equal to the 
proportion of women using a given method, u(m): e = Σ e(m) u(m)/u.  
Index of Induced Abortion 
   Ca =          (4) 
where 
TA = total abortion rate, the number of induced abortions per woman at the end 
of the reproductive period if induced abortion rates remain at prevailing 
levels throughout the reproductive period (excluding induced abortions to 
women who are not married); 
b = the average number of births averted per induced abortion, approximated by 
the equation b = 0.4 (1 + u); and 
u = proportion currently using contraception among married women of 
reproductive age (male methods, abstinence other than postpartum, and 
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sterilizing operations are included). 
Index of Postpartum Infecundability 
   Ci =         (5) 
where 
i = average duration of postpartum infecundability caused by breastfeeding or 
postpartum abstinence. 
After these two analyses, I begin the process of developing a theoretical model of the 
proximate determinants in below-replacement fertility countries.   
This chapter has introduced the data and methods that I will use to test the 
proximate determinants model within a below-replacement fertility context.  The next 
two chapter of this dissertation analyzes changes in each determinant over time in two 
countries: South Korea and the United States, respectively.  They supply a contextual 
foundation for the quantitative analysis to be undertaken in Chapter VI.       
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CHAPTER IV 
THE PROXIMATE DETERMINANTS OF FERTILITY IN SOUTH KOREA 
 
In this chapter, I discuss the manner in which the proximate determinants of 
fertility have affected the course of fertility in South Korea over time from the 1970s to 
the 2000s. I have adopted the style of Knodel, Chamratrithirong, and Debavalya‘s 1987 
study of fertility decline in Thailand and their identification of the role the proximate 
determinants played in affecting the course of fertility in South Korea over time.  (For a 
more comprehensive description of the work by Knodel and his colleagues, please refer 
to Chapter II.)  In the case study in this chapter, I undertake an in-depth look at the four 
primary proximate determinants, one by one, at the sub-national level in South Korea. 
The benefits of conducting case studies are manifold.  Undoubtedly, macro-level 
analyses of an extensive selection of countries can be ideal for identifying global and 
regional trends.  However, the discovery of trends does not necessarily entail the 
identification of explanations for the trends.  By selecting a small number of countries 
for more thorough investigation, it is likely that their individual experiences may 
elucidate possible explanatory factors of the larger-scale trends.  Furthermore, it is also 
possible that a close examination of a small number of cases may well reveal outlying 
influences on the greater trends.  In both kinds of outcomes, the information gained is 
very valuable in its complementary nature for the macro-level analysis, and in its ability 
to provide a foundation for the development of theory. 
As previously explained, the selection of South Korea and the United States as 
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the subjects for my case studies in this and in the next chapter was based on three 
criteria:  
(1) Inclusion in Bongaarts’ original research: Both South Korea and the United 
States were among the 41 developed, developing, and historical populations 
that were included in Bongaarts‘ famous 1982 study.  It was in this study that 
Bongaarts was able to show how the four proximate determinants accounted 
for 96 percent of the variance in the TFR.  Even more significant is the 
connection to his 1978 article, ―A Framework for Analyzing the Proximate 
Determinants of Fertility,‖ in which he first introduced his modified version 
of the Davis and Blake intermediate fertility variables framework.  In this 
article, he actually selected South Korea and the United States as the two 
―numerical illustrations‖ of his new model.  In these illustrations, he 
examined changes in each determinants‘ quantitative index over time, namely 
from 1960 to 1970 for South Korea, and 1965 to 1973 for the United States.  
In this way, my dissertation may be viewed as an up-to-date extension of 
Bongaarts‘1978 investigation.      
(2) Fertility experiences: Among the 41 populations included in Bongaarts‘ 1982 
research, I narrowed the selection to those with fertility above replacement in 
the 1960s to 70s and with below replacement fertility in the  2006 to 2008 
period.  Because Bongaarts‘ study consisted of quite a few developing 
nations whose fertility is still today above the rate of replacement, this 
effectively eliminated the majority of cases.   
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(3) Data availability: Among those nations who were left (South Korea, the 
United States, France, and Costa Rica) I further narrowed the selection based 
on the availability of data.  When he utilized South Korea as a numerical 
illustration, Bongaarts commented that the country ―is one of the few 
developing countries where measurements of reproductive variables are 
sufficiently detailed to allow the calculation of the indexes of the 
intermediate fertility variables at different points in time‖ (1978: 123).  Years 
later, South Korea remains among the minority of all nations with this kind of 
comprehensive fertility data.  The United States may also be counted in this 
group, with large-scale fertility surveys like the National Survey of Family 
Growth conducted every few years. Conversely, Costa Rica presented 
significant challenges in terms of obtaining current data on the proximate 
determinants, eliminating it from the selection.  France presented difficulties 
in obtaining the necessary historical data.  Furthermore, I considered France 
to be ―too similar‖ to the United States; if I used two Western nations with 
fairly comparable levels of fertility both in the 1970s and 2000s, the 
information gained would not be as interesting as that gathered from nations 
with more varied experiences.   
As Suzuki (2008) states, ―there is a cultural divide between moderately low 
fertility and lowest-low fertility‖ (36).  The United States and South Korea represent the 
two sides of this divide.  Thus, with their abundant data and very unique fertility 
experiences, the United States and South Korea presented themselves as the ideal choices. 
 95 
The Proximate Determinants: A Review 
 As discussed in Chapter II, when Bongaarts revised the Davis and Blake 
intermediate fertility variables framework into his proximate determinants model, he 
grouped the determinants into three broad categories:  
(1) Exposure factors 
a. Proportion married 
(2) Deliberate marital fertility control factors 
a. Contraception 
b. Induced abortion 
(3) Natural marital fertility factors 
a. Lactational infecundability 
b. Frequency of intercourse 
c. Sterility 
d. Spontaneous intrauterine mortality 
e. Duration of the fertile period (Bongaarts 1978: 106). 
For both of my two case studies, I will discuss the role of each of these individual 
determinants as Knodel, Chamratrithirong, and Debavalya did in their 1987 study of 
Thailand. 
 The Republic of Korea (hitherto and henceforth referred to simply as ―South 
Korea‖) has a vast and interesting history of fertility change over the past thirty to forty 
years.  As Suzuki explains, ―in the 1960s and 1970s, Korea suffered from a Malthusian 
nightmare of over-population under rapid population growth and high population 
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density‖ (2008: 36).  The legacy of this ―nightmare‖ would affect both government-level 
fertility decisions and individuals‘ experiences with fertility over the coming decades.  
The most notable outcome was the successful implementation of a population control 
policy, beginning in 1962, which occurred simultaneously with rapid socioeconomic 
development (Cho 2002).  Its effectiveness is evident in the reduction of the total fertility 
rate from 6.0 in 1960 to 1.4 in 1999.  However, this blanket trend masks differences in 
the contributions of the factors pertaining to marriage and marital disruption, the natural 
marital fertility factors (including postpartum infecundability), and the deliberate marital 
fertility control factors of contraception and induced abortion.     
 
Marriage and Marital Disruption 
 In the 1970s, it could be said that ―for women in most societies, exposure to 
childbearing commences at the time of entry into a more or less stable sexual union‖ 
(Korea Institute for Family Planning [KIFP] 1974: 65).  In South Korea, this was 
certainly the case with the vast majority of childbirth taking place within formal 
marriages, and this remains the case today.  As Lee explains, ―ceremonial marriage is 
established as a strong social norm, and extramarital childbearing is not socially 
accepted,‖ often being met with ―cold treatment and criticism‖ (2009: 61-62).  
Consequently, strong social sanctions exist to discourage illegitimate births (KIFP 
1974).  Even though there are no reliable statistics on the issue, it is believed that 
extramarital births in South Korea are still fairly rare as a result (Suzuki 2005).    
Because of this relationship between marriage and childbearing, the timing of  
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Table 3. Percentage Single by Age and Sex (in percentages): South Korea, 1970  
and 2000 
Sex Year 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 
Females 
1970 97.1 57.2 9.7 1.4 0.4 0.2 0.1 
2000 99.3 89.1 40.1 10.7 4.3 2.6 1.7 
Males 
1970 99.7 92.6 43.4 6.4 1.2 0.4 0.2 
2000 99.7 97.5 71.0 28.1 10.6 4.9 2.4 
 Source: Eun 2003 
 
 first marriage and percentage single by age (see Table 3) become very telling proxies of 
the duration of exposure to sexual relations.  The mean age at first marriage for females 
has witnessed substantial growth, from 20.0 in 1974 (KIFP 1974) to 28.3 in 2008 
(Statistics Korea 2009a), representing an increase of 41.5 percent.  By the time a woman 
was between the ages of 30 and 34 back in 1970, she was extremely like to be married, 
with only 1.4 percent of women in that age group identifying themselves as single (Jones 
2005).  As the mean age at first marriage increased over the decades, so did the 
proportion of single females, with 10.7 percent of women aged 30-34 identifying 
themselves as such by the year 2000 (Jones 2005).  The most extensive increase in terms 
of percentage points was witnessed by women ages 25 to 29, who increased 30.4 points 
from 9.7 percent single in 1970 to 40.1 percent in 2000.  However, the largest percent 
gain may be found among the 45 to 49-year-olds, whose climb from 0.1 percent single in 
1970 to 1.7 percent in 2000 represented an increase of 1,600 percent.  Thus, whereas 
thirty years ago it could be said that virtually all women in South Korea would marry at 
some point in their lives, this is no longer the case.   
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 Males have also experienced these trends.  Their rise in mean age at first 
marriage from an estimated 27.2 in 1974 to 31.4 in 2008 is slightly less than that 
undergone by females, but it nonetheless reveals that males consistently marry at a later 
average age than females.  Also, as with the females, this trend is accompanied by a 
notable increase in the proportion single.  Traditionally, there has been a higher 
proportion of single males than females at all ages, though this trend is far more 
pronounced at the younger ages.  For example, in 1970, 43.4 percent of South Korean 
males between the ages of 25 and 29 were single, compared to just 9.7 percent of 
females.  By ages 45 to 49, however, the majority of males also found themselves 
married with just 0.2 percent identifying as single, as compared to 0.1 percent of 
females.  This trend provides further evidence of the tendency for males to marry later 
than females, a trend that continues to be evident and more pronounced in recent data.  
While as stated above, 43.4 percent of males ages 25 to 29 were identified as single in 
1970, this percentage had risen to 71.0 percent in 2000—an increase of 63.5 percent.  
However, the most dramatic increase occurred among single males aged 40 to 44 and 45 
to 49, whose percentages single increased between 1970 and 2000 by 1,125 percent and 
1,100 percent, respectively.  The single men in the 40 to 44 group rose from 0.4 percent 
single in 1970 to 4.9 percent single in 2000, while single men in the 45 to 49 group 
increased from 0.2 percent to 2.4 percent over the same time period.  This is also 
significant because it represents a larger pool of men who, still single at such a late age, 
may never marry.  The proportions single by sex for all the relevant age groups are shown 
in Table 3. 
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  These findings suggest some interesting trends among South Korean women.  
In light of these trends, such as the substantial delay in marriage, the question becomes 
why are women waiting to get married?  What is influencing these decisions, and what 
does this mean for fertility?  Currently, three main factors may be put forth as likely 
explanations: education, individualism, and the economy.   
Education levels among women have increased appreciably between the 1970s 
and 2000s (see Table 4).  The percentage of women aged 25 and over reporting that they 
have completed college or more rose from 2.4 percent in 1975 to 18.0 percent in 2000.  
Meanwhile, the proportion reporting having only completed elementary school or less 
dropped from 77.1 percent in 1975 to 30.4 percent in 2000.  Higher levels of education 
among females lead to greater labor force participation and, ultimately, economic 
independence and empowerment—both of which diminish the incentive for women to 
marry (Lee 2007).  Additionally, women who are educated often seek to marry men who 
are at least as equally educated, and whose living conditions are either comparable or 
better than their own (Eun 2003).  By raising their personal standards thusly, women are  
 
Table 4. Highest Level of Education Completed by Women Aged 25 and Older (in 
percentages): South Korea, 1975 and 2000   
Education Level       1975   2000 
Elementary school or less 77.1 30.4 
Junior high school completed 12.1 14.3 
Senior high school completed 8.4 37.3 
College completed or more 2.4 18.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 
     Source: Chung and Das Gupta 2007 
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effectively reducing the size of the pool of potential marriage mates.     
This tendency toward greater individualism reflects changes in the system of 
values and norms in South Korea.  Youth who are able to secure employment may do so 
away from the comfort of their parents‘ home, where they are able to ―enjoy 
consumption‖ and put off the responsibility of supporting a family of their own (Lee 
2009: 59).  In this way, the emphasis on the family of procreation weakens as the focus 
shifts to personal aspirations and achievements.   In this grand scheme, marriage likely 
decreases in importance as women and men focus on education and/or on career-
oriented goals.  The trend of individualism is also tied to education in another way: the 
ability to achieve economic independence grants a woman far greater flexibility in her 
life choices; if she is able to provide for herself, finding someone to ―take care of her‖ no 
longer needs to be a priority.  That is, marriage becomes less of a necessity and more of 
a choice.  This choice is compounded by the increasing ―desire by women for greater 
equality in marital relations‖ (Jones 2005: 107).  Women may delay marriage as they 
search for a partner willing to accept less traditional gender roles in the relationships.  
But as Jones points out, ―this can lead to… non-marriage if a suitable partner cannot be 
found‖ (2005: 107).         
Other evidence that may point to increasing individualism is the concurrent rise 
in the proportion of single-generation households and the decline in the proportion of 
three-or-more-generation households.  According to Lee, ―the drop in the number of 
multi-generational families… did not lead to a surge in nuclear families consisting of 
parents and their children, but rather resulted in a growth of single-generation 
 101 
[households]‖ (2007: 2).  It is possible that a greater emphasis on personal goals and 
desires has led to this trend; young people focused on their own lives and careers could 
be less likely to want to live with or care for parents or grandparents.       
Perhaps the most significant factor in recent decisions to delay marriage has been 
the East Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s.  This economic crisis has been cited as 
the cause of ―the most fundamental change at the societal level‖ in South Korea (Eun 
2003: 583).  Essentially, the crisis became tremendously significant when several 
corporations declared bankruptcy.  The most immediate outcome was an extensive loss 
of jobs and ―soaring unemployment‖ at all ages (Eun 2003: 583).  Young people were 
especially hard hit, and graduates entering the job market for the first time were 
discouraged when they found very few jobs available.  One reason for this was the effort 
made by corporations to save money by hiring individuals with experience, so as not to 
have to spend money on training.  This effectively eliminated many of the individuals 
entering the labor force for the first time, which is particularly harmful within the 
context of the age discrimination in employment that exists in this country (Eun 2003).  
Essentially, if youths fail to find employment immediately following school, they are 
less and less likely to find it as they grow older.  This has even been known to drive 
individuals to give up seeking employment entirely (Eun 2003). 
Furthermore, part of the economic reconstruction efforts on the part of employers 
included the transition from ―permanent‖ jobs to part-time and temporary positions.  
This was instituted to create more jobs, but also resulted in very low job security for 
employees and the constant risk of being laid off whenever it is deemed necessary.  In a 
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society where a ―lifetime job‖ was a popular concept, this new system has made it 
extremely difficult for individuals to settle down, causing many young people to delay 
marriage until they feel they are in a better situation.  In such circumstances, it can be a 
long time (if ever) for that ―better‖ situation to come along.  This is consistent with 
research that shows how ―rises in ages at marriage and childbearing tend to be 
accelerated by the disruptive situation of high youth unemployment,‖ and which may 
also result in ―perpetuating the commonly observed behavior of [youth] staying in their 
parental homes until late ages‖ (Jun 2005: 38).   
In many cases, economic uncertainty has proved to be an additional motivation 
for women to seek jobs as well.  Between 1960 and 2004, the female economic 
participation rate nearly doubled, from 26.8 percent to 49.8 percent (Lee 2007).  
Research suggests, however, that women in South Korea still remain primarily 
responsible for caring for the household, regardless of their employment status (Lee 
2007).  In a typical working day in 2006, for example, South Korean women were 
estimated to spend an average of 197 minutes on household chores and childcare to 
men‘s average of 72 minutes (Lee 2009); as such, women were devoting over twice as 
much time a day to these tasks.  Balancing these responsibilities and a job could very 
well seem overwhelming, discouraging women from entering into a marriage.    
Other important factors include those that would interrupt or eliminate this 
relationship, such as separation or divorce.  In recent years, there has been a substantial 
increase in South Korea in the number of divorces.  Jun states that about half of the 
annual marriages end up as divorces, giving South Korea ―one of the highest divorce 
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rates in the world‖ (2005: 42).  Factors cited as causes for the rise in the divorce rate 
include increasing educational attainment, achievement of economic independence, and 
labor market participation among women, as well as changing family values (Eun 2003).  
This can have serious implications for fertility, as divorce usually reduces the exposure 
to the risk of childbearing.  However, Jun points out that knowledge of the likelihood of 
divorce itself can depress fertility, since it creates an environment of uncertainty.  Such 
uncertainty may push a newly-married couple to delay the initiation of childbearing, 
making it far less likely that the couple will ―realize their already small desired family 
size‖ (Jun 2005: 42).   
Even in light of this high national divorce rate, there is disagreement over 
whether the effect on fertility is pronounced.  Eun explains that while increasing divorce 
makes the family unstable, ―the impact on fertility decline is relatively small‖ (Eun 
2003: 579).  One possible explanation may be the recent rise in the number of 
remarriages for both males and females, which would mitigate the effect of divorce on 
fertility.  Lee claims that ―the upsurge in the number of [remarriages] demonstrates that 
nuptiality patterns have become more diverse than in the past‖ (2007: 6).  More 
significantly, this diversity also allows for ―another chance‖ at childbearing.  Men in 
their 40s and women in their 30s are cited as having the highest rates of remarriage (Lee 
2007), which puts them well within the range of female childbearing ages.   
It is clear that marriage patterns and norms have changed a great deal in South 
Korea between the 1970s and the 2000s.  Individuals are waiting longer to marry, with a 
greater percentage remaining perpetually single.  Ultimately, as Eun explains, a decrease 
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in the marriage rate at the societal level ―means less family formation… and can be a 
significant cause of lower ‗period‘ fertility in a society where only childbearing within 
marriage is accepted‖ (2003: 579).  There is much evidence to suggest that this is the 
case in South Korea, and that delayed marriage is having a significant effect on the total 
fertility rate.     
 
Natural Marital Fertility Factors 
Throughout the literature, marital fertility is cited alongside age at first marriage 
 as playing a primary role in affecting the total fertility rate of South Korea (Lee 2009, 
Suzuki 2008, Suzuki 2005).  John Knodel and his colleagues (1987) explain that even 
without some form of deliberate birth control, marital fertility can vary substantially.  
Therefore, it is not surprising in a society in which extramarital childbearing is socially 
unacceptable that the level of fertility in marriage would have such an influence on the 
overall level of fertility. 
When analyzing natural marital fertility, one of the first considerations should be  
those individuals who, due to primary sterility, are unable to bear children.  A higher 
proportion of sterile and subfecund couples would certainly have a depressing effect on 
the total fertility of a society.  In South Korea, the prevalence of primary sterility has 
recently increased.  In 1974, less than 3 percent of women who had been married more 
than 5 years were without children, and presumed to be suffering from primary sterility 
(KIFP 1974).  Such a low occurrence was not believed to have a notable effect on 
overall fertility.  However, more recently the number of sterile couples has been 
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increasing while the number of couples in the childbearing ages has been decreasing.  
While the number of sterile couples rose sharply from 250 thousand in 1990 to 640 
thousand in 2003, the proportion of sterile couples has continued to increase from its 
mid-nineties level of 10 percent (Jun 2005).  Over time, it would seem that the number 
of women who remain childless has gone from negligible to worth recognizing.  With 
over one in every ten couples unable to produce a child, it is far more likely that the 
depressing effect of sterility will be felt on the total fertility level of the nation. 
Another natural marital fertility factor is the duration of postpartum 
infecundability, which Knodel and associates describe as ―the most important proximate 
determinant of variation in ‗natural‘ marital-fertility levels‖ (1987: 79).  The duration of 
postpartum infecundability is largely a function of the infant-feeding practices of a 
society.  Whereas the exact nature of this relationship was not entirely understood in the 
1970s, there was enough evidence to establish a connection between the two.  
Subsequently, duration of breastfeeding was among the many items included on the 
1974 Korean National Fertility Survey.  According to data from the 1974 KNFS, women 
breastfed for 19.2 months on average, with most women breastfeeding for between one 
to two years.  Approximately 16 percent reported breastfeeding for greater than 2 years, 
while 12 percent breastfed for under one year.  Slight differences were apparent by age, 
with a higher proportion of older women choosing to breastfeed.  Furthermore, 
relationships were identified between the duration of breastfeeding and both age and age 
at first marriage: older women and those who married before age 20 breastfed longer 
than younger women and those who married at 20 or later, disparities which were cited 
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as likely reflecting cohort differences (KIFP 1974).  Regardless of age, the 
―overwhelming majority of women in Korea‖ reported breastfeeding during the last 
closed interval, or the interval between either the next-to-last birth and the last birth, or 
the last birth and the expected delivery date of a current pregnancy (KIFP 1974: 127).   
  Statistics for the most recent period that I was able to acquire are not directly 
comparable to those in the comprehensive 1974 survey.  Now that more is known about 
the relationship between breastfeeding and postpartum infecundability, it is more 
common in contemporary lactation literature to not only focus on the duration of 
breastfeeding, but to distinguish between ―exclusive breastfeeding‖ (EBF) and ―partial 
breastfeeding‖ (PBF).  Chung, Kim, and Nam define exclusive breastfeeding as ―feeding 
by breast milk only with no other liquids or solids with the exception of drops or syrups 
consisting of vitamins, mineral supplements or medicines‖ (2007: 225-226).  More 
recently, the mean duration among South Korean women engaging in EBF was 8.0 
weeks.  Meanwhile, partial breastfeeding was defined as ―any kind of breast-feeding, 
including partial or supplemented and exclusive breast-feeding‖ (Chung, Kim, and Nam 
2007: 226).  The mean duration among women participating in PBF was found to be 
12.0 weeks.  As this type of breastfeeding encompasses all combinations of infant 
feeding behaviors that involve some degree of breastfeeding, including EBF, this 
average duration is likely to be the most comparable to the 1974 mean duration of 19.2 
months.  Regardless of the measure used to compare with the 1974 data, it is very much 
evident that the duration of breastfeeding has undergone a sharp decline between the 
1970s and 2000s; in fact, the drop from 19.2 months (or about 77 weeks) to 12.0 weeks 
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represents a decline of approximately 84.4 percent.  Similarly, while breastfeeding in the 
1970s was said to be practiced by the ―overwhelming majority of women in Korea‖ 
(KIFP 1974: 127), the World Health Organization assigned South Korea a breastfeeding 
initiation rate of 81.3 percent in 2003. 
What might account for such a dramatic change?  In their 2007 study, Chung, 
Kim, and Nam used data from the 2003 National Fertility and Family Health Survey to 
identify characteristics of Korean women that were more likely to be associated with one 
form of breastfeeding or the other.  They found that higher rates of PBF were associated 
with higher levels of education and prenatal care, while mothers who had blue-collar 
jobs before marriage or who had premature births were less likely to engage in PBF.  
Particularly, they found that ―women who had a Caesarean section were approximately 
half as likely to initiate PBC as those who had a normal delivery‖ (2007: 227).   
In terms of EBF, the strongest association was with mothers who had a normal 
(vaginal) delivery and received more prenatal care, though the more prenatal care the 
mother had, the higher her likelihood of ceasing EBF earlier.  This result was determined 
to be fairly contradictory, and attributed to ―erroneous beliefs‖ passed on to women from 
many local maternity units that ―after 6 months, breastfeeding is no more beneficial to an 
infant‘s health than simply providing water‖ (2007: 228).  If such a misunderstanding is 
actually responsible for this trend, it would explain why women who spent more time in 
prenatal care would be more likely to cease EBF earlier; they would have had more time 
to absorb this idea. 
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 Interestingly, there is currently a push in South Korea to extend the duration of 
breastfeeding.  According to Chung, Kim and Nam, ―despite an increased breast-feeding 
initiation in South Korea recently, newborns are being fed with formula and 
complementary food too early‖ (2007: 228).  This platform has gone so far as to 
influence legal action designed to control the dispersion of and utilization of formula.  
One such measure, enacted in 1991, prohibited the promotion of infant formula to the 
general public, as well as the provision of free or low-cost supplies to health workers and 
healthcare facilities (Chung, Kim, and Nam 2007).  Presently, not all breast-milk 
substitutes are prohibited, however.  Regardless, while the goal of extending 
breastfeeding duration is put forth in the name of infant health, it directly challenges the 
goal of increasing the very low rate of fertility in the country; if more women are 
convinced to effectively breastfeed for longer periods of time, the duration of postpartum 
infecundability is likely to be extended, possibly further depressing the total fertility rate.  
At best, any further extension to the period of postpartum infecundability will not 
increase the total fertility rate.    
 
Deliberate Marital Fertility Control 
 As noted above, decreases in marital fertility are often cited as a central factor in 
the decline in overall fertility of women in South Korea.  Oftentimes, these decreases are 
the result of an underlying increase in the employment of deliberate marital fertility 
control.  A significant determinant of deliberate marital fertility control is the underlying 
level of contraceptive usage.  An array of contraceptive methods and services has ―been  
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Table 5. Contraception Usage Among Married Women Ages 15-49 by Method: 
1974 and 2008 (in percentages) 
Type of Contraception 1974 2008 % Change 
Any method 45.7 80.5 76.1 
Any modern method   n/a 66.9 - 
Pill 11.0 1.8 - 83.6 
IUD 10.4 13.2 26.9 
Injection 0.3 n/a - 
Condom 6.8 15.1 122.1 
Sterilization (male) 4.3 12.7 195.3 
Sterilization (female) 2.3 24.1 947.8 
Any traditional method            n/a   13.6 - 
Periodic abstinence 0.5 n/a - 
Withdrawal 3.4 n/a - 
n/a = data not available 
Note: % Change = (2008 value – 1974 value)/1974 value * 100 
Sources: KIFP 1974, Clifton, Kaneda, and Ashford 2008 
 
 
widely available to South Korean women since the late 1960s when the national family 
planning program expanded its services nationwide‖(Choe and Kim 2007: 42), though 
their availability was not enough to immediately secure their extensive usage.  However, 
as contraceptive knowledge spread, it became more likely that women would opt to 
deliberately control their fertility.  Additionally, the more contraceptive knowledge 
women had, the more likely it became that they were aware of the range of effectiveness, 
and could therefore choose to utilize the most effective method for their particular 
circumstances and needs.  Table 5 clearly illustrates that, as far as contraceptive usage is 
concerned, there has been a substantial increase between the 1970s and the 2000s among 
married women ages 15 to 49.  However, it is important to note that the data from 1974 
excludes women who are either already pregnant or reported to be infecund.  
Subsequently, the 2008 numbers are certainly inflated because they include all married 
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women.  Nevertheless, it is believed that the direction of the trends is correct, though the 
extent of the difference as measured by percent change may not be exact.     
For the available data, the most notable development between 1974 and 2008 is 
the increase in contraception usage of any method: whereas 45.7 percent of married 
women ages 15 to 49 relied upon any of the available contraceptive methods in 1974, 
this rate had increased to 80.5 percent by 2008.  In other words, as of 2008, only 19.5 
percent of married women are not employing any kind of contraception when 24 years 
prior this could be said for over half of married women.  Cho believes this is evidence 
that ―family planning has become a social norm in Korea,‖ describing the contraceptive 
practice rate as being at ―a saturation point, since effective contraceptives enable women 
of reproductive age to choose when and how many children they wish to have‖ (2002: 8-
9).  The term ―saturation‖ seems to imply that the rate will not increase too far above 
80.5 percent.  Choe and Kim note that between the late 1990s and 2007, the 
contraceptive prevalence rate did, indeed, hover around 80 percent (2007).  The 
remaining 20 percent may consist of married women who elect to abstain from 
contraceptive usage.   
 By far, the most significant percent change in rate of usage takes place 
specifically in the utilization of female sterilization.  Usage of this method increased 
from 2.3 percent of married women ages 15 to 49 in 1974 to 24.1 percent in 2008—an 
increase of 947.8 percent—which makes it the most commonly used form of 
contraception.  The second largest increase, though to a considerably smaller extent, was 
among women relying on male sterilization for contraception; this rate increased from 
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4.3 percent of married women in 1974 to 12.7 percent in 2008.  Thus, while the usage of 
male sterilization was higher than female sterilization in 1974, by 2008 the opposite had 
become true. These recent increases in South Korea in the use of female and male 
sterilization, by the way, have also occurred in other developed countries of the world.   
 A particularly interesting change can be found among users of the contraceptive 
pill: based on the available data, this is the only method to undergo a decrease in its 
usage by married women ages 15 to 49.  In 1974, 11.0 percent of married women 
reported taking a contraceptive pill; by 2008, only 1.8 percent women married women 
reported doing so, resulting in a decrease of 83.6 percent.  Cho describes this trend as an 
indication that ―contraception is no longer considered to be only the woman‘s 
responsibility in Korea‖ (2002: 10).  The concurrent increase in the use of methods 
which do not necessitate daily engagement suggests that this change may also be based 
upon convenience; that is, perhaps as greater numbers of women sought methods of 
contraception, they turned to forms that the male could be responsible for, that were 
long-term, or that were permanent; the usage of condoms, intra-uterine devices, and both 
male and female sterilization increased during this period of time.   
One possible explanation for these dramatic transformations in contraception usage 
rates among married women—especially in terms of the increase in female sterilization—
may be a shift in norms regarding what is considered a ―desirable‖ number of children.  In 
1974, the average number of children desired among currently married women was 3.2 
(KIFP 1974).  By 2003, this had dropped to 1.1 among single women in the 20s and 30s 
(Jun 2005).  While this comparison may not be among two identical populations, the 
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opinions of both groups are considered to be a reasonable reflection of the general opinion 
on desired family size during their respective year, so the implications of the trend still 
stand.  With such a low average number of children desired, it comes as no surprise that 
the vast majority (86.3 percent) of married women using some form of contraception state 
they are doing to for the purpose of pregnancy termination and not child spacing.  Just 9.3 
percent claimed to have adopted contraception for birth spacing, while 3.9 percent 
reported using contraception for ―other reasons‖ (Cho 2002).   
The change in the desired family size norm is perhaps even more evident among the 
number of married women aged 15 to 49 with one child who said they did not want more 
children, which increased substantially from 13 percent in 1974 to about 50 percent in 2003 
(KIFP 1974; Jun 2005).  Even over the period from 1997 to 2005, the proportion of married 
women aged 15 to 44 supporting the idea that a married couple ―must‖ have a child 
decreased from 73.7 percent to just 23.4 percent (Suzuki 2008).  This suggests, perhaps, that 
having children is seen far less as a necessity and more as a couple‘s choice.  Interestingly 
and despite these developments, the desire to have any children at all is still strong and has 
not changed much over the years: in 1974, 13 percent of all currently married ―fecund‖ 
women reported that they did not desire a child, while 15 percent of married women in 2003 
said they would remain childless voluntarily (Jun 2005).  This indicates that having a child 
may well be a deep-seated standard among Korean women, even if the desired number of 
children and feeling of obligation to do so has declined over the years.     
Numerous explanations have been offered for the decrease in the desired number 
of children.  For example, Lee (2009) cites a shift in expectations regarding children‘s 
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utility:   
…In the past, [children served as] a means of securing the family labor force, a 
source of security in retirement, and a succession of the family line.  As social 
security has developed and consciousness on blood relationships has weakened, 
more emphasis has been placed on children‘s values as agents of emotional 
dependence and support.  The changes in the values on the qualitative utility of 
children have affected the quantitative value of their numbers, helping to firmly 
establish people‘s views favoring a small number of children in Korea (59-60). 
 
That is, a shift in the focus on the quality of relationships with individual children has 
affected the overall quantity of children desired by women and couples.   
 Another possible explanation for the decrease in the average desired number of 
children is the fallout following the East Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s.  As 
described above, the economic crisis has significant implications for the lives of 
individuals and families.  Of these, uncertainty with respect to finding and keeping a job 
were paramount.  This kind of uncertainty could easily translate into a lowered desired 
number of children; when individuals are not sure if they will be able to continue caring 
for themselves, it does not seem illogical that they would not desire to further complicate 
matters by having numerous children.  In this way, children may be viewed as a source 
of anxiety.  This sentiment is echoed in the proportion of South Korean respondents 
who, in 2006, agreed with the statement that ―this society is good for raising a child‖: 
only 19 percent (Suzuki 2008).  Meanwhile, over three times as many (68 percent) 
identified ―financial difficulty to care and educate a child‖ as the reason they did not 
anticipate achieving their expected number of children (Suzuki 2008).  In fact, just below 
50 percent of unmarried respondents aged 18 to 34 in 2002 identified ―the burden of 
childbearing‖ as a primary difficulty expected for double-income couples (Lee 2007: 14).  
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This ―burden‖ would surely be disproportionately felt by the female half of these double-
income couples, who would be expected both to contribute to the family income through 
labor force participation and perform the bulk of household chores and childcare tasks.  As 
Suzuki (2005) explains, as women spend increased time on market activities, the opportunity 
cost of children also increases; time spent on childrearing is time not spent making what may 
be very much-needed income.  Clearly, the wake of such economic difficulty has tempered 
the number of children most individuals and couples aspire to have.      
Additionally, it is likely that this decrease in the desired number of children and 
increase in contraception prevalence may be attributed in part to the institution of 
national family planning programs.  As stated previously, overpopulation was a central 
concern in South Korea in the 1960s, and served as the motivation behind instituting a 
national family planning program ―as a major means of population control‖ (Lee 2009: 
61).  The policy, adopted in 1962, aimed to reduce the annual population growth and the 
total fertility rate to specified demographic targets, and was established through 
successive five-year plans (Lee 2009).  Ultimately, this policy met with undisputed 
success as fertility rates plummeted.  Cho attributes the strength of the policy to a 
number of factors, including its specific and limited goals, the acquisition of resources, 
the building of an organization process specifically for the demographic goals, and the 
―development of extensive linkages with other sectors such as the mass media, and 
private practitioners‘ clinics and hospitals‖ (2002: 5).  The fertility levels over the past 
four decades suggest that this comprehensive and meticulous approach paid off.   
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While the 1962 family planning program may be cited as responsible for the 
increasing adoption of contraceptive methods by couples, it may similarly be assigned 
some of the responsibility for a number of less ideal consequences that typically 
accompany such rapid fertility decline.  For example, since the institution of the policy, 
South Korea has also witnessed its sex ratio become severely unbalanced and its elderly 
population increase (Lee 2009).  To address these latent effects, the government 
established the Population Policy Deliberation Committee in 1994, which was tasked 
with conducting a review of population policy ―by focusing on its past accomplishments 
and future prospects, as well as related socioeconomic problems, in an effort to work out 
new policy directions and measures for the 21
st
 century‖ Lee 2009: 62).  These ―new 
policy directions‖ eventually took the form of the following broad goals:  
(1) To maintain the below replacement levels of fertility and to improve morbidity 
and mortality levels as part of the process of achieving sustainable socio-
economic development; 
(2) To enhance family health and welfare; 
(3) To improve the imbalance of sex ratio at birth and to reduce the incidence of 
induced abortions; 
(4) To tackle the sex related problems of the youth and adolescents; 
(5) To empower women by expanding employment opportunities and welfare 
services for them; and 
(6) To improve work opportunities and provide adequate health care and welfare 
services for the elderly (Cho 2002: 3-4).   
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  In 1996, this policy led to the adoption of a new family planning program, which 
focused on family planning, maternal and child health, sexually transmitted infections, 
HIV and AIDS, and adolescent reproductive health (Cho 2002).  Specifically, it aimed:  
(1) To enhance the quality of contraceptive services to reduce the induced abortion 
prevalence rate; 
(2) To integrate reproductive health programs, such as family planning, maternal and 
child health and other social welfare programs; 
(3) To strengthen social and institutional support policies for a balanced sex ratio 
through improvement of women‘s social status and gender equality; and 
(4) To expand the scope of the family planning program target population to cover 
the young unmarried population, to prevent premarital pregnancy (Cho 2002: 4) 
Whereas the national family planning program started in 1962 was regarded as 
largely successful (albeit with some unintended consequences), the family planning 
program begun in 1996 has been met with mixed results.  For example, despite the 
revised and modernized goals, the TFR in South Korea over the years following the 
establishment of this policy ―continually decreased from 1.56 in 1997 to 1.47 in 2000‖ 
(Cho 2002: 7).  Cho attributes such an outcome to several problems, such as a lack of 
unified coordination and data collection, and ultimately the low utilization of the data 
that are collected (Cho 2002).  Regardless, the persistent very low fertility has prompted 
additional policies, including a series of three plans spanning 2006 to 2020 and known as 
the Basic Plan for Low Fertility and Aged Society.  The first part of the plan covers the 
period of 2006 to 2010.  Its goals included fostering environments in favor of 
 117 
childrearing, establishing the base for improving the quality of life among the aged 
society, and securing power for economic growth in an aged society with low fertility.  
The second part of the plan will take place from 2011 to 2015, and aims to steadily 
recover a sustainable fertility rate while improving the social system for the older 
segments of society.  Finally, the third part of the plan will cover the period of 2016 
through 2020, and endeavors to increase the fertility rate to the average level of OECD 
countries, as well as accomplishing successful adaption by the aged society (Lee 2006).   
 Deliberate marital fertility control has played a conspicuous part in affecting 
changes to South Korea‘s total fertility rate over the last forty years.  At the current level 
of ―contraceptive saturation,‖ it seems that policies to increase fertility will have a 
dubious effect unless they can alter women‘s and couple‘s desires with regards to total 
family size.  To do so would require a complex strategy that extends into numerous 
spheres, such as the economy and gender relations.  Regardless, evidence suggests it is 
very unlikely that the depressing effect of deliberate marital fertility control will grow 
stronger over the coming years. 
 
Induced Abortion 
 While induced abortion is technically a form of deliberate marital fertility 
control, it will be addressed independently because of its salience in the fertility 
literature, the controversy that typically surrounds it, and the fact that Bongaarts 
classifies and analyzes it as a separate determinant. 
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Obtaining reliable abortion data can be tricky; in many countries, laws restricting 
or preventing access to induced abortions also complicate efforts to compile accurate 
statistics on the number and rate of abortions among the women of childbearing ages.  
As Choe and Kim stress, stringent legal restrictions have not been found to result in a 
low induced abortion rate, but rather in lower reporting and less reliable data (2007).  In 
South Korea, abortion is ―tacitly acknowledged [to be] one of the critical factors 
affecting fertility levels‖ (KIFP 1974: 130).  As a result, efforts have been made for 
decades to include abortion-related questions on national surveys in order to garner the 
most comprehensive data on the subject possible.  While under-reporting is still an issue, 
the data that are available can be very helpful in terms of identifying general trends and 
changes over time.   
With regards to the law, abortion was legalized in 1973 under the Maternal and 
Child Health law, provided that it took place within 28 weeks from the date of 
conception and fell into one of the following categories: 
(1) Possibility of fetal impairment (eugenic grounds); 
(2) Infectious diseases of the parent(s); 
(3) Rape or incest; 
(4) Impairment of the mother‘s physical and mental health (Cho 2002: 12). 
Despite these limitations, abortion in South Korea has been described as widely 
available in practice (Ganatra 2008).  In fact, by 1991, just 59 percent of ever married 
women aged 15 to 49 knew that the law only allowed for induced abortions under the 
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particular conditions just cited (Choe and Kim 2007), suggesting that over 40 percent of 
woman believed that anyone who wanted an abortion would be able to have one.   
 Regardless of legal status, there has been considerable change in trends 
surrounding induced abortions between the 1960s and 2000s.  One indicator of this 
change is the precipitous decline in the percent of pregnancies that ended in induced 
abortion, which declined from 43 percent in 1963 to 24 percent in 2003 (Choe and Kim 
2007).  Compared to the proportion of pregnancies that end in induced abortion 
worldwide, which is estimated at approximately 10 percent, 24 percent is still quite high.  
This considerably higher rate is likely attributable to the strong stigma that exists against 
having extramarital births.  According to Lee (2009), as of 2007 births from legally 
married couples accounted for approximately 98.5 percent of all births.  However, this 
does not mean that only 1.5 percent of conceptions take place out of wedlock.  Instead, 
because of the shame and social sanctions that accompany extramarital pregnancies, a 
large proportion of unmarried pregnant women decide to have an abortion—as of 2005, 
about 90 percent (Choe and Kim 2007).  Subsequently, a high rate of extramarital 
conception in conjunction with a strong anti-extramarital pregnancy norm would seem to 
explain why the induced abortion rate in South Korea is so much higher than the 
estimated global level.   
It is important to note that the general decline in South Korean induced abortions 
between 1963 and 2003 masks an initial increase in the number of abortions over time 
and by age.  This is illustrated in Figure 2, which presents data on induced abortion rates 
(the number of abortions per 1,000 married women) by age category for selected years  
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Figure 2. Changes in Induced Abortion Rates by Age Category: South Korea, 1975 
to 1999 
Note: Induced abortion rate = Number of abortions per 1,000 married women 
Source: Choe and Kim 2007 
 
 
between 1975 and 1999.  Among women in the 20-24 and 25-29 age groups, there is a 
substantial increase in the induced abortion rate between 1975 and 1990, which then 
undergoes a similarly steep decline between 1990 and 1999.  Meanwhile, among women 
in the three older age categories, the induced abortion rate consistently declines over the 
1975 to 1999 period.   
Another indicator of change in trends surrounding induced abortion can be found 
in the distribution of pregnancy termination between 1975 and 2003 (see Table 6).  
Between 1979 and 2003, the greatest difference in terms of both percentage points and 
percent change takes place among pregnancies that end in induced abortion, which  
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Table 6. Type of Pregnancy Termination Reported in National Fertility Surveys (in 
percentages): South Korea, 1979 and 2003 
Type of Termination 1979 2003 % Change 
Live birth 51 66 29 
Spontaneous abortion or stillbirth 7 10 43 
Induced abortion 43 24 -44 
Total percent 100 100 n/a 
Percentage of total pregnancy wastage 50 34 -32 
    Note: % Change = (2003 value – 1975 value)/1975 value * 100     
    n/a = not applicable 
    Source: Choe and Kim 2007 
      
 
decreases from 43 percent of pregnancies to 24 percent.  The increase of 15 percentage 
points among pregnancies ending in live births suggests that, ultimately, the majority of 
pregnancies that no longer result in induced abortion are now ending in live birth, rather 
than spontaneous abortions or stillbirths.  A likely explanation for this change is the 
concurrent rise in contraceptive usage over this period of time.  By adopting a form of 
contraception and therefore exerting greater control over their fertility, fewer women 
find themselves coping with an unplanned and/or unwanted pregnancy.  That is, having 
the option of employing contraception would mean that in many cases, pregnancies were 
deliberate and desired, and therefore considering an induced abortion unnecessary.  A 
negative relationship between the rate of induced abortion and contraception usage has 
also been found in other research (see Shears 2002).  This suggests that, in South Korea, 
induced abortion and contraception are not two parts of the same trend of increasing 
family limitation, as Knodel and his colleagues (1987) found was the case in Thailand.  
Instead, the various available methods of contraceptives function as alternatives to 
induced abortion, giving many women greater agency in terms of planning pregnancies, 
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and relegating induced abortions for them to the place of ―if all else fails.‖  However, 
with such a comparatively high rate of abortions, it may be deduced that for many 
women in South Korea, a ―limited understanding of the properties of different 
contraceptive methods [leads them to] choose inappropriate methods and/or fail to use 
them effectively‖ (Choe and Kim 2007: 50).  
 While the rate of induced abortions may have declined over the years, 
relationships between certain characteristics and the likelihood of obtaining an induced 
abortion have persisted.  Namely, religious affiliation has been shown to be related to the 
practice of induced abortion.  Chung, Kim, and Nam (2007) found that Christian women 
in South Korea with only sons or with one daughter and one son were less likely than 
Confucian women with the same sex distribution of children to have had an induced 
abortion, but that Buddhist women were not significantly different from Confucian 
women in their induced abortion practices.  This may be due, in part, to the belief in 
some Christian religions that life begins at the moment of conception; from this 
perspective, ending a ―life‖ via induced abortion is akin to murder.  It is interesting that 
this relationship was only found among the women who had only sons, or a son and a 
daughter; among women with only daughters, there was no significant difference in 
usage of induced abortion by religion.  It is also interesting to note that this relationship 
may be viewed as inconsistent with results from 1974 (see Figure 3) which show two 
Christian faiths with slightly higher use of induced abortion than women with no 
religion, or all women in general.  Unfortunately, women affiliated with the Confucian 
tradition are not specifically identified in this survey.  Furthermore, it should be noted  
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Figure 3. Percentage of Ever-Married Women Who Report Having Had at Least 
One Induced Abortion, by Religion: South Korea, 1974 
Source: KIFP 1974 
 
 
that ―the slightly higher use among the Christians… may be due to their more favorable 
educational composition and greater urban residence‖ (KIFP 1974: 137); in other words, 
the relationship between religion and abortion may actually be spurious, or the result of 
an interaction with another factor. 
Another characteristic that is typically linked with induced abortion is son 
preference, which is an issue in many other Asian countries.  In fact, there is sometimes 
even a link between son preference and religion, such as in the case of Confucianism, 
which includes traditions of ancestor worship that stipulate certain responsibilities for 
sons.  Regardless, in cases of very strong son preference, induced abortion is often relied 
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upon to abort female fetuses.  South Korea is an example of a society with this kind of 
very strong preference, due in large part to its system of patrilineal descent.  Chung and 
Das Gupta explain: 
The lineage was continued through the line of the eldest son in each generation, 
and other sons in each generation would start their own sub-lineages.  This meant 
that the eldest son had the burden of caring for all male ancestors, and it was 
especially important for him to bear a son to continue the male descent line.  
Women were severely marginalized by these strict rules of patrilineal kinship and 
inheritance, which placed the father and the son in the public sphere and 
relegated women to the domestic sphere…Only sons could care for their parents 
in this life and in their afterlife.  A woman‘s primary duty was to bear sons for 
her husband‘s lineage (2007: 762).   
 
Subsequently, induced abortion became a means for a woman to increase the likelihood 
of bearing a son; if she aborts a female fetus, this enhances her probability of having a 
male birth while simultaneously only having one or two children.   
A popular indicator of son preference is the sex ratio at birth (SRB), or the 
number of live male births for every 100 live female births.  In nature, approximately 
105 human males are born for every female; because males have higher age-specific 
mortality rates at every age, the sex ratio typically balances out by the 20s and 30s (so 
that there are relatively equal numbers of males and females), and then continues to 
decrease across the lifespan.  When an SRB deviates considerably from 105, it is a good 
indication that some tampering with the biology may well be taking place.  By 
examining the SRBs in South Korea over the past 30 years (see Table 7), it becomes 
evident that, as early as 1980 to 1985, some form of intervention was resulting in a 
higher number of male births than the ―biological norm.‖  By 1985, the SRB for all 
births was 109.5.  This ratio continued to increase precipitously into 1990 when it  
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Table 7. Sex Ratio at Birth by Birth Order from Vital Statistics Reports: South 
Korea, 1974 to 2000 
Year Total 1st Births 2nd Births 
  1974* 106.5 107.3 107.8 
1980 105.3 106.0 106.5 
1985 109.5 106.0 107.8 
1990 116.5 108.5 117.0 
1995 113.2 105.8 111.7 
2000 110.2 106.2 107.4 
    *Retrospective births from survey data 
    Note: Sex ratio at birth = number of male live births per 100 female live births 
    Sources: Park and Cho 1995; Cho 2002 
 
 
reached 116.5 for all births, but then began to decline.  As would be expected in a 
society exhibiting son preference, the SRBs for second births are consistently higher 
than for first births in every year.  In 1990, the SRB for the second birth is considerably 
higher—117.0 compared to just 108.5 for the first birth.  This trend is illustrative of 
women‘s increased efforts on the second birth to ensure that they have a son. 
 It is particularly notable that the SRBs in South Korea have been declining since 
the early 1990s.  In fact, South Korea is often touted as an example where the SRB has 
begun to return to normal due to comparatively successful efforts to ―rebalance‖ the sex 
ratio.  Explanations for this decline include many factors of social and economic change: 
industrialization and urbanization; the ability to obtain livelihoods and social status 
independently of lineage membership; increased participation of women in the labor 
force; better employment and educational opportunities for women; the development of 
relationships between parents and children based on ―affect rather than by rigid rules of 
gender and birth order‖ (Chung and Das Gupta 2007: 777); the establishment of 
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retirement savings for old age security; laws allowing women rights and responsibilities 
within their natal families after marriage; laws benefitting female-headed households; a 
―Love your Daughters‖ media campaign; a social movement for self-regulation of 
medical professionals for ―immoral medical services such as the performance of fetal 
sex determination procedures‖ (Cho 2002: 22); non-governmental campaigns on the 
negative effects of sex-imbalances in society; the prohibition of prenatal sex 
determination, as well as stiff penalties for the violation of this law; etc. (Ganatra 2008; 
Chung and Das Gupta 2007; Cho 2002).  
Despite the evident improvement, the sex ratio is still higher than the ―biological 
norm.‖  This indicates that, according to Chung and Das Gupta, ―the belief that one must 
fulfill the filial duty to continue the male family line remains significant‖ (2007: 778). 
Thus, even though the reliance on abortion as a method of deliberate fertility control has 
declined somewhat over the past thirty to forty years, it is still relatively high, and its effect 
on fertility cannot be disputed.  Because of this, Jun makes an interesting point: 
[An] individual couple‘s ability to fit actual fertility with their desired family size 
will in all likelihood improve in the phases of the second [fertility] transition and 
correspondingly, unwanted fertility may become a rare, anachronistic 
phenomenon.  However, the exception to this trend is highly plausible in cases 
where the Korean government puts a severe restriction on access to the abortion 
procedure, under the slogan of maternal protection and the repair of the sex ratio at 
birth imbalances (2005: 37). 
 
Jun‘s comment highlights the point that as long as induced abortion maintains a 
measurable depressing effect on fertility levels, there remains the potential for the 
government to manipulate access to abortion in favor of increased fertility.  How likely 
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this scenario is of actually playing out is debatable, but in extreme circumstances, it is 
certainly possible. 
 This chapter has examined the proximate determinants in South Korea and how 
they have changed over time. Each determinant was examined in depth, one by one.  In 
the next chapter, I will undertake a similarly thorough investigation of marriage and 
marital disruption, natural marital fertility factors, deliberate marital fertility control, and 
induced abortion in the United States.   
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CHAPTER V 
THE PROXIMATE DETERMINANTS OF FERTILITY IN  
THE UNITED STATES 
 
As with the previous chapter dealing with South Korea, this chapter adopts the 
style of Knodel, Chamratrithirong, and Debavalya‘s 1987 study of fertility decline in 
Thailand, focusing on the United States to show  how the proximate determinants have 
affected the course of U. S. fertility over time.  I undertake an in-depth look at the four 
primary proximate determinants of U.S. fertility during the 1970s and the 2000s.
1
 
 Patterns of change in the fertility levels of the United States over recent decades 
have been far more variable than the consistent—albeit sharp—patterns of change 
experienced in South Korea.  Whereas the post-World War II ―Baby Boom‖ produced 
birth rates of approximately 3.6 births per woman in 1955, by the early 1970s the rate 
had decreased to just 1.8 births per woman, where it remained through the mid-1980s 
before rising again to approximately two births per woman in the early 1990s (Mosher 
and Bachrach 1996).  Suzuki (2008) asserts that ―countries that have avoided lowest-low 
fertility should be seen as exceptional and requiring explanation‖ (2008: 36).  
Accordingly, these trends, relative to the experiences of other developed nations, raise 
questions about the ―exceptionalism‖ of the United States.  Lesthaeghe and Neidert 
elaborate: 
                                                 
1
 For a more comprehensive description of Knodel, Chamratrithirong, and Debavalya‘s work, 
please refer to Chapter II.  Furthermore, for a brief discussion of the benefits of conducting case 
studies, the process of selecting this country for investigation, or a review of the proximate 
determinants, please refer to Chapter IV.   
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The American total fertility rate now towers high above those of many of its 
industrial competitors, and especially above those of the EU-25 and Japan.  Add 
to this that the United States is still taking in more immigrants, and the 
conclusion is clear: the U.S. population will continue to grow, its aging will be 
less pronounced, and the country will easily avoid the negative population 
growth momentum that many other industrialized countries are about to face as a 
result of 25 years of ―lowest-low‖ fertility—that is, TFRs below 1.5 children 
(2006: 670).    
 
In light of this evidence, the question becomes why has the experience with fertility 
levels in the United States been so markedly different from other, similarly industrialized 
nations?  By undertaking a Knodel et al.-style study of the proximate determinants of 
fertility in the United States, I will be able to address this question. 
 
Marriage and Marital Disruption 
 The 1960s and 1970s were decades of great social and normative change in the 
United States.  One area in which this is particularly evident is that of marriage and 
family formation, where changes during this period have been described as ―fast and 
furious‖ or ―in the epic terms of transformation and revolution‖ (Estin 2008).  In the 
broadest terms, marriage has witnessed a shift from being a single primary model to 
being defined by ―many different types of marriage and marriage-like relationships 
[with] important social and legal consequences‖ (Estin 2008).  Among the relationships 
that have become more common are cohabiting couples with or without children, single 
parents, gay or lesbian couples with or without children, and all manner of step families.  
At the same time, as these family forms have gained more prominence, the divorce rate 
has increased precipitously and, moreover, a growing portion of couples opt to either 
delay or forgo marriage entirely.  All of these changes have been facilitated by a 
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constantly-evolving legal context, a complex network of laws and norms.  That is, as 
Estin (2008) explains, ―our institutions of marriage and family life reflect the broader 
and deeper values of our society.‖  Thus, by examining certain significant legal 
developments over recent decades, it becomes possible to gain a more comprehensive 
understanding of what some consider to be the ―deinstitutionalization‖ of marriage 
(Cherlin 2004). 
 The first of the relevant rulings, arguably, took place in 1965 when the Supreme 
Court determined in Griswold v. Connecticut that a law prohibiting married couples 
from using contraceptives was in violation of their constitutional marital privacy (Estin 
2008).  By stipulating that married couples may rightfully opt to utilize birth control, this 
ruling may have initiated a separation between the act of marriage and the act of 
childbearing.  Furthermore, if married couples could, in theory, be engaging in sexual 
activities for purposes other than procreation, it was not a far leap to the notion that 
anyone could be engaging in sexual activities for such reasons.  Research by Finer 
suggests that this was, in fact, the case.  He found that, since the 1950s, there has been a 
trend toward a higher proportion of individuals experiencing premarital sex (see Table 
8), despite the popular belief that pre-marital sex is a recent phenomenon.  Instead, even 
among those who turned age 15 between 1954 and 1963, just under half were having 
pre-marital sex by age 20.  By the time the 1994-2003 cohort of 15-year-olds turned 20, 
this number had risen to just fewer than 75 percent.  Another telling statistic is the 
median age at first premarital sex, which declined from 20.4 for the 1954 to 1963 cohort 
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Table 8. Percentage Experiencing Premarital Sex by Exact Age According to Cohort: 
United States, 1954 to 2003 
 Percent who had premarital sex by exact age: 
Median 
age at first 
premarital sex Cohort Turning 15 in: 15 18 20 25 30 35 40 44 
All 16 58 75 89 93 94 95 95 17.4 
1954-1963 4 26 48 73 82 84 85 88 20.4 
1964-1973 6 39 65 86 91 93 93 94 18.6 
1974-1983 10 50 72 88 92 93 93 NA 18.0 
1984-1993 13 59 76 89 94 NA NA NA 17.3 
1994-2003 14 54 74 NA NA NA NA NA 17.6 
    NA = not applicable 
    Source: Finer 2007 
 
 
of 15-year-olds to 17.3 among those who turned 15 between 1984 and 1993, before 
rising slightly to 17.6 for the 1994 to 2003 cohort (though because the data for the latter 
two groups are incomplete, it is possible that these numbers could still change—albeit 
slightly).  Nevertheless, the trend is clear: a significant proportion of individuals have 
engaged in premarital sex since as early as the 1950s, and this proportion has increased 
significantly over time.   
As Finer states, these results ―indicate that premarital sex is highly normative 
behavior,‖ which is ―not surprising in an era when men and women typically marry in 
their mid-to-late twenties‖ (2007: 76,78).  In fact, this increase in premarital sexual 
activity was accompanied by a similarly dramatic increase in the average age at first 
marriage, as well as a notable decrease in the proportion ever marrying.  Whereas until 
the 1960s, the overall trend in the United States was toward earlier marriage, it was at 
this point that the average age at marriage began to rise (Schoen and Canudas-Romo 
2005).  As illustrated in Table 9, the average age at marriage for females rose from 20.1 
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Table 9. Average Age at First Marriage and Proportion Ever Marrying by Sex: 
United States, 1960 to 2000 
 Average Age at Marriage Proportion Ever Marrying 
Year Female Male Female Male 
1960 20.1 22.2 0.977 0.976 
1965 20.4 22.1 0.982 0.981 
1970 20.6 22.2 0.972 0.981 
1975 21.3 23.3 0.954 0.958 
1980 22.2 24.2 0.916 0.921 
1985 22.5 24.5 0.904 0.883 
1990 23.0 25.0 0.890 0.862 
1995 24.3 26.0 0.897 0.865 
2000 24.4 26.1 0.886 0.852 
 Source: Schoen and Canudas-Romo 2005 
 
years in 1960 to 24.4 years in 2000—an increase of 21.4 percent.  Males experienced a 
slighter increase of 17.6 percent from 22.2 in 1960 to 26.l in 2000.  Meanwhile, the 
proportions of females and males ever marrying declined by 9.31 percent and 12.7 
percent, respectively, with 88.6 percent of females and 85.2 percent of males marrying at 
some point as of 2000, compared to 97.7 percent for females and 97.6 percent of males 
in 1960.  Perhaps a relationship can be drawn among these trends: with premarital (and 
thus non-marital) sex more normative, some individuals may find that there is less 
incentive to marry.          
There is an additional outcome emerging from increased premarital sex, namely,  
an increase in non-marital births (Mosher and Bachrach 1996).  Another ruling pertinent 
to family formation addresses this issue: Levy v. Louisiana in 1968 resulted in the 
Supreme Court overturning Louisiana‘s law denying ―illegitimate‖ children the right to 
recover after their mother‘s wrongful death, and extending Due Process and Equal 
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Protection to children born out of wedlock.  Essentially, the Supreme Court maintained 
that ―classification on the basis of legitimacy was invidious and unconstitutional‖ (Estin 
2008).  This was just part of the movement to combat the ―historic stigma attached to 
illegitimate birth‖ (Estin 2008), and ultimately its effect may be assessed in part by 
considering how the prevalence of non-marital births has changed since 1968.  As 
Cherlin points out, ―marriage is no longer the nearly universal setting for childbearing 
that it was a half century ago‖ (2004: 849).  Moreover, as is evident in Figure 4, while 
significant increase from the 3.8 percent born outside of marriage back in 1940.  
Nonetheless, the 1970 percentage had increased substantially by 2007 to 29.7 percent of 
 
 
Figure 4. Percent of Births to Unmarried Women in the United States: 1940-2007 
Source: National Center for Health Statistics 2003, Ventura 2009 
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just 10.7 percent of births in 1970 were to unmarried women, this by itself was a all 
births: an increase of 271 percent.  Put another way, nearly 4 in 10 births in 2007 were to 
unmarried women, representing a percentage of births more than double what it was just 
twenty-five years prior (Ventura 2009).  According to Ventura, the period of the mid-
1990s to 2002 was regarded as one of ―relative stability‖ in nonmarital childbearing, but 
since then the measures have ―risen sharply‖ to what she describes as ―an historic peak‖ 
(2009: 6).  This marked rise has occurred across racial and Hispanic origin groups, 
though much of the increase has taken place among women aged 20 and older.  The new 
age distribution of nonmarital births is notable when it is considered that nonmarital 
childbearing is often associated with teenagers.  In fact, nonmarital births to teenage 
women constitute less than one-fourth of recent total nonmarital births Ventura 2009).  
Even in light of this remarkable change, births to unmarried mothers are still considered 
a cause for concern based on the increased risk of low birth weight, preterm birth, dying 
in infancy, and ultimately living in poverty as compared to babies born to married 
women (Ventura 2009).   
 The substantial rise in nonmarital births has been attributed to many factors, 
including the aforementioned increased age at first marriage and a shift in attitudes--over 
time, the societal disapproval faced by unmarried mothers has diminished considerably 
(Ventura 2009).  These changes have occurred despite political efforts to combat such 
them, such as the 1996 Federal Welfare Reform Act which necessitated that states work 
toward reducing the number of births to unmarried mother, and actually establish 
specific annual numerical goals (Gray, Stockard, and Stone 2006).  However, one factor 
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that is commonly cited to have influenced the rise in nonmarital births is the increase in 
cohabitation (Ventura 2009).  For many, non-marital cohabitation is now viewed as ―a 
normal part of the life course‖ (Popenoe 2008a: 3).  As illustrated in Figure 5, the 
number of unmarried couples was over 14 times greater in 2007 than it was in 1960, 
representing an increase of over 1,368 percent.  What has been driving such remarkable 
growth?  Popenoe links this growth to the ―sexual revolution that began in the 1960s, a 
revolution which essentially gave premarital sex a social stamp of approval‖  (2008a: 4).  
Over time, the social approval of premarital sex extended into a virtual ―consensus 
among most Americans that cohabitation is much like a trial marriage or a step expected  
 
 
Figure 5. Number of Cohabiting, Unmarried Adult Couples of the Opposite Sex in 
the United States: 1960-2007 
Source: Popenoe 2008b 
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 to lead to marriage‖ (Raley 2001: 59).  This consensus is evident in changing attitudes, 
such as those revealed by the nationally representative Monitoring the Future survey of 
high school seniors, conducted by the Institute for Social Research at the University of 
Michigan.  The percentage of high school seniors who ―agreed‖ or ―mostly agreed‖ with 
the statement that ―it is usually a good idea for a couple to live together before getting 
married in order to find out whether they really get along‖ increased substantially from 
32.4 percent of girls and 44.9 percent of boys in the 1976 to 1980 period to 57.6 percent 
of girls and 64.5 percent of boys in the 2001 to 2006 period.  Despite the obvious trend 
toward greater acceptance—girls‘ approval increased by 25.3 percentage points, and 
boys‘ by 19.6—it is particularly interesting to note that since the 1996 to 2000 period, 
there has been a slight decrease: girls decreased from 59.1 to 57.6, while boys decreased 
from 65.7 to 64.5.  Unfortunately, it is too early to tell if this decline is temporary, or is 
an indication of a greater trend.  Even so, the growth in the approval of cohabitation 
between the 1970s and 2000s is unmistakable.   
The growing approval of cohabitation has been accompanied by greater legal and 
political recognition.  Cherlin states that, ―to be sure, cohabitation is becoming more 
institutionalized,‖ citing the greater rights and responsibilities being granted to 
cohabiting couples by some states and municipalities as evidence of this 
institutionalization (2004: 850).  Yet, interestingly, the ―elaboration of rules or standards 
in state or federal laws‖ to address issues of cohabitation has not necessarily matched the 
significant growth in the cohabitation rate among couples (Estin 2008).  For example, 
laws still vary considerably from state to state in terms of the conditions that need to be 
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fulfilled for a couple to be formally recognized.  Typically, requirements center around a 
particular duration of the cohabitation, the existence of a sexual relationship, and a 
shared address (Popenoe 2008a).  What is particularly noteworthy about cohabitation 
laws everywhere in the United States, however, is that there are ―no specific 
procedures…for getting into it, and none for getting out‖ (Popenoe 2008a: 12).  Indeed, 
this represents the starkest contrast to legally sanctioned marriages.  As Cherlin explains: 
…marriage still requires a public commitment to a long-term, possibly lifelong 
relationship.  This commitment is usually expressed in front of relatives, friends, 
and religious congregants.  Cohabitation, in contrast, requires only a private 
commitment, which is easier to break.  Therefore, marriage more so than 
cohabitation, lowers the risk that one‘s partner will renege on agreements that 
have been made (2004: 854).   
 
Yet Cherlin goes on to predict that, over time, differences in legality between the two 
types of relationship will become minimal (2004: 855).  Whether or not this actually 
becomes the case in the United States, the current differences have interesting 
implications for fertility. 
 It seems logical to draw a connection between the greater number of individuals 
living together unmarried and, presumably, engaging in sexual relations, and the greater 
number of nonmarital births.  Indeed, it has been found that ―many infants are…born to 
couples in cohabiting relationships: according to the 2002 NSFG, about 40% of recent 
nonmarital births were to cohabiting women‖ (Ventura 2009: 6).  This is a significant 
change from earlier decades, in which differences in fertility expectations and behavior 
were arguably the most significant distinction between marriage and cohabitation (Raley 
2001).  In fact, research by Raley suggests that cohabitation may be viewed, more and 
more, as an alternative to marriage rather than as a prelude.  This is supported by a 
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decreasing proportion of pregnant cohabiters who decide to marry prior to the birth of 
their child (Raley 2001).  If this is the case, it suggests that changes in the rates of 
marriage versus cohabitation may well have little effect on overall fertility, and that 
couples will make fertility decisions independent of decisions relating to marriage. 
 One factor that, for some, has become more and more of a deterrent to getting 
married in the first place is the rate of divorce.  This is another area in which trends have 
been largely dictated—or at least enabled—by legal context.  A landmark in the 
evolution of divorce was reached when Governor Ronald Reagan of California signed 
the nation‘s first no-fault divorce bill in 1969.  His intention was to ―eliminate the strife 
and deception often associated with the legal regime of fault-based divorce,‖ but he also 
ended up stripping marriage ―of its legal power to bind husband and wife‖ (Wilcox 
2009: 81).  That is, by permitting no-fault dissolutions, couples may now negotiate the 
terms of their divorce, but it also essentially granted spouses the power to end their 
marriages, as Wilcox put it ―for any reason—or for no reason at all‖ (Wilcox 2009: 81).  
The period of time surrounding this decision is often referred to as the ―divorce 
revolution,‖ primarily because of the sharp increase in the rate of divorces taking place: 
between 1960 and the early 1980s, the divorce rate more than doubled (2007).  As 
illustrated in Table 10, this trend is also evident in the percentage of the U.S. population 
age 15 and older that reports being ―currently divorced‖ (i.e. divorced at the time of the 
respective Current Population Survey, conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau).  The 
percentage of divorced males has increased from 1.8 percent in 1960 to 8.6 percent in 
2007, representing growth of nearly 378 percent; meanwhile, females experienced nearly  
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Table 10. Currently Divorced Population Age 15 and Older by Sex (in percentage): 
United States, 1960 to 2007 
Year Males Females 
1960 1.8 2.6 
1970 2.2 3.5 
1980 4.8 6.6 
1990 6.8 8.9 
2000 8.3 10.2 
2007 8.6 11.0 
              Source: Popenoe 2008b 
 
as substantial an increase from 2.6 percent in 1960 to 11.0 percent in 2007, reaching a 
higher level but at a slightly lower increase over time of about 323 percent.  As divorce 
has grown more common, there has also been evidence of a growing acceptability of 
marital dissolution.  Cherlin comments that ―although relatives and friends will view a 
divorce with disappointment, they will accept it more readily than their counterparts 
would have two generations ago‖ (2004: 855).  Explanations for the trend vary, but Estin 
suggests that the higher rates over time may actually be a simple reflection of higher 
standards among individuals regarding marital happiness and success, as well as a 
greater emphasis on ―freedom to form and leave unions and further… individual 
happiness‖ (Estin 2008).  Regardless of the cause, the effect on fertility is 
straightforward: with marriages becoming less stable or reliable, it is possible that 
individuals may opt to delay or forgo bearing children in order to determine whether the 
marriage seems like it will last.   
 These findings suggest some interesting trends among American women.  As 
with the case in South Korea, the question then becomes why are women waiting to get 
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married?  Why are couples cohabiting with greater frequency, and what are the 
incentives for having a child outside of marriage?  Currently, two main factors serve as 
likely explanations: gender roles and individualism.   
 The early 1960s were also known for the marked increase in the intensity of the 
women‘s movement.  The ability to leave broken marriages and greater access to 
contraception (see section below) gave women freedoms they had not possessed 
previously, and this newfound freedom spread into other areas of their lives.  For 
example, as Cherlin notes, ―although women continued to do most of the housework and 
child care, the roles of wives and husbands became more flexible and open to 
negotiation‖ (Cherlin 2004: 852).  Popenoe adds the following: 
At the same time, the sexual revolution was enhancing the gender revolution 
which was bringing greater equality to women, especially in the workplace.  
Being less impelled to marry at a young age, women entered jobs and careers in 
ever larger numbers and marriage and childbearing were increasingly delayed.  
The delay was enhanced by women‘s greatly increased entry into higher 
education, desired not only in its own right but often required by the jobs and 
careers that women aspired to (2008a: 6).  
 
Indeed, the opportunity to achieve higher levels of education and aspire toward more 
prestigious and higher-paid occupational positions certainly affected women‘s decisions 
to marry and bear children, usually to the effect that they were delayed or relinquished 
altogether.  Education and employment also gave women additional freedom: the 
freedom of economic independence, meaning that they no longer were forced to rely on 
men for financial stability.  This often meant the ability to support one‘s self, or to leave 
a bad marriage as necessary, and yet to ―still remain economically viable through their 
new access to jobs‖ (Popenoe 2008a: 6).  
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 While increased access to education and career opportunities certainly have  
affected fertility, they have functioned in tandem with the increasing focus on 
individualism.  Cherlin states that the last few decades of the century were characterized 
by what he calls ―an ethic of expressive individualism‖ (2004: 851).  He explains as 
follows: 
…An even more individualistic perspective on the rewards of marriage took root.  
When people evaluated how satisfied they were with their marriages, they began 
to think more in terms of the development of their own sense of self and the 
expression of their feelings, as opposed to the satisfaction they gained through 
building a family and playing the roles of spouse and parent.  The result was a 
transition from the companionate marriage to what we might call the 
individualized marriage (2004: 852).  
 
This sort of ―pure relationship‖ is ―not tied to an institution such as marriage or the 
desire to raise children,‖ but ―exists primarily in the realms of emotion and self-identity‖ 
(Cherlin 2004: 853).  In other words, people have increasingly begun to enter 
relationships for the benefits and fulfillment they can receive from them.  If they believe 
children to be such a benefit, then they have children; if it so happens that some 
individuals do not perceive children to be a benefit they desire, then they do not have 
children.  Marriage and fertility have, in this way, evolved into options rather than 
required or guaranteed stages in the life course.  Instead of being a step one takes to 
establish oneself at a young age, marriage is now more ―a status one builds up to, often 
by living with a partner beforehand, by attaining steady employment or starting a career, 
by putting away some savings, and even by having children...It is something to be 
achieved through one‘s own efforts rather than something to which one routinely 
accedes‖ (Cherlin 2004: 855).  Individuals want to feel secure that they have reached 
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certain goals—whether personal or financial—before ―settling down.‖  Accordingly, the 
result is often that marriage and fertility are sacrificed, or at least delayed, in this 
process. 
Such notable changes to the institution of marriage since the 1970s, and the 
concomitant developments in cohabitation, non-marital births, and divorce, are likely to 
have exerted a similarly notable influence on the total fertility rate in the United States.  
Yet during the vast majority of 1961 through 1975, the decline in marital fertility was 
cited as the ―dominant factor‖ influencing the continuous decline in the TFR.  
Specifically, 83 percent of the decline was attributed to marital fertility rates, while just 
16 percent was accounted for by changes in marital status, with changes in non-marital 
fertility registering but a ―negligible effect‖ (Gibson 1976: 252).  In other words, the 
changes to fertility taking place within marriage were having a much more significant 
effect on overall fertility levels than changes in marriage patterns.  Thus, before the 
weight of changes to marriage and marital disruption can be fairly assessed, trends in 
both natural marital fertility and deliberate fertility control must be thoroughly 
considered. 
 
Natural Marital Fertility Factors 
 Unlike in South Korea, nonmarital births in the United States are being met with  
lower levels of stigma over time.  Subsequently, as discussed above, there has been a 
significant increase in the prevalence of births outside of marriage over past decades.  
This might seem to suggest that the influence of marital fertility on the total fertility rate 
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would be lessening over time; accordingly, throughout the literature, decreasing levels of 
U.S. marital fertility have been identified as having a notable impact on the TFR. 
 Once again, it is logical to begin a discussion of natural marital fertility by 
addressing the population of individuals who, due to primary sterility, are unable to bear 
children at all.  Lundquist, Budig, and Curtis point out that among American women, 
childlessness has doubled in the last 3 decades, and this growing proportion of women 
who are childless at the end of their childbearing year ―has sparked research into the 
causes and consequences of this trend‖ (2009: 741).  By examining the proportion of 
women who suffer from impaired fecundity, it becomes possible to separate women who 
deliberately (or accidentally) remain child-free from those who are unable to conceive.  
Chandra and colleagues elaborate on the difference between voluntarily and 
―nonvoluntarily‖ childless women: 
Most childless women 15–44 years of age are ‗‗temporarily childless,‘‘ meaning 
that that they expect to have one or more children in the future. Voluntarily 
childless women are women who are fecund (physically able to have a birth) and 
expect to have no children in their lifetimes or they are surgically sterile for 
contraceptive reasons. Nonvoluntarily childless women are those who expect to 
have no children in their lifetimes, and either have impaired fecundity or are 
surgically sterile for reasons other than contraception (2005: 7). 
 
In 2002, 42 percent of women aged 15 to 44 were childless.  Of these, 33 percent 
qualified as temporarily childless, with 6.2 percent voluntarily childless, and 2.5 percent 
nonvoluntarily so (Chandra et al. 2005). Table 11 identifies married women according to 
fecundity status by age and parity between 1976 and 2002.  The designation fecund 
refers to the ability of the woman to have a live-born child at the time of the interview 
(Mosher 1980).  In 1976, 43.9 percent of women were not fecund, meaning that they 
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Table 11. Number of Married Women 15-44 Years of Age (in thousands) and 
Percent Distribution by Fecundity Status, According to Age and Parity: United 
States, 1976 and 2002 
Selected  
Characteristic Year 
Number of  
Women in  
Thousands Fecund 
Contraceptively  
Sterile 
Noncontraceptively  
Sterile or  
Impaired Fecundity 
Age      
All Ages 1976 27,488 56.1 18.6 25.3 
 2002 28,327 50.1 32.7 17.2 
15-29 1976 12,463 76.7 8.1 15.2 
 2002 7,246 75.0 11.8 13.2 
30-34 1976 5,736 47.5 26.5 26.1 
 2002 6,351 58.0 25.2 16.8 
35-39 1976 4,814 36.3 28.9 34.9 
 2002 6,989 41.6 43.5 15.0 
40-44 1976 4,474 31.2 26.4 42.4 
 2002 7,740 28.1 48.8 23.2 
Parity      
0 1976 5,235 73.0 1.5 25.5 
 2002 5,142 65.6 6.8 27.6 
1 or more 1976 21,983 52.1 22.6 25.3 
 2002 23,185 46.7 38.5 14.8 
      Source: Mosher 1980; Chandra et al. 2005 
 
were either sterile or suffered from impaired fecundity.  By 2002, this figure had risen 
slightly to 49.9 percent.  Yet this general trend includes women who were both 
contraceptively and noncontraceptively sterile.  By subtracting out women who had 
undergone a sterilizing operation for the purposes of contraception, the trend is actually 
reversed: whereas 25.3 percent of women aged 15-44 in 1976 were considered either 
noncontraceptively sterile or to have impaired fecundity, 17.2 percent fell into this 
category in 2002, representing a decrease of 32 percent.  The change in the direction of 
 145 
this trend is accounted for by an overall increase in women who are sterile for purposes 
of contraception. 
Interestingly, there is no consistent trend regarding changes in the percentage of 
fecund women by age.  For the age groups 15 to 29 and 40 to 44, as well as the overall 
age range of 15 to 44, there has been a decline in the percentage of fecund women, with 
the greatest percent decline taking place overall at 10.7 percent, followed by a 9.9 
percent decline in the percentage of fecund women between 1976 and 2002 for those 
aged 40 to 44.  Meanwhile, for the age groups 30 to 34 and 35 to 39, there is an increase 
in the percentage of fecund women by 22.1 percent and 14.6 percent respectively.  In 
other words, while a higher percentage of 30 to 39-year-olds qualify as ―fecund,‖ a 
lower percentage of 15 to 29 and 40 to 44-year-olds, as well as women overall, do so.   
Once again, these trends in overall fecundity can be misleading as, in several 
cases, they are dictated by significant changes in the percentage of women who are 
contraceptively sterile.  Subsequently, it is worthwhile to also consider changes over 
time in the percentage of women who are either noncontraceptively sterile, or who have 
impaired fecundity.  Interestingly, doing so reveals that the percentage of such women 
has actually declined for all age groups between 1976 and 2002.  The largest decline is 
evident among 35 to 39-year-olds, who drop from 34.9 percent noncontraceptively 
sterile or of impaired fecundity in 1976 to 15.0 percent in 2002, representing a decrease 
of 57 percent.  This decline is followed closely by that experienced among 40 to 44-
year-olds, who drop from 42.4 percent noncontraceptively sterile or of impaired 
fecundity in 1976 to 23.2 in 2002, constituting a decrease of 45.3 percent.   
 146 
This trend is really remarkable when examined alongside the overall decrease 
between 1976 and 2002 in fecundity among women aged 15 to 44 between 1976 and 
2002.  Ultimately, the factor responsible for what otherwise appear to be contradictory 
changes is, as mentioned above, an increase in the percentage of women contraceptively 
sterile in all age groups.  Even if the population of women who have impaired fecundity 
or are noncontraceptively sterile is decreasing—suggesting, perhaps, medical advances 
and improvements in fertility treatment options—a greater number of women electing 
contraceptive sterilization is driving down the overall relative numbers of fecund 
women.  In a context of fertility that is teetering on the edge of the replacement level, 
this may be an area worth exploring; for example, it would be informative to ascertain 
why more women are turning to sterilization. 
In terms of fecundity status by parity, there was a slight increase in the 
population of women aged 15 to 44 with parity zero who were classified as having 
impaired fecundity or as being noncontraceptively sterile, from 25.5 percent in 1976 to 
27.6 in 2002.  However, the rate underwent a notable decrease for women with 1 or 
more children: 25.3 percent of these women in 1976 were noncontraceptively sterile or 
had impaired fecundity, while just 14.8 percent of women with 1 or more children in 
2002 fell into this category; this is a decrease of about 41.5 percent.  What the 
discrepancy in these two trends may well be illustrating is an improvement in diagnosis 
and fertility treatment options; that is, if a woman appeared subfecund, the doctors could 
determine more efficiently if she was actually sterile or simply struggling with impaired 
fertility—which could potentially be successful addressed with medical advances.  
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Additionally, these improvements would likely assist women who already had one child, 
but were struggling to have a second, to achieve their fertility goals.  Once again, due to 
increases in women engaging in sterilization procedures for contraceptive purposes, the 
overall level of fecundity at both a parity of 0 and 1 or more children has declined.         
 The next factor central to natural marital fertility is the duration of postpartum 
infecundability, which is inexorably tied to breastfeeding practices in the society.  
Breastfeeding habits in the United States are the product of an interesting legacy, which 
began with a late 19
th
-century push to encourage women to increase breastfeeding as a 
means of keeping their infants alive. Prior to reliable pasteurization methods and 
refrigeration, low rates of breastfeeding were tied to comparatively high rates of infant 
death due to issues with the cow‘s milk ingested by the babies (Wolf 2003).  Even so, it 
was difficult for poor mothers to adhere to such recommendations when they often were 
forced to work long hours away from their young children.  Efforts at disseminating 
knowledge about the benefits of breastfeeding were met with some success, but a more 
substantial effect resulted from the development of effective pasteurization techniques in 
the early decades of the twentieth century.   
By the 1930s, many medical doctors were decreeing that human milk did not 
impart any particularly special advantages, and that ―regular‖ milk was an adequate 
substitute.  The product of this outlook was a rate of breastfeeding that reached an all-
time low in 1971, with just 24 percent of mothers breastfeeding at least once before 
being discharged from the hospital.  Since 1971, the rate of breastfeeding has 
―inexplicably receded and surged‖ as various movements and efforts, including the 
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women‘s movement of the 1970s, attempted to ―rekindle‖ interest in breastfeeding 
(Wolf 2003: 2004).  Nevertheless, the difference between the NSFG 1976 estimate of 
breastfeeding prevalence and the more recent measure from 2002 is substantial: while 
38.2 percent of ever-married women 15 to 44 years of age reported breastfeeding at all 
in 1973, the overall rate of breastfeeding initiation increased to 67 percent in 2002 
(Hirschman 1979; Chandra et al. 2005).   
Despite this significant increase, breastfeeding initiation is not the only important 
factor; duration is also extremely important.  According to the American Academy of 
Pediatrics, it is recommended that virtually all infants be breastfed for the first year of 
life, and exclusively so for the first six months (Chandra et al. 2005: 26).  In 1973, only 
13 percent of ever-married women aged 15 to 44 reported breastfeeding their first child 
for more than 3 months, without specific mention of whether the breastfeeding was 
exclusive, and with the percentage decreasing with subsequent births (Hirschman 1979).  
As of 2002, just 17 percent of women reported adhering to the recommendation of the 
American Academy of Pediatrics.  According to Wolf (2003), this is a reflection of the 
current custom to supplement breast milk with formula early in an infant‘s life, 
discontinuing breastfeeding altogether after just a few weeks or months.  Accordingly, 
53 percent of mothers now introduce formula before their babies are a week old, 68 
percent do so by 2 months, and 81 percent by 4 months of age, with less than 5 percent 
of American mothers claiming to be still breastfeeding their baby when the child 
becomes one year of age (Wolf 2003: 2005).  
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Even by 1973, the incidence of breastfeeding varied according to particular 
characteristics.  Namely, the results of the NSFG Cycle I suggested that it was ―most 
common among relatively advantaged women in society,‖ that is, women with college 
degrees and women working in high-status white-collar occupations.  About half of such 
women reported having breast fed their first baby, with nearly a fifth doing so for three 
months or more (Hirschman 1979: 12).  Interestingly, the same trend is still evident 
today: 2002 NSFG data reveal that college-educated mothers are far more likely to 
initiate breastfeeding, with 84 percent of college-educated mothers doing so compared to 
50 percent of mothers with less than a high school education (Chandra et al. 2005: 27).  
Similarly, subgroups that have met or are most near to meeting the breastfeeding goals 
set by ―Healthy People 2010‖ include Whites and Hispanics, mothers aged 30 to 44, 
those with college educations, and those with higher incomes (Chandra et al. 2005).   
 Despite medical evidence heralding breastfeeding as ―preventative medicine at its 
best,‖ rates of exclusive breastfeeding—touted to be the best for both mother and child—
and extended durations of breastfeeding, remain lower than what is considered ideal (Wolf 
2003: 2006).  Yet within the context of below-replacement fertility, it is important to 
consider the effects of successful efforts to promote breastfeeding.  Taking the pregnancy-
inhibiting consequence of exclusive breastfeeding into account, would not higher levels of 
breastfeeding result in even lower levels of fertility?  After all, if breastfeeding becomes 
more widespread among the populations that typically have higher rates of fertility—such 
as the Hispanic population—isn‘t it feasible that the fertility level could experience a 
noticeable decline?  The answers to these questions are contingent upon a key factor: 
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contraception use.  As Hirschman pointed out in the late 70s, ―to the extent that 
breastfeeding previously provided some protection against unwanted and untimely 
pregnancy by its suppression of ovulation, that protection must now be foregone or 
provided by some other contraceptive means‖ (1979: 7).  In other words, women who are 
not seeking to get pregnant are also women not relying on breastfeeding to operate as a 
contraceptive.  Thus, any protection from pregnancy afforded by breastfeeding is nearly 
obsolete—assuming, of course, the proper employment of effective contraceptives.       
 
Deliberate Marital Fertility Control    
 As with the case in South Korea, change in the level of marital fertility among 
U.S. women has been cited as a key factor influencing the decline in the TFR.  
Specifically, as noted above, 83 percent of the decline in the TFR between 1961 and 
1975 has been attributed to decline in marital fertility (Gibson 1976: 252).  The level of 
marital fertility is oftentimes inextricably tied to the employment of deliberate marital 
fertility control, a significant determinant of which is the underlying level of 
contraceptive usage.  After all, if women only desire a small number of children, they 
―must spend approximately three decades of their reproductive lives trying to avoid an 
unintended pregnancy‖ (Becker et al. 2007: 206).  Their ability to do so has undergone 
notable change over the past several decades.  While many of the significant changes 
surrounding contraception usage in South Korea took place in relation to national family 
planning programs and efforts, the overwhelming majority of change in the United 
States has been related, instead, to developments in legislation.  
 151 
 The first birth control pill, known as Enovid, was approved by the FDA on May 
9, 1960.  Its release granted U.S. women ―unprecedented freedom to plan childbearing 
and their careers‖ (Bailey 2006: 289).  Nevertheless, this freedom was only available to 
some until Griswold v. Connecticut in 1965 had the effect of legalizing contraception 
(Shorto 2006).  Indeed, the period of time during which these decisions were occurring 
was one of great social, legal, and economic change, including ―the resurgence of the 
women‘s movement, the spread of labor-saving household technologies, the enactment 
and increasing enforcement of antidiscrimination legislation, and the social unrest 
associated with the Civil Rights Movement and Vietnam‖ (Bailey 2006: 290).  Within 
this context, the effects of legalized contraception—and the birth control pill in 
particular—had widespread effects:  for example, the ability to delay childbearing 
allowed women to stay in school longer, pursue longer-term careers, and engage in labor 
force participation during ages more commonly associated with childrearing; 
meanwhile, among college women, oral contraception was tied to a later age at first 
marriage and greater representation in nontraditional and professional occupations 
(Bailey 2006: 317).   
Bailey offers remarkable insights into the significance of the introduction of the 
birth control pill by highlighting three critical ways in which it ―revolutionized the 
technology of birth control‖:  
First, the pill constituted the female contraceptive.  A woman could 
independently decide to take the pill; it did not require the consent or knowledge 
of men or discomfort to either party during sex.  The pill transferred control of 
contraception, which had long resided with men, to women who bore the high 
physical and opportunity costs of childbearing.  Second, the pill divorced the 
decision to use contraception from the time of intercourse.  This lowered the 
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marginal costs of preventing births during sex to zero and shifted decisions about 
contraception to times separate from the act of intimacy.  Third, the pill‘s 
effectiveness far exceeded that of all other methods available in 1960.  Whereas 
most couples regarded pregnancy risk as part of the costs of intercourse, oral 
contraception virtually eliminated concerns about unwanted conception (2006: 
295-296).  
 
Essentially, oral contraceptives gave women control over their reproductive choices and 
paths in a convenient and private manner.   
 Despite such benefits, not all segments of society were happy with the 
developments surrounding the release of the birth control pill.  In 1968, an encyclical by 
Pope Paul VI served to establish an anti-contraception attitude among many Catholics.  
It ―forbade ‗any action which either before, at the moment of or after sexual intercourse, 
is specifically intended to prevent procreation‘‖ (Shorto 2006).  Whereas Protestants and 
other non-Catholics were still able to partake in various forms of birth control under a 
―general society-wide acceptance,‖ this Catholic approach slowly ebbed into other 
spheres of Christianity.  Typically, the use of contraception was associated with an 
―antichild mind-set‖ or as ―worrisome in terms of respecting life‖ (Shorto 2006). 
 Despite religious opposition, another critical legal landmark was reached in 1976 
when the Supreme Court determined in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. 
Danforth that ―the higher age of legal majority [was] inapplicable to the prescription of 
oral contraception‖ because states did not possess a ―‗compelling interest‘ in using age 
as the sole criterion under which to regulate contraceptive access‖ (Bailey 2006: 301).  
Ultimately, there were three main effects of opening the birth control pill to early access 
that revolved around reducing the costs of childbearing and increasing the returns to 
pursuing careers:  
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(1) Reducing the cost of delaying pregnancy in order to make career investments, 
as young women could now stay in the labor market or educational 
institutions, invest in their careers, and be sexually active without the risk of 
pregnancy; 
(2) Increasing the expected lifetime returns to career investments by allowing 
women to control when and how often she would leave the labor force for 
purposes of childbearing; and 
(3) Increasing labor supply among women who may be willing to work to help 
their husbands gain more education or progress in their careers, without any 
real career aspirations of their own (Bailey 2006).  
Such newfound opportunity, in conjunction with the women‘s rights movement, allowed 
women to determine what kind of family life and career paths they wanted, while granting 
them the tools to achieve these goals.  Logically, by maximizing career opportunities and 
significantly minimizing unwanted pregnancies, the natural outcome would be a 
considerable depressing effect on total fertility.  For these reasons, it is even more imperative 
that changes in women‘s contraceptive behaviors from the 1970s to the 2000s be considered.  
As far as general contraceptive usage is concerned (see Table 12), the United 
States witnessed a slighter increase than South Korea between the 1970s and the 2000s 
among married women ages 15 to 49.  Once again, it is important to note that the data 
from 1973 and 2002 are not exactly comparable: the sample in 1973 consisted of women 
strictly from the coterminous United States.  Regardless, it is believed that the directions 
of the trends are correct, though the extent of the difference as measured by percent 
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Table 12. Contraception Usage (in percentages) Among Currently Married Women 
Ages 15-49, By Method: United States, 1973 and 2002  
Type of Contraception 1973 2002 % Change 
Any method 69.6 72.9 4.7 
Any modern method 48.2 68.5 42.1 
Any traditional method 21.4 4.3 -79.9 
  Pill 25.1 17.2 -31.5 
  IUD 6.7 1.9 -71.6 
  Condom 9.4 12.0 27.7 
  Sterilization (male) 7.8 11.2 43.6 
  Sterilization (female) 8.6 21.7 152.3 
  Periodic abstinence 2.8 1.3 -53.6 
  Withdrawal 1.5 3.0 100.0 
Note: % Change = (2002 value – 1973 value)/1973 value * 100 
Sources: Ford 1979; Mosher et al. 2004 
 
change may not be exact.     
 For the available data, the most notable development in overall trends between  
1973 and 2002 is the decrease in usage of traditional methods: whereas 21.4 percent of 
percent of married women ages 15 to 49 relied upon traditional methods of contraception 
in 1973, this rate had decreased to 4.3 percent by 2002, representing a decline of about 
80 percent.  The causes of this dramatic change are certainly tied to the effective 
legalization of contraception that had taken place less than a decade prior in conjunction 
with the women‘s movement, which would have encouraged women to employ more 
modern and effective methods of contraception—such as the birth control pill—in order 
to take their fertility into their own hands.  Despite this significant decrease, the overall 
usage of contraception among married women as measured by those using ―any method‖ 
increased only slightly, from 69.6 percent in 1973 to 72.9 percent in 2002.  This suggests 
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that by 1973, acceptance of contraception was already fairly widespread, and that any 
alterations in contraceptive behavior had more to do with the development of new, more 
effective methods.   
 As was the case in South Korea, the most significant percent change in rate of 
usage took place specifically in the utilization of female sterilization.  Usage of this 
method increased from 8.6 percent of married women ages 15 to 49 in 1973 to 21.7 
percent in 2002—an increase of 152.3 percent—which makes it the most commonly 
used form of contraception by married women in both the United States and South 
Korea.  Male sterilization also increased, though to a much slighter degree: whereas 7.8 
percent of currently married women were relying on their husband‘s sterilization to 
prevent pregnancy in 1973, this rate had increased by 43.6 percent to 11.2 percent in 
2002.  To some, it may appear unusual that such a seemingly dramatic method of 
contraception as sterilization, which requires surgery and is effectively permanent, 
would find such popularity.  However, Mosher and Bachrach address such qualms by 
offering this compelling explanation:   
Why has sterilization, especially female sterilization, become so popular?  First, 
the experience of an unintended pregnancy, whether it results in an unplanned 
birth or an abortion, is probably one reason why so many couples choose 
sterilization, with its minimal failure rate.  Second, many women wish to avoid 
the side effects associated with reversible methods.  (Such a concern may seem 
excessive, given the health data, but is nonetheless genuine.)  Third, many 
couples have had all the children they want at a surprisingly young age and 
typically face 15 or more years in which they want to avoid any further 
pregnancies… While the initial cost of sterilization is higher than that of other 
methods, it is often covered by insurance.  When averaged over many years, its 
long-term costs are relatively low.  Thus, couples may view sterilization as 
providing permanent, coitus-independent protection from unwanted pregnancy at 
low cast and with no worry about side effects (1996: 6).   
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These reasons are especially convincing when it is considered that it is only among 
married women that sterilization is the most commonly employed method of 
contraception.  Among all women in 2002, the birth control pill was the leading method 
of contraception with approximately 19% of women reporting current usage.  
Meanwhile, female sterilization came in second among all women aged 15 to 44 at a 
current usage rate of 17 percent (Mosher et al. 2004).  This is particularly interesting 
given that among married women, usage of the birth control pill actually underwent a 
31.5 percent decline, from 25.1 percent of women in 1973 to 17.2 percent in 2002.  This 
slight discrepancy between the behaviors of all women versus married women is 
certainly intriguing, but unfortunately it cannot be compared with the data from 1973 
which were not collected for childless single women.  Yet it seems likely that married 
women would have a higher propensity to become sterilized based on their membership 
in a supposedly committed and enduring relationship, which in theory allows them not 
only the freedom to have all the children that they want, but also to stop permanently 
without fear of recourse over potentially lost opportunities.  Single women, on the other 
hand, are probably both less likely to already have children—let alone the total number 
that they desire—and are therefore less likely to find a technically irreversible surgical 
procedure an appealing prospect when a daily pill will do.   
The second largest percentage increase was, interestingly, among women relying 
on withdrawal for contraception, which increased by 100 percent.  However, it is 
important to note that the reason behind this significant percentage increase was the 
 157 
originally very low rate: it increased from 1.5 percent to 3.0 percent, effectively 
doubling despite the very small increase in the number of women relying on this method.   
 In addition to these overall changes, there are also many noteworthy differences 
in contraception utilization by demographic characteristics.  For example, it has been 
found that women of higher socioeconomic status are more likely to use contraception 
and less likely to experience contraceptive failure or unintended pregnancy than women 
of lower socioeconomic status (Frost, Singh, and Finer 2007).  This is often due to 
differences in educational attainment, implying a greater knowledge of effective usage 
of modern methods of contraception, and higher incomes which enables women to more 
easily bear the sometimes costly expenses of contraception.   
Another frequently identified area of discrepancy in terms of contraception usage 
is that of religion.  There are three conditions on the part of a religious organization that 
have been cited as producing religious effects on fertility: 
(1) The dissemination of norms about specific fertility-related behaviors; 
(2) The ability to enforce conformity to these norms through either social 
influence or sanctions; and 
(3) The ability to foster a strong sense of religious solidarity, establishing 
religion as a central aspect of individuals‘ identities (McQuillan 2004).  
As discussed above, closely following the legalization of contraception and the release 
of the birth control pill, the Catholic Church made its official anti-contraception stance 
known.  One might expect that, as a result, Catholic women would easily have lower 
rates of usage than women of other religious backgrounds.  This seems particularly 
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likely based on the mid-20
th
 century trend of higher birthrates among Catholics as 
compared to Protestants; a trend which continued into the later 1960s, ultimately ending 
by the 1980s (Mosher and Bachrach 1996).  As it turns out, married Catholic women in 
1973 were less likely than Protestant women to be currently using contraception: while 
66.4 percent of Catholic women reported using contraception, 70.6 percent of Protestant 
women were doing so.  However, it is interesting to note that when we use 2002 data and 
compare all Roman Catholic women to U.S. women in general, being Catholic has very 
little effect on contraception usage.  It was found that the Roman Catholic women had 
patterns of contraception usage that were very similar to those of U.S. women in general, 
but were slightly more likely to be currently using the birth control pill: 19.6 percent of 
Catholic women reported doing so, compared to 18.9 percent of U.S. women in general.  
However, Catholic women were slightly less likely to employ surgical sterilization either 
for themselves or their partners, with 17.5 percent of Catholics doing so compared to 
19.2 percent of all U.S. women.  Finally, in terms of condom usage, Catholic women and 
U.S. women had approximately equal rates of utilization (Ohlendorf and Fehring 2007).  
Unfortunately, it is difficult to draw conclusions from this general change in trends 
alone.  Assuming that the Catholic Church has continued to disseminate its views on 
contraception to the same degree, it could mean, for instance, that they are either losing 
their ability to enforce conformity to their norms, or that Catholicism has lost some 
amount of salience with regards to individuals‘ identities. Without further research on 
the other characteristics of these women, it is impossible to say for sure. But sociological 
research by Andrew Greeley (1993) suggests both factors as significant.  All that can be 
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said is that being Catholic does not appear to have the same depressing effect on 
contraceptive usage or, for that matter, on fertility that it once did. 
    In South Korea, a series of family planning programs at the national level have 
had serious implications for trends in fertility, especially with respect to deliberate 
marital fertility control.  As already mentioned, legislation seems to have played a 
greater role in the contraceptive behaviors of women in the United States.  Yet this is not 
meant to suggest that national family planning programs do not exist in the United 
States; they simply take a different form than those in South Korea, typically as non-
government family planning organizations.  Of these, perhaps the best known is Planned 
Parenthood.  The Planned Parenthood Federation of America has worked for over 90 
years to promote ―a commonsense approach to women‘s health and well-being, based on 
respect for each individual‘s right to make informed, independent decisions about health, 
sex, and family planning‖ (Planned Parenthood n.d.).  Indeed it was the Planned 
Parenthood Federation of America that, in 1959, funded a reproductive physiologist 
(Gregory Pincus) and a gynecology professor (John Rock) to develop a simple and 
effective oral contraceptive that was then marketed in 1960 as the first birth control pill 
(Poston and Bouvier 2010). To meet the above mandate, the Planned Parenthood 
Federation these days not only operates 850 health centers across the country, but is 
responsible for widespread media campaigns and massive efforts to achieve its goals on 
an international scale.  Over the years, Planned Parenthood has been associated with the 
passage of virtually all legislation dealing with fertility and reproductive health.  
According to their website, each year: 
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 Over three million women, men, and teens are served in their affiliate health 
centers nationwide;  
 Over 1.2 million teens and adults receive medically accurate sex education 
from their affiliates; 
 Approximately one million women, men, and teens in other countries have 
their reproductive health needs met through their international programs;  
 Over 15 million people around the world turn to their websites for Planned 
Parenthood services, information, and opportunities for involvement; and 
 Over four million supporters, activists, and donors heed their call to take a 
stand on behalf of reproductive health and freedom (Planned Parenthood n.d.). 
While the Planned Parenthood organization does not necessarily have the clout or legal 
authority of a government-mandated program of the South Korean type, their influence 
is undeniably effective and widespread. 
Contraception is commonly utilized when pregnancy is perceived as an obstacle 
to the achievement of goals, or an otherwise undesired event.  However, it is clear that in 
some cases, pregnancy occurs anyway.  While some unplanned pregnancies result in live 
births, this is not always the outcome.  The next section discusses one of the other 
possibilities: induced abortion.   
 
Induced Abortion 
 Abortion became increasingly available during the same period of social  
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transformation in the 1960s and 1970s as described above by Bailey (2006).  
Undoubtedly, young women‘s access to contraception and abortion had far-reaching 
effects on their lives.  Yet abortion is arguably the most controversial form of deliberate 
marital fertility control in the United States.  Entrenched in a religious and moral dispute 
over when ―life‖ starts and at what point a human being‘s rights begin, the topic of 
abortion has been hotly debated for the past forty years.  However, much earlier in the 
nation‘s history, abortions before a certain pregnancy duration were ―both legal and 
commonplace, often performed by midwives‖ (Toobin 2009).  During the nineteenth 
century, this began to change as medical professionals fought for control of health care 
and used the opposition of abortion as a means to achieve this goal.  Subsequently, by 
1868 thirty-six states had passed restrictive abortion laws, with the rest of the states to 
follow shortly thereafter (Krannich 1980).  At the start of the following century, abortion 
was nearly universally illegal across the United States, with strict exceptions made for 
therapeutic abortions.  By the mid-1960s, approximately 8,000 legal abortions were 
occurring annually, with a total of  from 300,000 to 2,000,000 illegal abortions estimated 
to have taken place (Krannich 1980). 
Though the feminist movement in the 1970s made monumental efforts to 
decriminalize abortion, resulting in the 1973 Supreme Court ruling in Roe v. Wade 
prohibiting states from outlawing it (Toobin 2009), a stigma has persisted around the 
procedure.  Recently, so-called ―conscience clauses‖ have evolved to essentially grant 
medical professionals in receipt of certain federal funds the right to refuse to perform 
abortions if in conflict with their personal religious beliefs or moral convictions (Toobin 
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2009).  However, as Toobin states, abortion itself ―is almost as old as childbirth.  There 
has always been a need for some women to end their pregnancies‖ (2009).  
Subsequently, it is interesting to examine how women‘s use of abortion has varied over 
these past decades in order to assess the extent of its effect on total fertility. 
 Prior to the late 1960s, data on the rates, ratios, and distributions of abortion are 
limited and questionable at best.  As Krannich states, ―the most that can be said on the 
basis of available data is that abortion in the United States certainly did not decline with 
the implementation of laws and policies restricting legal access to induced pregnancy 
termination‖ (1980: 366).  The liberalization of abortion laws has brought about marked 
improvements in data collection over the years.  For example, the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) began systematically compiling annual abortion data in 
1969 in what they called an annual surveillance of legal abortions, which continues to be 
published to the present day.  The Alan Guttmacher Institute began to collect data from 
abortion providers in 1973 to provide additional data (Krannich 1980).  Despite this 
progress, there is still much concern about the underreporting of abortions that is tied to 
the stigmatized nature of the act.  Jones and Kost identify a number of reasons why 
women may underreport induced abortion, such as the belief that abortion is immoral, 
guilt concerning the termination of the pregnancy, fear that they will be regarded with 
censure, or embarrassment stemming from the feeling that ―the inability to prevent an 
unwanted pregnancy is socially blameworthy‖ (2007: 194). 
Analyses of nationally representative samples of women in the United States, 
such as the NSFG, have estimated that anywhere from 35 to 59 percent of abortions that 
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occur are actually reported (Jones and Kost 2007).  In particular, Black women, low-
income women, unmarried women, and occasionally Hispanic women have been found 
to have higher rates of underreporting.  This can cause a number of issues identified by 
Jones and Kost, including: 
(1) Inaccurate measurement of commonly used demographic measures, such as 
pregnancy rates, levels of unintended pregnancy, and contraceptive method 
failure rates; 
(2) Complications for research in which abortion is a key independent variable 
used to predict specific outcomes, such as depression, generalized anxiety 
disorder, or substance abuse; and 
(3)   Inaccurate or misleading associations between abortion and other outcomes 
could be drawn (2007: 188). 
Currently, some of these problems could be addressed by further research in the area of 
reliable predictors of underreporting, and the ability to compensate statistically for them.  
However, in the long run, it would be more valuable to target the stigma surrounding 
abortion, and to encourage women to open up about their experiences. 
 The CDC abortion surveillance system mentioned above consists of data 
tabulated annually from the fifty states, the District of Columbia, and New York City.  It 
provides the total number of abortions by a wide variety of characteristics, as reported by 
the central health agency of each reporting area.  A considerable limitation to this 
otherwise comprehensive system is the fact that the reporting of abortion data by the 
central health agencies is on a voluntary basis.  As a result, the completeness of the 
 164 
information obtained varies from year to year.  In 2006, the year in which the following 
data were collected, 49 of the 52 reporting areas shared their information (CDC 2009).  
Because it is equally likely that the 1976 data—also based on the results of a CDC 
Abortion Surveillance—suffered from such limitations, it must once again be said that 
the trends described below are believed to be accurate, while the extent of the trends or 
differences over time may not be exact. 
 According to the CDC, 1,179,300 abortions were reported in 1976, as compared 
to 846,181 in 2006.  This represents a decline of about 28.2 percent.  This decline is 
particularly evident when change is analyzed according to age group (see Figure 6). It is 
easy to identify that the most dramatic changes took place among the 15 to 19 and 20 to 
24-year-old groups; the decrease from nearly 363 thousand in 1976 to just over 121 
thousand in 2006 among 15 to 19-year-olds represented a decline of about 66.6 percent, 
while the drop from approximately 392 thousand to 240 thousand among 20 to 24-year-
olds was a nearly 39 percent decline.  In reality, women under the age of 15 also 
experienced a significant percentage decline of over 75 percent during this time frame; 
however, because abortions among this age group are so relatively uncommon to begin 
with, the actual numeric change was only about 12 thousand fewer abortions, as 
compared to nearly 242 thousand among the 15 to 19-year-olds and about 152 thousand 
among the 20 to 24-year-olds.   
 Whereas the overall trend in the number of abortions is certainly negative, an 
intriguing difference may be found among the two oldest age groups: 35 to 39-year-olds 
and those aged 40 or over.  In both cases, there was actually a slight increase in the total  
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Figure 6. Number of Legal Abortions by Age Group: United States, 1976 and 2006 
Sources: Forrest, Sullivan, and Tietze 1979; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2009 
 
 
number of abortions between 1976 and 2006.  This increase was most pronounced 
among the 35 to 39-year-olds, which is also more significant considering that the age 
group is not open ended (even though pregnancies, and thus abortions, above the age 49 
are extremely rare).  Among this group, the number of abortions increased from 
approximately 57 thousand to 65 thousand, or about 15 percent.  From a purely 
speculative standpoint, it may be that the older a woman gets, the less she expects to get 
pregnant, and the more likely she is to either forgo contraception or experience a 
contraceptive failure, leading in some cases to ultimate termination of the pregnancy. 
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Even though these overall changes come across as fairly straightforward, what is 
not evident is the sharp increase in the number of abortions that took place following its 
legalization in 1973.  According to the CDC, the rate of abortions peaked in the 1980s, 
and has since ―declined at a slow but steady pace, but with considerable variation across 
demographic populations‖ (2009: 2).  This variation is already evident by age, when 
considering that the number of abortions has actually increased slightly among the two 
oldest age cohorts.  Further examples of this variation can be found in Table 13, which  
 
Table 13. Number and Percentage Distribution of Legal Abortions by Selected 
Characteristics: United States, 1976 and 2006 
Characteristic 1976 2006 1976 (%) 2006 (%)** 
Total  1,179,300 846,181* 100.0 100.0 
Race     
White 784,890 335,989 66.6 55.8 
Non-White 394,410 266,348 33.4 44.2 
Marital Status     
Married 290,030 103,214 24.6 16.5 
Unmarried 889,270 534,603 75.4 83.5 
Previous live births     
0 562,610 249,485 47.7 41.3 
1 244,430 159,458 20.7 26.4 
2 181,520 117,929 15.4 19.5 
3 97,690 49,903 8.3 8.3 
4 or more 93,050 25,938 7.9 4.4 
Previous Abortions     
0 911,320 342,964 77.3 55.2 
1 213,240 158,628 18.1 25.5 
2 40,400 69,606 3.4 11.2 
3 or more 14,340 48,325 1.2 8.0 
*Some abortions were registered without data on particular characteristics.  For this reason, the 
number of abortions in each category will not add up to the total number of abortions.  
**Percentage of 2006 values represents percentage of known values for each characteristic.   
Sources: Forrest, Sullivan, and Tietze 1979; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2009 
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presents the number and percentage distribution of legal abortions according to several 
different characteristics.  Among the categories of race, marital status, and previous live 
births, the overall number of abortions declined for all groups.  Yet when considered in 
terms of how the percentage of total abortions for each group has changed, it becomes 
apparent that there are differences by sub-category.  For instance, though total abortions 
for both Whites and non-Whites decreased over the period of 1976 to 2006, the 
percentage of total abortions by race among Whites decreased by about 16 percent, 
while increasing among non-Whites by just over 32 percent.  Similarly, among the 
married and unmarried, abortions overall declined, though the percentage of total 
abortions obtained decreased 33 percent for married women and increased almost 11 
percent for unmarried women to 16.5 and 83.5 percent respectively.  In other words, the 
vast majority of abortions are still obtained by the unmarried, and that percentage has 
increased since the 1970s.   
With respect to previous experiences, the trend for previous live births follows 
the same pattern as that of race and marriage: despite the overall decline in the number 
of abortions, an increase in the percentage of total abortions took place among women 
with 1 or 2 births, while a percentage decrease took place among women with 4 or more 
previous births, or no births at all (women with 3 previous births experienced no change 
in their percentage).  Despite these changes, the greatest percentage of abortions 
continues to take place among women with no previous births, with a smaller percentage 
taking place with each increase in parity.  It is among trends in abortions based on the 
number of previous abortions that things are a little bit different: this is the only instance 
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in which, among two of the categories, there has been an overall increase: the number of 
abortions for women with 2 prior abortions increased from 40,400 in 1976 to 69,606 in 
2006, representing an increase of 72.3 percent.  At the same time, the number of 
abortions among women with 3 or more previous abortions increased by 237 percent 
from 14,340 to 48,325.  In terms of the percentage of total abortions, women with no 
previous abortions declined in representation 28.6 percent from 77.3 percent of all 
abortions in 1976 to 55.2 percent in 2006.  Each of the other three groups—one, two, 
and three or more previous abortions—experienced a resultant increase, to 25.5, 11.2, 
and 8.0 percent of total abortions, respectively.  Thus, while the numbers of abortions by 
women in the latter two groups were unique in that they increased, they still constitute a 
combined total of just 18.2 percent of all abortions.   
A final characteristic by which the level of abortions is often examined is the 
weeks of gestation at which the abortion takes place (see Figure 7).  Socially, this is a 
very contentious issue because of the debate surrounding the experiences the fetus is 
believed to have at varying stages of fetal development.  Regardless, it is clear that the 
vast majority of abortions in both 1976 and 2006 took place at 8 weeks‘ gestation or 
less: 47.4 percent in 1976 and 62 percent in 2006.  What this means is that not only are 
women having fewer abortions than they did in 1976, but they are having them at earlier 
stages of the pregnancy.  Figure 7 also makes it clear that among abortions in 2006, there 
is the sharpest decrease in percentage between a gestation time of 8 weeks or less and 9 
to 10 weeks, after which there is a steady decline over the duration of pregnancy.  
Meanwhile, the decline since 1976 has been fairly steady from the 8 weeks or less 
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Figure 7. Percent Distribution of Legal Abortions by Weeks of Gestation: United 
States, 1976 and 2006 
Sources: Forrest, Sullivan, and Tietze 1979; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2009 
 
category through 13 to 15 weeks, at which there was a very slight increase (from 4.2 
percent of all abortions to 4.7) before it declined again for gestations of 21 weeks or 
greater.   
An interesting overall distinction between the use of abortion for deliberate 
fertility control in the United States as compared to South Korea is the way that 
abortions in the United States are essentially divorced from the issue of sex preference.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, many women in South Korea prefer sons, and 
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sometimes elect to have an abortion if they determine the fetus they are carrying is 
female.  In the United States, no such overwhelming son preference exists, as 
demonstrated by the very stable sex ratios over the past decades (Poston 2005).  In other 
words, U.S. women either have a balanced gender preference, or do not resort to 
techniques like sex-selective abortion to manipulate the sex of their children if a personal 
preference exists.   
This chapter has examined how the proximate determinants have changed in the 
United States over time by taking an in-depth look at each determinant, one by one, at 
the sub-national level.  In the next chapter, I will undertake a quantitative analysis of the 
impact over time of the four proximate determinants on the fertility levels of both South 
Korea and the United States. 
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CHAPTER VI 
AN APPLICATION OF THE PROXIMATE DETERMINANTS MODEL TO 
TWO NATIONS OVER TIME 
 
This chapter analyses the impacts of the four key proximate determinants on the 
fertility levels of both South Korea and the United States over time. I follow here the 
general style of Knodel and his associates (1987) in their study of fertility decline in 
Thailand.  (See Chapter II for a more comprehensive description of this work, and 
Chapters IV and V for a consideration of the changing effects of the proximate 
determinants on the course of fertility over time in South Korea and the United States, 
respectively).   
As demonstrated in the previous chapters, the proportion of women married, 
contraceptive use and effectiveness, the prevalence of induced abortion, and the duration 
of postpartum infecundability have all undergone varying degrees of change over the last 
several decades in both South Korea and the United States.  It stands to reason that the 
influence of each on the total fertility rate (TFR) would have also varied over this period 
of time.  To determine the extent of change in the relationship between each determinant 
and the TFR, the quantitative index for each may be calculated and substituted into 
Equation 1, first introduced in Chapter II:  
TFR = Cm x Cc x Ca x Ci x TF    (1) 
This calculation not only provides, as Bongaarts explained, ―an approximate breakdown 
of the contributions made by [the] different intermediate variables to levels and trends in 
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fertility‖ (1982: 184), but it also makes possible the determination of the overall 
explanatory power of the four determinants in these two below-replacement fertility 
contexts; this is so because it facilitates a comparison within each of the two countries 
between the TFR estimated by this equation and the value of TFR calculated 
independently from the fertility data.  Accordingly, following Bongaarts (1982), the 
quantitative indices were computed like so: 
 
The Index of Marriage 
 The marriage index (Cm) represents the influence of membership in a marital or 
consensual union, and the resulting sexual exposure, on fertility.  When it has a value of 1, it 
indicates that all women of reproductive ages are in such a union, while a value of 0 
indicates that no women are in a marital or consensual union.  The equation for this index is: 
     Cm = Σ m(a) g(a)/Σ g(a)     (2) 
where 
m(a) = age-specific proportions currently married (or in consensual union) 
among females; and 
g(a) = age-specific marital fertility rates. 
Thus, to calculate it necessitated identifying both the proportions married by age as well 
as age-specific marital fertility rates. Because the latter is not always available, 
Bongaarts and Potter (1983) advise that age-specific marital fertility rates can be 
obtained instead by dividing the age-specific fertility rate by the proportion of women 
currently married in each age group.  The only caveat for employing this approach arises 
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for the 15 to 19 cohort, whose results can be ―erratic‖ because of small errors in the 
proportion married that translate into large errors in the age-specific marital fertility rate.  
Additionally, Bongaarts and Potter point out that the majority of married women in this 
age group are actually the 18 and 19-year-olds, and are therefore not representative of 
the entire age group.  To address this issue, they offer a special equation that calculates 
the age-specific marital fertility rate for the 15 to 19-year-olds based on the value of the 
20 to 24-year-old population: 
g(15-19) = 0.75 x g(20-24)           (6) 
It is important to note, however, that this equation is applied only to the denominator of 
Equation 2 in order to ensure the validity of the calculation of the TFR in Equation 1.  
Table 14 presents the input data used to calculate the index.  Using the adjustment  
 
Table 14. Input Data for Calculation of Index of Marriage: South Korea, 2008, and 
the United States, 2005 
 South Korea United States 
Age Group m(a) g(a) m(a) g(a) 
15-19 0.007 1.7 0.018 41.9 
20-24 0.107 18.2 0.219 105.9 
25-29 0.592 85.6 0.497 116.8 
30-34 0.869 101.6 0.635 97.7 
35-39 0.907 26.5 0.666 47.3 
40-44 0.889 3.2 0.673 9.4 
45-49 0.861 0.2 0.664 0.6* 
*Rate for age group 45-54; because of the low incidence of births above age 49, it is not 
believed that this discrepancy affects the overall calculation of the index of marriage. 
 g(a) = age-specific fertility rate 
 m(a) = age-specific proportion currently married or in consensual union 
 Source: United Nations Population Division 2007b; Hamilton et al. 2007; Statistics Korea 
2009a, 2009b 
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provided by Equation 6 reduces the contribution of the 15-19 group in the numerator 
from 0.095 to 0.012 for South Korea, and from 1.430 to 0.754 for the United States.  The 
resulting index of marriage is 0.713 for South Korea and 0.480 for the United States.   
 
The Index of Contraception 
The contraception index (Cc) represents the influence of deliberate fertility 
control through the use of contraceptives on the level of fertility.  When it has a value of 
1, it indicates that no contraception is being used, while a value of 0 indicates that all 
fecund women of reproductive ages are using completely effective modern methods of 
contraception.  As explained by Bongaarts and Potter, this index ―varies inversely with 
prevalence and use effectiveness of contraception practiced by couples‖ (1983: 82).  
Therefore, the equation for this index is: 
   Cc = 1 – 1.08 * u * e     (3) 
where 
u = proportion currently using contraception among married women of 
reproductive age (male methods, abstinence other than postpartum, and 
sterilizing operations are included); and 
e = average use-effectiveness of contraception; the weighted average of the 
method specific use-effectiveness levels e(m) with the weights equal to the 
proportion of women using a given method, u(m): e = Σ e(m) u(m)/u. 
The 2008 Family Planning Worldwide Data Sheet provided the individual measures of 
the percentage of married women using various methods of contraception.  These 
 175 
became the measures of u in Equation (3).  Ultimately, I used as many types of 
contraception in the equation as I had values for both u and use effectiveness for a given 
country.  However, to calculate the e component of the equation, the average use-
effectiveness of each form of contraception, I adapted measures of failure rates from 
Trussell (2004 and 2007) into success rates by subtracting these values from 100, and 
then dividing by 100 to turn them into a rate.  I opted to use the ―use effectiveness‖ 
instead of the ―theoretical effectiveness‖ failure rates because they provide more valid 
measurements of reality.  ―Use effectiveness‖ refers to how well contraception works in 
actual practice; ―theoretical effectiveness‖ refers instead to what is known in the 
epidemiology literature as efficacy, or how well a contraceptive method works in clinical 
trials (Trussell 2004), i.e., theoretically.  For cases in which Trussell provided more than 
one measure for a type of contraceptive—for instance, giving the failure rate for both 
ParaGard and Mirena (each a type of intrauterine device)—I took the average if the 
values were not identical.  In these cases, the difference was often a matter of but a few 
hundredths of a point.  For the contraceptive practice ―periodic abstinence,‖ also known 
as the ―calendar method‖ or the ―rhythm method,‖ only a theoretical use effectiveness 
rate was available.  Subsequently, the use effectiveness rate for all fertility awareness 
methods, which also includes the ―ovulation method‖ and ―standard days‖ was deemed a 
suitable substitute and used as opposed to dropping the measure entirely.  These values 
are shown in the table in Appendix 1.   
The measures available for South Korea and the United States are shown in 
Table 15.  The United States had data for all categories: the pill, intrauterine device,  
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Table 15. Input Data for Calculation of Index of Contraception: South Korea, 2008, 
and the United States, 2002 
Type of Contraception 
Contraceptive Prevalence 
Use Effectiveness  
South Korea United States 
Any method (u) 0.805 0.729 -- 
Any modern method 0.669 0.685 -- 
Any traditional method 0.136 0.043 0.74 
  Condom 0.151 0.120 0.85 
  Injection n/a 0.022 0.97 
  IUD 0.132 0.019 0.9955 
  Periodic Abstinence n/a 0.013 0.75 
  Pill 0.018 0.172 0.92 
  Sterilization (female) 0.241 0.217 0.995 
  Sterilization (male) 0.127 0.112 0.9985 
  Withdrawal n/a 0.030 0.73 
   n/a = data not available 
   Sources: Clifton, Kaneda, and Ashford 2008; Mosher et al. 2004; Trussell 2004 and 2007 
 
 
injection, male condom, female sterilization, male sterilization, periodic abstinence, and 
withdrawal.  However, South Korea lacked data on injection usage, as well as the 
traditional methods of periodic abstinence and withdrawal.  Because, instead, there was a 
usage rate available for the blanket measure of ―traditional methods,‖ I substituted the 
average of use effectiveness for the two primary traditional methods: withdrawal and the 
calendar method.  This produced an estimated use effectiveness of 0.74 for ―traditional 
methods.‖   
 Then, because e is actually the weighted average of the method specific use-
effectiveness levels with the weights equal to the proportion of women using a given 
method, e was calculated individually for each of the two countries using the formula 
e=Σ e(m) u(m)/u.  The resultant value was 0.92 for South Korea and 0.94 for the United 
States.  Finally, substituting these values into Equation 3 produced an index of 
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contraception for the 2000s of 0.197 in South Korea and 0.263 in the United States.   
 
The Index of Induced Abortion 
The induced abortion index (Ca) represents the influence of deliberate fertility 
control through the use of abortion on the level of fertility.  When it has a value of 1, it 
indicates that no induced abortion is practiced in the population, while a value of 0 
indicates that every pregnancy that occurs is aborted.  According to Bongaarts and 
Potter, ―the number of births averted per induced abortion is strongly related to the 
practice of contraception following the induced abortion.  In the absence of 
contraception, an induced abortion averts about 0.4 births, while about 0.8 births are 
averted when moderately effective contraception is practiced‖ (1983: 85).  This 
relationship is represented by the equation b = 0.4 (1 + u ), where u is equal to the 
prevalence of contraception among all married women, also used in the previous 
calculation for the index of contraception.  The value of b is then substituted into the 
equation for the index of induced abortion as follows 
 
   Ca =          (4) 
where 
TA = total abortion rate, the number of induced abortions per woman at the end 
of the reproductive period if induced abortion rates remain at prevailing 
levels throughout the reproductive period (excluding induced abortions to 
women who are not married). 
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Table 16. Input Data for Calculation of Index of Induced Abortion: South Korea, 
1999, and the United States, 2006 
Age Group 
Age-Specific Abortion Rates 
South Korea United States 
15-19 n/a 0.3 
20-24 53 6.6 
25-29 33 11.2 
30-34 33 8.8 
35-39 12 5.3 
≥40 1 1.7 
Total Abortion Rate 0.66 0.17 
     n/a = data not available 
Total abortion rate = (sum of age-specific abortion rates * 5)/1000 
Sources: Cho 2002 (South Korea only); U.S. rates adapted from Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention 2009 
 
The calculation of the total abortion rate, in turn, necessitates measures of the rate of 
abortion by age (see Table 16).  Because abortion rates by age in the United States were 
only available for all women, these numbers were standardized by the proportion of 
women married in each age group, resulting in the age-specific abortion rates above.  
Inserting these rates into Equation 4 produces an index of induced abortion of 0.711 for 
South Korea and 0.946 for the United States. 
 
The Index of Postpartum Infecundability 
The postpartum infecundability index (Ci) represents the influence of lactation 
and breastfeeding behaviors following birth on the level of fertility.  When it has a value 
of 1, it indicates that no women are experiencing postpartum infecundability—that is, 
there is an absence of lactation—while a value of 0 indicates that all women are 
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experiencing postpartum infecundability—that is, the duration of this period is infinite.  
Essentially, this index is equal to ―the ratio of the [total natural marital fertility rates] in 
the presence and absence of postpartum infecundability caused by breastfeeding or 
abstinence‖ (Bongaarts and Potter 1983: 86).  In order to establish the value of this index 
for a population, it is first necessary to determine the length of the birth interval if no 
breastfeeding or postpartum abstinence are practiced.  According to Bongaarts and 
Potter, this duration is equal to about 20 months, which consists of ―the sum of 1.5 
months of minimum postpartum anovulation, 7.5 months of waiting time to conception, 
2 months of time added by spontaneous intrauterine mortality, and 9 months for a full-
term pregnancy‖ (1983: 86).  Adding in the presence of breastfeeding and postpartum 
abstinence shortens this duration, resulting in a value of 18.5 months.  Subsequently, the 
equation for this index becomes:     
   Ci =         (5) 
where 
i = average duration of postpartum infecundability caused by breastfeeding or 
postpartum abstinence. 
 Because data on the average duration of postpartum infecundability for most 
populations are not available, approximate values are estimated based on the average 
duration of breastfeeding according to an equation supplied by Bongaarts and Potter 
(1983):  
A = 1.753 e 
0.1396 * B – 0.001872 * B2
    (7) 
where  
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i = average duration of postpartum infecundability caused by breastfeeding or 
postpartum abstinence. 
The results of this calculation for South Korea and the United States are presented in 
Table 17.  An average 3.0 months of breastfeeding among women in South Korea 
translates to approximately 2.62 months of postpartum infecundability; that is, each 
additional month of breastfeeding results in less than one additional month of 
postpartum amenorrhea (Bongaarts and Potter 1983).  Similarly, an average of 5.5 
months of breastfeeding among women in the United States translates to approximately 
3.57 months of postpartum infecundability.  Substituting these values into Equation 5 
produces a postpartum infecundability index of 0.947 for South Korea and 0.906 for the 
United States. 
 
The Proximate Determinants Model in Low Fertility Countries 
The quantitative indices developed above for the four primary determinants each 
range from 0 to 1, where 0 represents complete fertility inhibition and 1 represents no  
 
Table 17. Input Data for Calculation of Index of Postpartum Infecundability: South 
Korea, 2003, and the United States, 2006 
Country 
Average Months of  
Breastfeeding 
Average Months of 
Postpartum 
Infecundability (i) 
South Korea 3.0 2.62 
United States 5.5 3.57 
Sources for Average Months of Breastfeeding: Chung, Kim, and Nam 2007; Briefel  
et al. 2004 
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fertility-inhibiting effect of a given intermediate variable.  Accordingly, it is possible to 
see how the higher the value for the four determinants overall, the higher the 
corresponding fertility.  However, because the level of fertility in a population is the 
result of the combination of all four determinants, the effect of one may overwhelm the 
effect of another.  Table 18 presents the values of the following four fertility levels and 
other selected measures calculated with the four indices.  
Based on the results for the model indices, it is apparent that considerable 
changes have taken place among the proximate determinants of both South Korea and 
the United States over the period of the late 1960s/early 1970s and the 2000s.  Upon first 
glance, there is a notable difference between the observed TFRs and the estimated TFRs 
for the 2000s data that appears more extreme than that resulting from Bongaarts‘ own 
estimations.  Whereas Bongaarts‘ estimated TFR for South Korea in 1970 was just 4 
percent lower than the observed TFR, my estimated TFR for South Korea in the 2000s 
of 1.45 was 24 percent higher than the observed TFR, 1.17.  Similarly, Bongaarts‘ 
estimated TFR for the United States in 1967 was only 3 percent lower than the observed 
TFR for that same year, while my estimated TFR for the 2000s of 1.66 was about 20 
percent lower than the observed TFR of 2.07.  In consideration of these differences, it 
seems reasonable to conclude that the proximate determinants model does not do as well 
in predicting the total fertility rate of South Korea and the United States in the 2000s as 
it did back in the late 1960s and early 1970s.   
Examining the changes to each determinant individually offers greater insight 
into the overall difference in fertility over this period of time.  In South Korea, the  
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Table 18. Estimates of Selected Reproductive Measures and Derived Indices of Four 
Proximate Determinants According to Bongaarts’ Model Over Time: South Korea 
and the United States  
 South Korea United States 
1970 2000s 1967 2000s 
Measure     
 Observed Total Fertility Rate (TFR) 3.97 1.17 2.34 2.07 
Total marital fertility rate (TMFR) 6.85 2.03 3.71 3.45 
 Current contraceptive use (u) 0.24 0.805 0.72 0.729 
Total induced abortion rate (TA) 1.5 0.66 1.080 0.17 
Lactational infecundability (i) 11.90 2.62 3.0^ 3.57 
Model Indices     
Index of marriage 
Cm = TMFR/TFR 
0.580 0.714 0.631 0.481 
Index of contraception 
Cc = (1 – 1.08 *u*e) 
0.769 0.197 0.254 0.263 
Index of induced abortion 
Ca = TFR/{TFR + [.4 * (1 + u) * TA]} 
0.820 0.711 0.999 0.946 
Index of lactational infecundability 
Ci = 20/(18.5 + i) 
0.658 0.947 0.930^ 0.906 
Combined Indices 
Cm * Cc * Ca * Ci 
0.241 0.095 0.149 0.108 
Model Estimate of TFR 
Cm * Cc * Ca * Ci * TF 
3.81 1.45 2.27 1.66 
^According to Bongaarts and Potter, figure is approximate. 
Note: Total induced abortion rate for South Korea actually based on data from 1999, which was the 
most recent age-specific abortion data available. 
e = average use-effectiveness of contraception, the weighted average of the method specific use-
effectiveness levels e(m) with the weights equal to the proportion of women using a given method, u(m): 
e = Σ e(m) u(m)/u.  
TF = The Total Fecundity Rate, or the fertility level that occurs when the combined effect of the 
remaining intermediate variables is removed, namely fecundability, spontaneous intrauterine mortality, 
and permanent sterility.  Bongaarts estimated this value to be about 15.3 for all women. 
Sources: 1970 and 1967 data from Bongaarts and Potter 1983  
 
greatest change in percentage points occurred for the index of contraception, revealing 
that the inhibition due to contraceptive prevalence and effectiveness increased from 23 
percent to 80 percent.  A second dramatic change, though less so, occurred with the 
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index of postpartum infecundability, which decreased nearly 30 percentage points from 
34 percent in 1970 to 5 percent in the 2000s.  The change in the index of proportion 
married or in consensual unions was less pronounced, with its inhibiting effect 
decreasing about 13 percentage points from 42 percent to 29 percent.  Finally, the 
inhibition due to induced abortion increased about 11 percentage points from 18 percent 
to 29 percent.  Based on the direction of these changes, it appears that the rate of 
contraception usage and the prevalence of induced abortion were primarily responsible 
for the decrease in the TFR over this time period.  However, these changes—particularly 
for the index of marriage—are quite surprising when considered that they occurred 
counter to the trends witnessed over this period of time.  That is, South Korean women 
were observed to get married later and in slightly smaller proportions in the 2000s than 
they did in the 1970s; thus it would seem to hold that the inhibiting effect of marriage 
would have increased over this time.  Possible explanations for this contradictory result 
will be explored in the ―Discussion‖ section of Chapter VII.   
Ultimately, these changes resulted to a differing order of magnitude regarding the 
extent that each determinant inhibits fertility.  In 1970, the proportion married had the 
strongest inhibiting effect, followed by the average duration of postpartum 
infecundability, contraceptive usage and effectiveness, and induced abortion.  By the 
2000s, contraceptive usage and effectiveness had become the strongest inhibitor, 
followed by induced abortion, the proportion married, and the average duration of 
postpartum infecundability.   
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In the United States, change in the inhibiting effects of the individual 
determinants was less pronounced across the board.  The greatest change in percentage 
points occurred for the index of marriage, revealing that the inhibition due to the 
proportion married or in consensual unions increased 15 percentage points from 37 
percent to 52 percent.  The second largest change took place for the index of induced 
abortion, with the inhibiting effect increasing about 5 percentage points from 0.1 percent 
to 5 percent.  Meanwhile, the inhibiting effects of both postpartum infecundability and 
contraceptive prevalence and effectiveness remained virtually unchanged, with the 
inhibiting effect of postpartum infecundability increasing about 2 percentage points from 
7 percent in 1967 to 9 percent in the 2000s, and the effect of contraception decreasing 
very slightly from 75 percent to 74 percent.   
As with South Korea, not all of the trends follow the direction of change 
suggested by the case study.  In particular, the inhibiting effect of contraceptive usage 
decreased slightly, even though the usage rate, particularly among modern methods, by 
American women increased between 1960 and the 2000s.  This trend will also be 
explored in greater detail in the ―Discussion‖ section of the following chapter.  However, 
unlike the case of South Korea, the changes observed over time did not contribute to a 
different order of magnitude in the extent that each determinant inhibits fertility.  In both 
1967 and the 2000s, contraceptive use and effectiveness had the strongest inhibiting 
effect, followed by the proportion married or in consensual unions, the average duration 
of postpartum infecundability, and the prevalence of induced abortion.   
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Another way to interpret the change over time in the proximate determinants is 
by assessing the proportion of change in the total fertility rate that is due to changes in 
each determinant.  This may well be the most interesting analysis of my dissertation. 
Figure 8 illustrates this concept by representing the proportion change in the 
determinants between the late 1960s/early 1970s and the 2000s, as well as the overall 
proportion change in the TFR over that period.  It is useful for seeing both the direction 
and extent of the proportion change for each proximate determinant.  For South Korea, 
the TFR underwent a decrease of 62 percent.  However, on an individual basis, the 
 
 
Figure 8. Proportion of Change in Total Fertility Rate Due to Changes in the 
Proximate Determinants of Fertility: South Korea, 1970-2000s and the United 
States, 1967-2000s 
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change to the index of contraception was greater, decreasing almost 75 percent.  Change 
to the index of postpartum infecundability was second greatest, though in the opposite 
direction, increasing by about 44 percent.  Meanwhile, the indices of marriage and 
induced abortion underwent slighter changes over time, with the index of marriage 
increasing by 23 percent and the index of induced abortion decreasing by 13 percent.   
It is interesting to note that because among the four determinants, two experienced 
increases while the other two experienced decreases over this same period of time, the 
already significant overall change in the TFR was not as extreme as it otherwise would 
have been.  That is, the inhibiting effects on fertility of the proportion married and the 
duration of postpartum infecundability decreased, while the inhibiting effects of 
contraception and abortion increased.  It was changes to contraceptive prevalence and 
effectiveness and the utilization of induced abortion that resulted in the overall TFR  
declining so precipitously.  Yet if the inhibiting effect of marriage had increased—
indicating that fewer women were entering into consensual unions and thus exposing 
themselves to the risk of pregnancy (which, as discussed briefly above, is actually what 
happened)—than the TFR might be even lower than it is.  Similarly, if a greater number of 
women had decided to breastfeed their infants, then the duration of postpartum 
infecundability would have been extended, and the inhibiting effect of this determinant 
would have been increased.  The overall effect would be an even lower TFR than South 
Korea currently possesses, which is one of the very lowest in the world.  Had the above 
actually occurred, it is likely that South Korea‘s TFR today would be less than 1.0. 
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On the other hand, had fewer women employed effective methods of 
contraception or elected to have an induced abortion, the inhibiting effects of these 
indices would have decreased, either slowing down the overall decline in the TFR or 
even resulting in an increased fertility rate.  Examining the potential effects of these 
changes on the fertility rate of the population has very intriguing implications, which 
will be explored in the next chapter.          
For the United States, the percent change in the TFR between 1967 and the 2000s 
was much less substantial than that experienced by South Korea, decreasing just 27 
percent.  And unlike the situation in South Korea, the majority of the effects of the 
changes in the proximate determinants worked mainly in the same direction, with the 
indices of marriage, induced abortion, and postpartum infecundability decreasing by 24 
percent, 5 percent, and 3 percent respectively, representing an increase in the inhibiting 
effect of all three.  The index of contraception increased slightly by 4 percent.  Because 
three of the four indices changed in the same direction—increasing their inhibiting effect 
on fertility—it is unlikely that a change to the direction any individual determinant 
would have had a significant effect on the overall fertility level.  However, if one 
determinant were to have such an effect, it would most likely be the index of marriage.  
In other words, if women had continued to marry at their 1967 rate, or if a higher 
proportion of women had either married or stayed married (i.e. fewer divorces), then the 
index of marriage would have remained higher, while the inhibiting effect of marriage 
would have been less than it was reported to be for the period around 2000.  Overall, this 
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would have slowed down the already-gradual decline in U.S. fertility between 1967 and 
the 2000s.   
 
Testing the Hypotheses 
In Chapter III, a number of hypotheses were proposed according to expected 
relationships between the proximate determinants of fertility and the total fertility rates 
in South Korea and the United States.  It is now possible to take the results presented in 
this chapter and determine whether or not the hypotheses were supported: 
 Generally speaking, I hypothesized that the proximate determinants model of 
fertility would not explain over 90 percent of the variation in the total fertility rates of 
two below-replacement nations, as it did when applied to a combination of primarily 
developing nations and historical populations in Bongaarts‘ original study.  While there 
was no method available to identify the specific proportion of variance explained for 
each country, the differences between the estimated and observed TFRs from my 
analyses were much more significant than the differences produced in Bongaarts‘ study.  
Furthermore, the presence of contradictory or inconsistent results between the case 
studies and the quantitative analysis shown above suggest that the proximate 
determinants did not perform as robustly in a low-fertility application as they did in 
Bongaarts‘ original analysis, leading me to believe that this hypothesis was supported by 
the data. 
 Additionally, I identified a series of specific hypotheses: 
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1. The effect of the marriage determinant among Korea women and U.S. women 
will be weaker in the 2000s than it was in the 1970s.  If the index of marriage 
continued to be a strong determinant of fertility, we would expect to see 
continuity between the trends identified in the case studies and the calculated 
indices.  Though this held true for the United States, the opposite was found 
for South Korea, where trends suggesting declines in marriage were 
identified in the case study, but the determinant reflected a greater 
contribution of the proportion married to the total fertility rate.  This suggests 
that the relationship between the determinant and the fertility level has 
weakened, providing support for this hypothesis.        
2. The effect of the contraception determinant among Korea women and U.S. 
women will be weaker in the 2000s than it was in the 1970s. If the index of 
contraception continued to be a strong determinant of fertility, we would 
again expect to see continuity between the trends identified in the case 
studies and the calculated indices.  Generally speaking, I found continuity. In 
South Korea, where the usage rate increased substantially between the 1970s 
and the 2000s, the inhibiting effect of contraception increased significantly.  
Meanwhile, in the United States, where the usage rate increased only slightly, 
the inhibiting effect of contraception remained virtually the same.  This 
suggests that the relationship between the contraception determinant and 
fertility has not weakened, and that this hypothesis was not supported.        
 190 
3. The effect of the postpartum infecundability determinant among Korea 
women and U.S. women will not be significantly different in the 2000s than it 
was in the 1970s.  To determine that the effect of the index of postpartum 
infecundability has not changed significantly between the 1970s and the 
2000s would require the demonstration of fairly constant trends identified in 
the case studies as well as minimal change between the indices.  While this 
might be the case for the United States, where the overall balance of changes 
in breastfeeding initiation and average duration did not appear to have made a 
substantial difference in the period of postpartum amenorrhea, the same 
cannot be said among Korean women.  In South Korea, there has been a 
sharp decline in the proportion of women who report breastfeeding their 
infants since the 1970s; this change is reflected in the index of postpartum 
infecundability, which increased significantly, hence indicating a less 
pronounced inhibiting effect of breastfeeding on the fertility level.  In other 
words, while the effect of this determinant may not be as strong as the others, 
its impact on fertility has certainly changed since the 1970s.  Therefore, this 
hypothesis is not supported.      
4. The effect of the induced abortion determinant among Korea women and U.S. 
women will not be significantly different in the 2000s than it was in the 
1970s.  Once again, the determination that the effect of the index of induced 
abortion has not changed significantly between the 1970s and the 2000s 
would require fairly constant trends identified in the case studies as well as 
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minimal change between the indices.  In both South Korea and the United 
States, a general decline indeed took place in the number of abortions, 
decreasing the inhibiting effect of induced abortions on the fertility level.  
Yet this effect was not reflected in the index of induced abortion for either 
country: for both, the index decreased suggesting a greater inhibiting effect, 
and quite substantially so in South Korea.  Ultimately, it seems there have 
been changes in the effect of the index of induced abortion on fertility, and 
that induced abortion may not be as effective a determinant as it once was.  
This hypothesis has not been supported.           
5. Change in the index of marriage will contribute significantly to change in the 
fertility rate of South Korean women between the 1970s and the 2000s.  
Relative to the other indices for South Korea, the index of marriage did not 
undergo significant change between the 1970s and 2000s.  Thus, this 
hypothesis has not been supported.     
6. Change in the index of contraception will contribute significantly to change 
in the fertility rate of South Korea women between the 1970s and the 2000s. 
Relative to the other indices for South Korea, the index of contraception 
underwent very significant change between the 1970s and 2000s.  Thus, this 
hypothesis has been supported.     
7. Change in the index of abortion will not contribute significantly to change in 
the fertility rate of South Korea women between the 1970s and the 2000s. 
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 Relative to the other indices for South Korea, the index of induced abortion 
underwent the least amount of change between the 1970s and 2000s.  
Therefore, this hypothesis has been supported.     
8. Change in the index of postpartum infecundability will not contribute 
significantly to change in the fertility rate of South Korea women between the 
1970s and the 2000s.  Relative to the other indices for South Korea, the index 
of induced abortion experienced a significant amount of change between the 
1970s and 2000s.  Therefore, this hypothesis has not been supported.     
9. Change in the index of marriage will contribute significantly to change in the 
fertility rate of women in the United States between the 1970s and the 2000s.  
Relative to the other indices for the United States, the index of marriage 
underwent the greatest amount of change between the 1970s and 2000s.  
Therefore, this hypothesis has indeed been supported.     
10. Change in the index of contraception will contribute significantly to change 
in the fertility rate of U. S. women between the 1970s and the 2000s.  
Relative to the other indices for the United States, the index of contraception 
underwent a minimal amount of change between the 1970s and 2000s.  
Consequently, this hypothesis has not been supported.     
11. Change in the index of abortion will contribute significantly to change in the 
fertility rate of women in the United States between the 1970s and the 2000s.  
Relative to the other indices for the United States, the index of induced 
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abortion underwent a minimal amount of change between the 1970s and 
2000s.  Therefore, this hypothesis has not been supported.     
12. Change in the index of postpartum infecundability will not contribute 
significantly to change in the fertility rate of women in the United States 
between the 1970s and the 2000s.  Relative to the other indices for the United 
States, the index of postpartum infecundability experienced the smallest 
degree of change between the 1970s and 2000s.  As a result, this hypothesis 
has been supported.     
The final chapter of my dissertation will discuss the results of these hypotheses 
tests in greater detail, and will especially consider the implications for the proximate 
determinants model in a low fertility context.  It will also examine directions for future 
research.     
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CHAPTER VII 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
In this final chapter of my dissertation, I review and evaluate the basic findings 
presented in earlier chapters. As I have noted previously, the hypotheses proposed and 
tested received mixed levels of support.  Whereas five of the twelve specific hypotheses 
dealing with the specific proximate determinants received some support from the case 
studies and quantitative model, seven did not.  However, it still may be said that my 
research provides evidence that the proximate determinants of fertility paradigm may be 
in need of respecification for the purposes of application in below-replacement fertility 
nations.  This chapter illustrates the why and the how of this conclusion by examining 
the findings in detail.  Then, the implications of these findings will be considered with 
regard to future research, theories, and policies relating to below-replacement fertility.   
Perhaps the most notable findings of my dissertation arise from the 
inconsistencies uncovered between the trends identified in the case studies and the 
results of the quantitative analysis of change to the determinants over time.  
Theoretically speaking, if a case study reveals a trend in one direction—e.g. an increase 
in contraception usage—then the quantitative index representing that determinant should 
reflect the same change.  In cases where this was not the case, it suggests that the 
proximate determinants model may not be as effective a model with respect to the 
conceptualization and measurement of that particular aspect of fertility as it once was.  
Table 19 summarizes the results of both the case studies and quantitative analysis,  
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Table 19. Review and Summary of the Tests of the Proximate Determinants of 
Fertility Model:  Results of Case Studies and Quantitative Analysis in South Korea 
and the United States   
Country 
Proximate 
determinant 
Trend identified in 
case study 
Change to 
index implied 
by case study 
Change in index 
observed from 
1960s/70s  
to 2000s Mismatch? 
South 
Korea 
Marriage 
Women are marrying 
later and at a 
decreased rate. 
Decrease Increase Yes 
Postpartum 
Infecundability 
The duration of 
breastfeeding has 
undergone a sharp 
decline. 
Increase Increase No 
Contraception 
There has been a 
dramatic increase in 
contraceptive utilization. 
Decrease Decrease No 
Induced 
Abortion 
The rate and number of 
induced abortions has 
declined considerably. 
Increase Decrease Yes 
United 
States 
Marriage 
Women are marrying 
later, at a decreased 
rate, and with a higher 
incidence of dissolution. 
Decrease Decrease No 
Postpartum 
Infecundability 
More women are 
initiating 
breastfeeding, with a 
slight increase in the 
percentage doing so 
long enough to have an 
impact on fertility. 
Decrease Decrease  No 
Contraception 
There has been a slight 
increase in contraceptive 
utilization, with a more 
notable increase in the 
usage of modern 
methods versus 
traditional ones. 
Decrease 
Slight increase; 
no significant 
change 
Maybe 
Induced 
Abortion 
The rate and number of 
induced abortions has 
increased considerably 
since the data were 
collected for Bongaarts’ 
analysis, which was 
prior to the 1973 
legalization of abortion. 
Increase Increase No 
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indicating where the various ―mismatches‖ were found to occur.  
The first mismatch dealt with the marriage determinant.  For both South  
Korea and the United States, the data indicate that women began to marry later and at a 
decreased rate between the 1960s/70s and the 2000s.  This should technically have 
decreased the index of marriage, since lower values represent that fewer women are 
married and subsequently exposed to sexual relations and the risk of pregnancy.  While 
this was the case for the United States, the index of marriage was shown to actually have 
increased in South Korea, corresponding to a greater number of women in such 
relationships and an ultimately a lower inhibiting effect on fertility.   
It is particularly puzzling that the model would correctly represent one country 
and not the other; after all, both experienced an increase in the median age at marriage, a 
higher proportion single by age, and a significant rise in the rate of marital dissolution.  
The most significant difference between the two nations with respect to marriage 
behaviors is pre-marital sexual activity; such behavior is normative in the United States 
but non-normative in South Korea.  Thus, it seems logical to try to tie the inability to 
accurately represent changes over time in the proportion married in South Korea with 
this major difference.  That is, is there something about Equation 2, which provides the 
calculation for the index of marriage, which performs more accurately in an environment 
with significant non-marital fertility than in one with primarily marital fertility?  After 
all, in the case of the United States, there is a lower age-specific proportion married than 
in Korea after age 24, but higher age-specific fertility.  By employing Equation 2, where 
the age-specific fertility and marriage rates are multiplied, a higher proportion of births 
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is left attributed to the unmarried, and thus not included in this calculation, than in South 
Korea.  Yet it has already been established that the majority of births in South Korea are 
believed to occur within marriage.  Furthermore, even if the index of marriage moved in 
the appropriate direction for the United States, it does not necessarily follow that the 
index of marriage per se is a good determinant of overall fertility in today‘s day and age.  
After all, the estimated TFR for the 2000s was 20 percent lower than the observed TFR 
for the same time frame.  It seems extremely likely that changes in marriage behaviors in 
the United States would result in the proportion married being a more accurate indicator 
of the Total Marital Fertility Rate rather than the TFR, and most certainly contributing to 
this 20 percent discrepancy.  In other words, the measure of ―marital fertility‖ is likely 
no longer capturing the proportion of all births that it once was, since now a significant 
number of births are occurring outside of marriage, to singles or to cohabiting couples.  
Yet when considering that, even despite this, the data from the case study and 
quantitative analysis supported each other, it suggests that the model is actually working 
inefficiently for both countries.  Regardless, it does not contribute to a possible 
explanation for why.   
Accordingly, the most immediate possible improvement to the proximate 
determinants model would be to attempt the same kind of quantitative analysis portion, 
but with a measure of sexual exposure for all women aged 15 to 44, as opposed to just 
married women—much as Stover (1998) has already suggested.  Unfortunately, accurate 
measures of sexual exposure are not yet commonly collected for most countries.              
The second mismatch was identified for the induced abortion determinant.  In 
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South Korea, though the rate and number of induced abortions underwent a considerable 
decline, this did not result in an increase in the index of induced abortion; instead the 
empirical analysis in South Korea showed a negative association.  The index underwent 
a decrease, implying that more abortions are taking place, and the inhibiting effect on 
fertility has increased.  This was a very surprising result, considering that the 
measurement of this index, as illustrated Equation 4, seemed likely to hold up against 
change.  If the total abortion rate (TA) decreased over time, which it did for both 
countries, this should decrease the denominator of the equation, thus increasing the 
quotient, with the larger index ultimately representing a decreased inhibiting effect of 
induced abortion on fertility.  Because this is not what happened, it suggests that either 
the value for b in the equation, the component representing the number of births averted 
per each abortion, or the relationship between the TFR and the TA have evolved.  In the 
first case, for the index of abortion to increase as it was expected to, the value for b 
would need to decrease.  However, let‘s assume hypothetically that due to contraceptive 
saturation, getting an abortion averts just slightly less than a full birth: perhaps women 
who go through the process of having an abortion are eager to avoid the experience 
again, and are especially careful to use effective methods of contraception in future 
sexual encounters.  If the number of births averted for each abortion is 0.99, then the 
equation for b becomes b = 0.495(1 + u).  In this equation, it is implied that 0.495 births 
are averted in the complete absence of contraception.  Yet there is nothing about 
contraceptive saturation that suggests the rate suggested by Bongaarts and Potter of 0.4 
births averted in the absence of contraception should increase.  As a result, it is entirely 
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possible that a new mathematical relationship between contraceptive prevalence and the 
number of births averted per abortion needs to be revised.   
In the second case, I am suggesting that perhaps the relationship between the 
TFR and the TA has evolved.  That is, perhaps the mathematical relationship identified 
in Equation 4 is different in instances of low fertility.  In fact, it seems circular to mee to 
employ the TFR at all in an equation whose result is ultimately utilized to estimate the 
TFR.  As a result, I would suggest developing an index of induced abortion that is 
entirely independent of the observed total fertility rate; that is, I would argue that we 
need an index that represents the effect of induced abortion on fertility without relying 
on a current measure of fertility.  Whether it is possible to develop such an equation  is a 
subject for future research. 
 Even though the remaining two determinants, postpartum infecundability and 
contraception, did not exhibit contradictory trends between the case studies and 
quantitative analysis, it should not be taken for granted that the proximate determinants 
model is working as it was intended to.  For example, in the case of postpartum 
infecundability, the estimated relationship with the fertility level represented by 
Equation 5 is contingent upon a number of factors.  In order to establish the value of the 
index for a population, Bongaarts and Potter identified the length of the birth interval if 
no breastfeeding or postpartum abstinence were practiced: the 20 month interval consists 
of 1.5 months of minimum postpartum anovulation, 7.5 months of waiting time to 
conception, 2 months to account for spontaneous intrauterine mortality, and 9 months for 
a full-term pregnancy (1983: 86).  If any of these components have changed over the 
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past several decades—that is, if the waiting time to conception is shorter on average, if 
women are typically delivering later or earlier on average, and so forth—then the 
calculation of this index needs to be adjusted.  Consequently, postpartum infecundability 
may still be an effective determinant of the fertility level, but perhaps not as effective; it 
may, indeed, be contributing to the portion of the TFR left unexplained.  Further, more 
biologically-based research could investigate the length of this birth interval for the 
purposes of revising Equation 5. 
 Then, though the changes in the index of contraception closely mirrored 
contraception as represented in  the case studies, one could still well question the 
accuracy of its representation of contraception effectiveness in the United States.  That 
is, whereas the overall usage of contraception only increased minimally from 0.72 in 
1967 to 0.729 in the 2000s, the usage of modern—i.e. more effective—methods 
increased 42.1 percent, from 48.2 percent in 1973 to 68.5 percent in 2002.  
Theoretically, this increase in the utilization of more effective methods should translate 
into less contraceptive failure and, accordingly, an increase in the inhibiting effect on 
fertility.  That is, the index of contraception should have undergone at least a slight 
decrease, as opposed to the negligible increase it experienced.  The fact that a 42.1 
percent increase in the usage of modern methods does not resonate in a more than 
negligible increase in the index of contraception suggests that this is another area that 
may be contributing to the unexplained portion of the observed TFR.   
An additional component that should be addressed is the value of 1.08 in the 
calculation of the index (see Equation 3).  This value is an adjustment that represents the 
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fact that women who know or believe that they are sterile do not use contraception, 
causing the practice of contraception to become concentrated among nonsterile couples.  
Essentially, u is inflated by this sterility correction factor to take into account this 
concentration of contraception (Bongaarts and Potter 1983).  This constant was 
estimated directly from data from 30 years ago on the proportion of women in a number 
of countries who believed that they were nonsterile.  Today, the number may be lower 
due to the higher prevalence of surgical sterility and sterility resulting from sexually 
transmitted infections and/or HIV/AIDS.  In either case, this too needs to be reevaluated 
with more recent data.     
Furthermore, even though the index of induced abortion appeared to accurately 
portray the case of the United States, this may not actually be the case.  The number of 
abortions in the United States has undergone a considerable overall decline since the 
1970s.  However, Bongaarts‘ calculations were based on 1967 data, which was over five 
years prior to the legalization of abortion in the United States in Roe v Wade in 1973.  As 
a result, baring the presence of illegally obtained abortions, the index value of 0.999 
seems relatively reasonable at first.  If we were to examine a value for this index shortly 
after 1973, it would certainly be much lower than the values in both 1967 and 2006, 
meaning that the trend between this period and the 2000s seems to be accurately 
represented.  Yet when the value of the 1967 index of abortion of 0.999 is considered 
side-by-side with the total induced abortion rate (i.e. the number of induced abortions 
per woman at the end of the reproductive period if induced abortion rates remain at 
prevailing levels throughout the reproductive period) of 1.08, it seems slightly suspect; 
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how could the inhibiting effect of induced abortion on fertility be so minimal, when the 
hypothetical number of abortions each woman could expect by the end of her 
reproductive period based on current levels is greater than 1?   
For this reason, I decided to re-calculate the index of induced abortion according 
to Equation 4 with the data supplied by Bongaarts and Potter (1983) (see Table 18).  By 
substituting the 1967 values for the TFR, u, and TA into the equation, I was very 
surprised to produce a value of 0.759 for the index of induced abortion, as opposed to 
the 0.999 indicated by Bongaarts and Potter.  Such a discrepancy could well mean a 
number of things; for instance, Bongaarts and Potter may be operating under certain 
assumptions that they did not elucidate.  Perhaps based on the legal status of abortion in 
1967, they deemed it unnecessary to account for illegally obtained abortions in the final 
index, even though they may have been included in the total induced abortion rate.  
Regardless of the reason, if this alternate value for the index of abortion was inserted 
into the model, the trend for the United States would still typically follow that identified 
by the case study, offering no additional insight into its limited effectiveness in South 
Korea.           
Ultimately, the proximate determinants model does not offer a clean picture of 
the fertility level in either South Korea or the United States.  However, that is not to say 
that it offers no insights into fertility, or that it is no longer a useful tool.  On the 
contrary, the proximate determinants model holds considerable potential for the analysis 
of low fertility countries, provided that the kinds of limitations encountered in this 
dissertation can be addressed.  These limitations are considered in the next section. 
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Limitations and Future Research 
It would not be fair to critique an application of the proximate determinants 
model without identifying the limitations personally acknowledged by Bongaarts and 
Potter.  After all, as Knodel and his colleagues point out in their treatment of the model, 
several of the calculations employed ―require that a variety of assumptions be made in 
order to convert the observed data into measures‖ (1987: 96).  Bongaarts and Potter have 
identified a list of assumptions which may, when combined, account for the degree of 
variance left unexplained by the proximate determinants, including the following:  
(1) Errors in the measurement of the proximate determinants; 
(2) Errors in the specification of the model; 
(3) Deviations from the total fecundity level (TF) of 15.3.  Bongaarts and Potter 
explain that ―the TF is a function of the three proximate determinants not 
explicitly included in the model (i.e., natural fecundability, intrauterine mortality, 
and the prevalence of permanent sterility).  As a consequence, the assumption 
that TF = 15.3 is only an approximation‖ that reflects the ―normal‖ range of TF 
of from 13 to 17 births per woman; and  
(4) Errors in the observed TFRs (1983: 92).  
Yet even in consideration of these limitations and others, Knodel and his colleagues 
emphasized that ―rough estimates are possible,‖ provided that the assumptions above are 
reasonable (1987: 96).   
 In addition to these limitations built into the proximate determinants model, my 
research included a number of limitations of its own, generally having to do with data 
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availability.  For example, of the data I was able to compile for the two countries in my 
investigation, there is a significant limitation in that not all the data could be collected 
for the same year.  Considering that slight changes in the components of each 
quantitative index can translate into significant differences in the resulting estimated 
TFR, this could well have had an effect on the overall empirical legitimacy of the model; 
it is possible that the estimated TFR is either too high or too low.  Similarly, the data 
used to calculate each index came from a wide variety of secondary sources, which 
introduces an array of possible uncertainties ranging from differences in methods of data 
collection, to a lack of fit between the concepts measured in the original studies from 
which I drew data and the concepts serving as the focus of my investigation.   
Additionally, insofar as limitations regarding the usefulness of case studies may 
be concerned, it must be considered that in many ways, the experiences of the United 
States with regards to fertility levels have differed substantially from those of South 
Korea, as well as virtually all of its developed, post-industrialized peers.  Yet it is of 
great importance to note that the United States is a very heterogeneous country in terms 
of race, ethnicity, religious affiliation, educational attainment, and more.  Lesthaeghe 
and Neidert have insisted that there is ―even more variation within [U.S.] borders than 
within the EU-25‖ and that the experiences of ethnic minorities—especially the Hispanic 
population, believed by Lesthaeghe and Neidert to be still in the process of completing 
the first demographic transition—―statistically distort the picture for most of the other 
segments of the population‖ (2006: 671-672).  Specifically, they explain: 
That the American total fertility rate is close to 2.0 is the result of the following 
circumstances.  Although non-Hispanic white fertility dropped below 
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replacement, it stayed in the vicinity of 1.8, and that was high enough for the 
contribution of the Black and especially of the Hispanic population, which 
together form about a quarter of the U.S. population, to raise the TFR of the 
United States as a whole to replacement level… Hence, the ethnic factor is 
important in maintaining the overall American TFR around replacement level.  In 
effect… immigration and higher immigrant fertility compensate for sub-
replacement fertility of much of the native population (2006: 693-694).   
 
In this context, it makes sense that a fertility model that accounts for the total fertility 
rate via numbers representing the behaviors of the entire population would be less 
effective in a racially and ethnically diverse population.   
Even these issues exist within the context of data limitations.  Initially, the two 
case studies were intended to set the stage for a much broader macro-level investigation 
that would have essentially reproduced the 1982 Bongaarts study of developing, 
developed, and historical populations with exclusively below-replacement fertility 
nations.  This entailed obtaining data for all the components necessary to calculate each 
quantitative index for as many below-replacement fertility nations as possible.  Finding 
these measures for the 74 countries I had identified as having average 2006 to 2008 
TFRs below 2.1 proved to be an insurmountable challenge.  Most notably, the average 
duration of breastfeeding was discovered to be rarely available for developed nations, 
preventing the calculation of the index of postpartum infecundability.  For contraceptive 
prevalence, whereas data referring to 1985 or later are available for 170 of the over 190 
countries in the world, only 109 countries have data for as recently as the year 2000, 
representing 85.8 percent of women of reproductive age in a marriage or consensual 
union (United Nations Population Division 2008); of these, only 41 are below-
replacement fertility nations with contraceptive prevalence data only for the majority of 
 206 
contraception types, placing another significant limitation on the possible coverage of a 
macro-level analysis of this type.  Additionally, data were only available for 51 countries 
for the index of marriage and for 36 countries for the index of abortion.   
Had I been able to run the proximate determinants model with a sufficient 
number of below-replacement fertility nations, I still may have been prevented from 
accomplishing the greater intent of this dissertation: respecifying the model in an attempt 
to explain over 90 percent of the variation in below-replacement fertility.  To accomplish 
this would have necessitated identifying more accurate measures of the determinants, 
and then gathering the appropriate data and testing the model on as many countries as 
possible.  For example, instead of limiting the model to married women as was done in 
Bongaarts‘ original analysis, the results of my investigation suggested that extending the 
model to all women of reproductive ages would likely explain a greater proportion of 
variation in fertility.  However, in many countries—even among developed nations—
much of the data relating to reproductive health and pregnancy are still collected for 
married women only.    
 Subsequently, for a modern, macro-level analysis of below replacement nations 
in the style of Bongaarts‘ original investigation to have been conducted, there needs to 
be a widespread international effort to encourage nations—and especially developed 
nations—to collect more comprehensive fertility data for all women.  The knowledge 
that stands to be gained from such an endeavor is well worth the likely cost.  As Morgan 
and Taylor point out, the fertility-related concerns ―facing Greece, Italy, and Spain are 
very different from those facing France and Australia.  For the latter two countries, 
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moderate levels of immigration could offset sub-replacement fertility, producing 
population stability.  For Greece, Italy, and Spain, only massive immigration could 
offset their very low fertility‖ (2006: 377).  What their point highlights is the fact that 
differences among low TFRs are important: even little differences can have a striking 
influence on the shape of a country‘s future.  Accordingly, it is critical to develop an 
effective model of below-replacement fertility.   When it is considered that many of 
these nations already have fertility surveys of a national scale in place, it becomes a 
matter of simply ensuring that the ―right‖ questions are asked to make the reproduction 
and respecification of this model a possibility.    
 
Implications for Public Policy 
In 2003, S. Philip Morgan asserted that low fertility is not a twenty-first century 
crisis—at least, not yet.  Instead, he described it as: 
…a genuine problem, but the kind of problem we want to have.  That is, it is the 
result of solving a bigger, more threatening social problem: the crisis of 
continued population growth.  Low fertility is also a problem that can be 
addressed through public policy and institutional adjustments.  Finally, low 
fertility is a problem that befalls developed countries that, by and large, have the 
resources to respond (600). 
 
What is particularly notable about his declaration is the belief that ―public policy and 
institutional adjustments‖ are capable of addressing this problem—especially because he 
makes no specific mention of pro-natalist policies.  After all, research suggests that even 
―abrupt and sustained‖ increases in fertility rates won‘t affect the supply of workers for at 
least fifteen years and would not factor into an altered ratio of the working age population to 
the elderly for at least fifty years, so other considerations and/or solutions are absolutely 
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necessary in the meanwhile (Bermingham 2001: 359).  This suggests that countries will 
need to be more creative than simply asking women to have more babies for some kind 
of reward.  Instead, it would be beneficial for countries to concentrate on a combination 
of immigration policies and economic restructuring in anticipation of what very well 
may occur.  After all, there is much to be said for the benefits of smaller populations, at 
least in certain parts of the world.  When the widespread lack of success met by most 
pro-natalist policies is taken into consideration, it would seem to be worthwhile for 
countries to identify what would be the smallest functional population in their particular 
circumstances (Bouvier 2001), and what kinds of changes would be necessary to make 
that population sustainable.   
One such change might include addressing a significant fear related to declining 
fertility, introduced in Chapter II: the shrinking working-age population and the resulting 
lack of support for the older, retired populations.  One promising solution to this 
problem is to tap what Coleman calls the ―hidden labor supply‖ (1992: 435), that is, the 
economically inactive, including many women (especially married women), teenagers, 
and the healthy elderly.  After all, high unemployment rates suggest that there is, in fact, 
a ready and waiting supply of people.  Certain historical evidence, on the other hand, 
does not bode well for this plan.  Japan is the best example of a country that attempted to 
supplement its labor population with females, the elderly, and rural workers rather than 
resort to employing immigrants.  While Japan‘s efforts were initially regarded as 
successful, by the end of the 1980s the nation was still faced with a severe domestic 
 209 
labor shortage and the need to reevaluate its immigration policies (Cornelius et al. 1992: 
439-440).   
Of course, based on its original commitment to using an entirely native 
workforce, Japan might be classified as a unique situation.  The lesson that may be taken 
from Japan‘s experiences is that as shortages in particular sectors are anticipated or 
identified, policies to filter underutilized laborers into these areas should be developed in 
conjunction with other efforts, such as admitting immigrants whenever possible and 
even restructuring the economy.  Anything reminiscent of a solution is going to result 
from a combination of different endeavors, and other countries may find greater degrees 
of success in expanding their labor force by utilizing distinct combinations of economic, 
social, and immigration policies.  Mitra Toossi, an economist at the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, explains that labor force growth in the future can only stem from two causes: 
growth in the labor force participation rates of the different age, sex, racial, and ethnic 
categories, or growth in the actual populations of the different age, sex, racial, and ethnic 
categories (2006: 38).  Insofar as producing the latter effect is concerned, only increases 
in fertility and immigration rates seem to be relevant.  Yet the many means of increasing 
labor force participation speak directly to Coleman‘s hidden labor supply; for example, 
increasing the participation rate of the young, of women, of the older workforce, and of 
the unemployed and underemployed across all social categories.   
Though such a plan is logical—getting more of the people that are already 
available working, thus improving the rate of dependency and decreasing the need to 
rely on imported labor or potentially unsuccessful fertility initiatives—its realization is 
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multidimensional, and an extremely complex undertaking.  For instance, consider how 
this might play out in the United States.  To increase the participation of the older 
workforce, the obvious solution would be raising the retirement age.  The underlying 
problem an aging population faces is an insufficient number of laborers to generate 
enough funds to support the older, non-working population.  Raising the retirement age 
addresses this directly in three ways: 
First, since people will have to work longer before receiving full benefits, they 
will also have to pay taxes longer.  Second, workers will receive full benefits 
later in life and, hence, receive fewer total benefits.  And finally, as the 
retirement age is pushed back, fewer people will reach it, reducing the number of 
people who will ever see benefits at all‖ (Weller 2002: 76-77). 
 
What this does not address is the fact that people are not generally willing and ready to 
work additional years, especially since many individuals already choose to retire before 
the official age.  Furthermore, Weller argues that ―great disparities among different 
demographic groups in the U.S. workforce‖ allow an increase in the retirement age to be 
―most burdensome for those who depend on social security the most‖ (2002: 80, 84).  
That is, groups like African Americans, the poor, blue-collar workers, and workers with 
less education will be ―hit harder‖ by an increase in the retirement age because they have 
shorter life expectancies to begin with.  Some workers may even be forced to retire early 
due to deteriorating health conditions, and will suffer significantly decreased benefits as 
a result (Weller 2002: 81).  Consequently, expanding labor force participation this way 
supposedly benefits all of society, but at the expense of certain disadvantaged groups.   
 If not with the older workforce, would the U.S. have better luck encouraging the 
unemployed to ―pick up the slack‖?  This is problematic on several levels.  For instance, the 
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unemployed are not equally dispersed across the society; particular groups (such as women, 
minorities, and those with lower educational attainment) are far more likely to fall into this 
category.  If they were to enter the work force, many of them would likely end up employed 
in the service or sales sectors.  However, a decreased work force does not only mean 
decreases in those occupations; there will be a need for skilled labor as well, a need to fill 
positions requiring lots of education and training.  Thus, getting the unemployed to work 
may not necessarily supplement the labor force in the necessary places.  If desperate enough, 
this could mean widespread retraining with employers footing the bill.  Yet all of this 
assumes that most of the unemployed are actively seeking jobs.  Many may feel 
disenfranchised, disillusioned, and discouraged.  Others may feel pessimistic about job 
prospects based on the low wages available to them.  Feeling perhaps that no one is working 
to support them, persuading such individuals to work to improve the nation‘s support ratio is 
not likely to resonate.  One possible encouragement could be increasing the minimum wage.  
Results presented in a recent Congressional Research Service report reveal that ―a higher 
minimum wage may raise [low-wage workers‘] incomes and it may encourage greater labor 
force participation among members of low-income families‖ (Low-Wage Workers 2007: 
73).  In fact, the report goes on to state that an estimated 21.9 percent of workers in near-
poor families and 32.7 percent of workers in poor families stand to benefit from such an 
increase.  This could certainly aid in abating negative feelings toward the workforce. 
 With regards to increasing the female participation in the labor force, this is an area 
with real potential.  While the U.S. has witnessed a considerable increase in this rate since 
the 1970s, some studies have projected that it has ―already reached its peak‖ (Toossi 2006: 
 212 
39).  A likely strategy for continuing to encourage women to enter or reenter the labor 
force would involve the development of policies designed to ease the burden of balancing 
a family and a career; these would involve affordable daycare, extra personal days to care 
for sick children or aging parents, maternity and paternity leave, and so forth.  While such 
policies would certainly increase the labor force participation rate of women, the obstacle 
here is money.  Without the means to subsidize daycare costs or without corporations 
willing to make allowances for parents, these policies simply are not possible.  Another 
less likely tactic is to develop policies aimed at reducing the gender gap in wages.  This is 
complicated based on the fact that a primary reason women still earn so much less than 
men is because of sex segregation in the labor market, or women being ―funneled into 
‗female jobs‘‖ (Verdugo 2006: 563).  This type of work, also referred to as ―pink-collar 
jobs,‖ has considerably lower levels of pay and prestige.  Yet halting such practices, as 
Verdugo recommends, would entail major structural changes to society, the sorts of 
changes that would probably take a very long time.  By that point, any problems due to a 
labor shortage or support ratio imbalance may well have already manifested themselves 
and possibly have been addressed in different ways.   
Other Western countries might likewise face the difficulties I have outlined or 
hypothesized for the U.S.  Conversely, they may not be due to their unique political or 
socio-cultural context.  Ultimately, it remains to be seen if there is a way to successfully 
restructure the economy and society of a nation so that more of the potential workers it 
already has are employed, or to eliminate the need for some workers in certain industries 
so they can be filtered elsewhere.  If it is possible, a declining population may not be the 
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dramatic problem it is made out to be.  However, based on the complexities described 
above, this appears to be much easier said than done.  
Ultimately, Morgan and Taylor remind us that ―both the current prevalence of low 
fertility and its persistence are unprecedented‖ (2006: 377).  This means that to address 
this issue will require considerable time and effort on the part of politicians, government 
officials, and everyday individuals.  Comprehensive research in the area of low fertility 
can aid in the process of adjustment by providing additional information with which 
nations can determine how best to adapt to their new demographic reality.  Thus, while 
many societies of the world certainly face a major challenge on their horizons, they do 
not face this challenge without tools to aid them, and they do not face it alone.  If history 
is any example, societies will adapt to their below-replacement fertility future and—in 
some form or another—they will go on. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Contraceptive Effectiveness Rates (Percentage of Women Not Experiencing an 
Unintended Pregnancy During the First Year of Use) According to Use 
Effectiveness.  
Method Use Effectiveness 
Calendar Rhythm 0.75 
Combined Pill & Mini-pill 0.92 
Injectables 0.97 
     Depo-Provera 0.97 
     Lunelle 0.97 
Intrauterine Device (IUD) 0.9955 
     ParaGard 0.992 
     Mirena 0.999 
Male Condom 0.85 
Sterilization (Female) 0.995 
Sterilization (Male) 0.9985 
Withdrawal 0.73 
*Use effectiveness derived from measure for all fertility awareness  
methods, which also includes the ―ovulation method‖ and ―standard  
days.‖ 
        Data adapted from Trussell 2004 and 2007.    
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